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Ranjita Mohanty, Lisa Thompson 
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1. Introduction 
Democracy is considered the common ‘currency’ of state and 
civil society interaction in middle-economic-power states 
such as India, Brazil and South Africa. In fact the IBSA (India, 
Brazil, South Africa) link, as it is understood in international 
relations, is premised upon certain political and economic 
similarities between these three states in the South, not least 
their democratic political foundations.1  In this paper we 
are looking at the IBSA states from a citizen-centric point of 
view, embarking upon a comparative analysis of how states 
deal with citizens’ demands from within. Given the broad 
2Introduction
similarities of democratic political structures, the emerging economies 
that make the three states middle-income and the persistent socio-
economic inequalities in these countries, such an analysis of society-state 
relationships in the IBSA countries will have value for understanding 
how democracies can be deepened in order to make states responsive 
to citizens’ demands.
This paper consolidates and synthesises the insights from an 
international research project that has investigated citizen participation 
and the deepening of democratic processes in the southern countries, 
including the IBSA countries.2 The aim of this synthesis paper is to revisit 
the research findings from this project to explore the interaction between 
mobilisation and the state as they continue to respond, influence and 
reconstitute each other in the three formal democracies under study in 
India, Brazil and South Africa.3 In drawing attention to this feature we 
expect to shed light on the trajectories and mechanisms of state-society 
engagement that may strengthen democracy (or democracies) in order 
to make it more capable of overcoming the historic inequalities that are 
so pronounced in these three states.
The central question the paper addresses is: In what circumstances is 
citizen mobilisation for claiming rights and entitlements addressed, responded 
to and dealt with by the three different types of democratic states in ways that 
deepen democracy? The question we pose above is located within the 
comparative frame of three democratic states that are comparable in 
terms of their history, their institutions, their processes and cultures, 
and their socio-economic settings.4  We draw a distinction between the 
‘political’ and bureaucratic faces of the state and show how different faces 
of the state influence forms, strategies and outcomes of engagement. 
In pursuing the above, this paper focuses on an underexplored 
political feature – the modes of interaction between the state and civil society – 
that is different in each of these three democracies. ‘Modes of interaction’ 
in this paper refer to interactions between forms of societal mobilisation 
and state action. We are treating modes of interaction as an independent 
variable, the democratic potentials and outcomes of which are what we 
will explore in greater detail in the paper. In adopting a political process 
approach, we expect to shed new light over a series of interrogations 
concerning how, to what extent and in which directions democracy is 
becoming more inclusive; put another way, we examine the extent to 
which democratic practices are contributing to reducing the gap between 
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the formal equality guaranteed by representative democracy and the 
extremely pronounced socio-economic inequalities present in the three 
states under scrutiny. 
We examine modes of interaction from a perspective that 
emphasises both historical processes and selected contemporary cases 
of mobilisation/state interaction, though the aim of this paper is not 
to compare either cases or contexts. Accordingly, we link the concept 
to the range of literature on Political Opportunity Structures (POS), 
where these are conceptualised both as moments of engagement and as 
conditioned by institutions and historical conditions that enable certain 
types of action and activism over other types and forms. We refer also 
to the social opportunity structures that are required in order to take 
advantage of political opportunity structures. 
To anchor the analysis in each IBSA state’s context we examine the 
broad trajectories of social mobilisation in each state and six specific 
cases of modes of interaction from the three states. The cases do not 
always tie in neatly with broader trends, showing both the observable 
trends and the variable nature of modes of interaction. It is important 
to emphasise that the paper does not attempt to argue that there are 
homogenous patterns or trends either between (or even within each of) 
the states discussed; but there are certain broad patterns of engagement 
between different types of social actors and the state in the three 
countries that emerge from certain similarities in the ways the states 
deal with their citizens. For example, one finding was that mobilisations 
are often concerned with issues of recognition of excluded identities 
such as poor, indigenous and women, and with the redistribution of 
state resources to such people. Another was that all three states have 
shown willingness to engage with the social actors pursuing more 
‘participatory/collaborative’ engagements with them than with those 
adopting the ‘critique/protest’ approach.
The cases analysed are less about social transformation than about 
resource allocation, and the socio-economic rights of particular groups 
mobilising on the basis of shared identities. However, in the struggles for 
rights, one of the possible outcomes of modes of interaction is ‘footprints’ 
of democratic engagement; that is, besides small gains in resource 
distribution – and, at times, big gains in policy change – the interface 
between mobilisation and state can be critical for making democracy 
work for the poor. This point is consistent with much of the critical 
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thinking on state-societal interaction in the global South, as is emphasised 
by Kothari and others (Kothari, 2005; Thompson & Tapscott, 2010).
In the next section we critically review literatures that suggest 
that the problems of democracy can be addressed exclusively by the 
state or by civil society. In our view, democracy should be understood 
as constitutive both of actors and of their actions, as neither can be 
understood in isolation from the political and social opportunities 
which condition interactions. Section 3 presents a historical overview 
of the political trajectories of democratisation in the three countries. 
In section 4 we explore six cases of mobilisation that are less about 
social transformation than about resource allocation, and the socio-
economic rights of particular groups that mobilise on the basis of shared 
identities. In section 5 we systematically compare the political and social 
opportunities (as well as the mechanisms of engagement) that make 
up the modes of interaction described in the earlier sections. And in 
section 6, after exploring how citizen mobilisation for claiming rights 
and entitlements is addressed, responded and dealt with by the three 
‘emerging’ democratic states, we present the outcomes from different 
modes of interaction. In conclusion, section 7 sums up the lessons learned 
about building inclusive democracies in IBSA countries.
2. Theoretical frame(s) for understanding ‘modes of 
interaction’
By the end of the 20th century there was overwhelming evidence that 
the mere implementation of democratic policies and democratically 
constructed institutions is not enough to overcome the historic challenges 
that bedevil the South, such as poverty, social inequality and economic 
underdevelopment. In addressing this evidence, some authors have dug 
into the ‘black box’ of the state, hoping to find the roots of democracy’s 
inefficiency in overcoming these challenges in the malfunctioning of 
state bureaucracies, or in the inadequacy of their institutional designs 
(Skocpol, 1985; Ostrom, 1990). Other observers have chosen to blame 
capitalism and the unequal opportunities available to the poorest 
countries in the newly globalised division of labour (Amin, 1976). A 
third group has moved in yet another direction, finding the origins 
of democracy’s imperfections in civil society’s lack of organisation or 
absence of ‘democratic culture’ (Putnam, 1993). These approaches have 
in common the shared belief that democracy can be strengthened from 
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a single one of the following entry points: the state, the market or civil 
society.
In contrast with these three familiar approaches, we argue that the 
results of inclusive democracy depend mainly on transformations in the 
dynamics and structures of interaction between state and society actors 
that occur through mobilisation and state interaction – for example, 
new alliances between state and society and new participatory spaces. 
From this angle we still acknowledge the importance of state and civil 
society actors in making democracy happen; but we believe that these 
factors should be taken into account together, through a model that 
highlights the specificity of the interactions in question. As so many 
critical theorists writing in the South have concluded, participation in 
democratic institutions does not necessarily yield democratic outcomes. 
Contestation (sometimes illegal, and even conflictual) may result in 
more responsive state action than so-called democratic ‘invited’ spaces. 
Yet not all forms of contestation are necessarily supportive of broader 
rights claims on the part of impoverished or resource-denied groups. 
Broadly speaking, then, we can take neither the democratic design of 
state institutions nor the civility (or lack of it) of societal mobilisations 
as an indication that democratic modes of interaction are taking place 
(see for example the wide range of discussion on spaces of participation 
and mobilisation in the Zed volumes edited by Cornwall and Coelho, 
2007; Thompson and Tapscott, 2010a; and Coelho and Von Lieres, 2010 
(forthcoming)). Modes of interaction are contextual and complex – 
framing institutional and societal histories and locating the actors, the 
POS and social opportunity structures enable us to examine exactly 
what dynamics are taking place at any given time, as well as the short-, 
medium- and long-term implications of such interactions; bearing in 
mind that successes might not be linear, and that the boundaries between 
state and society are porous, with constant movement and mediation 
occurring between the constitutive actors.
Hence, looked at from the perspective of the resource-deprived, the 
critical issue is not a choice between state patronage or empowerment, 
but both; not fear or aspiration for closeness, but both; and not desiring 
a provider of services (welfare state) or an enabler of empowerment, 
but both. Mobilisation and state interaction illustrate how these two 
paradoxical trends – taking place simultaneously, and with reference 
to each other – shape state-society relationships in the three countries. 
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In this sense, neither civil society nor the state are isolated entities 
capable of promoting democracy on their own; actors from both fields 
are constantly engaging with each other, thus shaping and reshaping 
the society-state relationship.
In defining political opportunity structures we borrow from Tarrow 
(1994), Gaventa and McGee (2009), and Thompson and Tapscott (2010). 
As these authors have shown, political opportunity structures are 
particular political environments in which social and state actors define 
their struggle; yet political structures are not structures given from 
‘above’, to which social actors merely respond. Rather, such political 
opportunity structures are themselves conditioned by – and therefore, 
are a result of – historical processes (including struggles) that shape the 
behaviour of social and state actors. Hence, what may appear as a ‘given’ 
political opportunity structure at a particular instant may have evolved 
over time through historical struggles. As such, political opportunity 
structures refer to what political mechanisms are available (for example, 
constitutions, policies, institutions, legislation) as well as historical 
opportunities, or moments at which political coalitions are challenged – 
before and after elections, or around international events such as summits 
on the environment that have helped to strengthen the environmental 
movement in all three contexts. These conditions, which can be created 
both by the state and by civil society, not only constrain the activities of 
some actors but also stimulate and strengthen the activities of others (see 
for example Alonso et al, in Thompson and Tapscott, 2010a). 
Likewise, social opportunity structures are those enabling or 
constraining conditions for mobilisation which are socially located, such 
as social inequalities, cultural features, the nature of associational life 
and the history of mobilisation in the region (Thompson and Tapscott, 
2010). In this sense, from society’s point of view, aspects such as religious 
disputes or historic exclusion of certain groups may work as bonds or 
impediments, determining the capacity of these groups to form networks 
of solidarity that are fundamental for their mobilisation in relation to 
the state.
In adopting a more process-oriented approach, we argue that 
features of representative democracy and social mobilisation are building 
blocks of state-society relations; and we explore how they are conditioned 
over time, by different historical contexts and forms and strategies of 
engagement. We examine how forms of mobilisation and engagement 
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with the state lead to a process of ongoing contestation and mutual re-
constitution. In our view, this process is critical in understanding how 
democracy can be understood as constitutive of actors as well as of their 
actions, and neither can be understood in isolation from the political and 
social opportunities which condition interactions. 
3. The interface between the state and forms of 
mobilisation: The historical context 
There are obvious difficulties in comparing three states with differing 
historical and political trajectories of democratisation and participation. 
India’s democratisation process began in 1950, while Brazil had a 
democratic ‘window’ between 1946 and 1964 and then again from 1984. 
South Africa’s democratisation is but 16 years old, beginning officially in 
1994 with the first non-racial democratic elections. The three countries 
are different in terms of their ‘age’ of democracy, South Africa being the 
newest or youngest of the three, and therefore the respective societies 
and polities have gone through stages (Brazil with an intervening period 
of military rule) of state formation and democracy. The nature of the 
ruling coalitions is also very different in each case, perhaps reflecting 
the specific historical trajectories of these states.
The international or global contexts in which democracy was 
established in each country are also different. India became a democratic 
state at a time long before globalisation, in the cold war era, when the 
nation-state was still the sovereign authority in deciding the issues 
pertaining to development and economic growth. Brazil’s second phase 
of democracy coincided with what is called ‘the triumph of democracy’, 
with the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of communism and 
beginnings of the free market. South African democracy is very much 
part of the post-cold war, ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA) phase of global 
history: democracy is established as the desirable political system, 
and globalisation and the free market influence the economic settings 
and internal governance of the country. We can see the signs of India 
transforming into a neo-liberal state, and the corresponding changes 
in mobilisation as Indians grapple with new issues. The Brazilian 
democracy was born at the start of neo-liberalism and struggled to 
balance the liberalisation of the economy with the maintenance of welfare 
policies; and South African democracy was born squarely in the neo-
liberal period. At the time of writing the three countries have broadly 
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similar contexts, in which the state in each case must manage the socio-
economic development and interests of the poor and at the same time 
respond to the global contexts of economic growth.
The three countries have shown strong political mobilisation, which 
has led to the end of colonisation (and in the case of South Africa, the end 
of apartheid) and the formation of democratic states. But their trajectories 
have differed afterwards. What follows is a snapshot of aspects of the 
modes of interaction that are important to our analysis.
3.1 India
The democratic state that was formed after freedom from colonial rule 
was expected to remain an independent and autonomous actor that 
would reform society, create opportunities for the poor and promote 
growth, but would remain above the diversity, complexities and 
divisiveness of Indian society. But as the subsequent years revealed, 
the state could not remain an independent actor. The socio-economic 
transformation agenda was subverted by the same forces against which 
it was planned. The landed elite, the industrial class and the higher 
castes – historically placed in a dominant position – applied pressure to 
the state to mould the democratic polity and appropriate developmental 
benefits, thereby undermining the purpose of democratic institutions 
and a developmental agenda (Kothari,2005; Bardhan, 1984, 1988; Kohli, 
1987, 1988; Dhanagre, 1987). However, there were no major stirrings in 
the social sphere for almost two decades after independence, due to what 
is elusively called the phase of ‘nation building’. Since the state assumed 
the role of provider, protector and regulator there was a consensual 
expectation on the state to deliver. The general belief among the people 
was that the state was responsible for framing the best way to govern 
its citizens. But in the 1960s it became increasingly clear that the state 
had not been able to live up to its democratic promises.
The 1970s marked the emergence of social movements in India. 
The Naxalite movement in West Bengal mobilised poor peasantry to 
demand land reforms; the Chipko movement in Uttaranchal mobilised 
women to protect the forests against commercial encroachment; and 
Sampoor Kranti (‘total revolution’) mobilised students to critique the 
very foundation of governance, which had turned in favour of the ruling 
elites (Tandon and Mohanty, 2002). How the state responded to these 
movements is significant. It crushed the peasant movement with brute 
force; student movements were dealt with by putting the leaders in jail. 
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Only the Chipko movement emerged as successful, for two reasons: 
the movement was peaceful and did not make a radical critique of the 
state; but in addition, it coincided with the Stockholm conference on the 
environment – the international context meant that the state was obliged 
to take ecological safeguards. As our case studies in the next section 
will illustrate, the pattern of state response remains the same today. It 
is hostile to contestation, but will tolerate and talk with mobilisations 
that subscribe to state ideology.
The 1970s are also significant because they witnessed one of the 
periodic shifts in the nature of the Indian state; in this case, one which led 
to the redefinition of the relationship between civil society and the state 
in India. The national emergency declared in 1975 by the ruling Congress 
party was in operation for 19 months (June 1975 to March 1977), during 
which time the democratic system was undermined. Declared on 25 June 
1975, against a backdrop of social and political agitation, the emergency 
revealed the democratic state’s hidden potential to turn dictatorial. The 
period saw the curtailment of people’s fundamental rights, the power 
of the judiciary, and freedom of the press. Dissident political leaders 
were jailed. The state of emergency and the subsequent restoration of 
democracy not only redefined and extended the boundaries of civil 
society; by redefining the relationship of the citizens with the state, they 
also restructured civil society in a significant way and made it more 
alert to transgressions of its boundary by the state. The most important 
consequence for civil society were the questions raised concerning the 
collapse of state institutions and their inability to protect citizens’ rights. 
Until then, the civil rights movement had remained confined to the 
piecemeal addressing of issues such as the suppression of the Naxals. The 
state of emergency galvanised the movement – democracy, citizenship 
and constitutional protection of fundamental rights became important 
issues for public debate and several organisations promoting these ideals 
were formed in the post-emergency phase. The People’s Union for Civil 
Liberty and the People’s Union for Democratic Rights were two such 
organisations (Tandon and Mohanty, 2002).
The 1980s saw the growth of voluntary development organisations 
(mostly NGOs), which were formed to address issues of rural 
development, ecology, education and health. The organisations occupied 
space both at grassroots and at provincial and national level. Grassroots 
activist groups were supported by urban-based research and advocacy 
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organisations. In the late 1980s the policies of the government, particularly 
at the national level began to treat the ‘voluntary sector’ as a source of 
policy engagement. This is when committees and consultations between 
NGOs and government began. The legitimacy of grassroots knowledge 
for informing policy began during this period (Pant, this volume).
With the advent of globalisation and the liberalisation of the 
economy, a complex interplay between society-state and market began 
in the 1990s. Several critical trends emerged and continue to exist: 
social movements contesting economic growth (particularly in the 
form of industrialisation and special economic zones) have met the 
brute force of the state (Mohanty, 2010); where NGO representation 
is sought in policy matters, collaboration is increasingly facilitated 
through various consultative forums created by the government; and 
local governance institutions are reinvigorated through constitutional 
declarations promoting the participation in democracy of people at the 
grassroots. NGOs are now on the forefront, working with both rural 
communities and state officials in promoting the participation of the 
socio-economically deprived poor in local governance. Thus, at the time 
of writing, two dominant modes of mobilisation are social movements 
that contest the economic growth processes followed by the state under a 
neo-liberal agenda and NGO intermediation to interface between citizens 
and the state in a manner which is less threatening to the state.
3.2 Brazil
The notion of ‘citizenship’ in Brazil has usually been associated with 
adjectives such as ‘conceded’, ‘regulated’ or ‘negative’ (Carvalho, 1997). 
Historically at least, citizenship has been regarded as a ‘favour’ from the 
state to society rather than a genuine ‘right’ of all Brazilians. Brazil was the 
last American country to abolish slavery, in 1888 – yet it did so without 
establishing the minimal conditions for the social integration of freed 
slaves on an equal footing. Black people remained largely marginalised 
from the productive system, forming clusters of poverty in the urban 
peripheries or joining the landless peasant communities. Something 
similar occurred to indigenous peoples, who have traditionally been 
regarded as ‘relatively incapable’ and submitted to a regime of state 
tutorship (Fausto, 1981; Franco, 1969; Ramos, 1997).
The country has changed its political institutions often. In less 
than 200 years of independent history, Brazil has been a monarchy 
(1822–1889), an oligarchic republic (1889–1930), an authoritarian civil 
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state (1930–1945), an autocratic democracy (1945–1962), a parliamentary 
democracy (1962–1964), an authoritarian military state (1964–1985) and 
finally a liberal democracy (fully established in 1988). Such institutional 
fluidity has marked the dynamics of state-society relations across time 
and has certainly affected the full implementation of civil, political and 
social rights. 
Brazil started its late but ‘accelerated march’ (Carvalho, 1997) 
towards modernity only in the 1930s. After four decades of an oligarchic 
republican system (1889–1930), the country adopted a centralised 
and authoritarian political apparatus, which allowed it to implement 
a fast industrialisation process based on import substitution and a 
new immigrant labour force. The state was the central agent of this 
transformation, and the model of state-society articulation revolved 
around the political incorporation of the social actors engaged in the 
productive process – industrial employers and urban workers – within 
a single corporatist structure controlled by the state. In this context, 
access to social rights was extended to urban workers who were legally 
registered in the state-controlled unions. However, civil and political 
rights remained strongly restricted, and rural and undocumented 
workers remained unable to access these rights at all. Between the 1930s 
and the 1950s, state-society relations were characterised by populism and 
paternalism, which to this day are still a notable legacy of the top-down 
approach tendencies of the state towards society (Santos, 1987). 
After a short democratic period (1946–1964), military dictatorship 
was established, in 1964. The following decades were marked by fast 
economic growth and fierce suppression of political opposition. The 
so-called ‘Brazilian Economic Miracle’, based on foreign investment, 
centralised economy and state control over production and salaries, 
stimulated the concentration of wealth, uncontrolled urbanisation and 
an extreme rise in social inequality. 
Ironically, although civil liberties were severely confined during 
the military period, political rights were only partially restricted and 
social rights were even increased. Welfare benefits were expanded to 
include rural workers and other excluded sectors of the population. 
Housing, basic sanitation and several social assistance programmes 
were implemented by federal agencies during the 1970s. Although these 
initiatives represented new forms of state control of the rural areas, 
they also contributed to the establishment of new channels for social 
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mobilisation among the rural population (Arretche, 2002). Another 
distinguishing feature of Brazilian dictatorship was that it maintained 
some political institutions from the previous democratic regime. The 
Federal Congress continued to function and indirect elections for states 
and municipal governments were permitted throughout the military 
years. Of course, those allowances were very limited. But they proved to 
be fundamental during the democratic transition of the late 1970s, when 
the official opposition channelled the growing popular discontentment 
with the military regime (Lamournier, 1988). 
However, in the last 30 years this picture has gradually been 
transformed. Firstly, the end of 21 years of military rule and the 
promulgation of a new democratic constitution in 1988 put important 
institutional changes in place. General elections were re-established, 
amnesty was given to exiled leaders and political parties were liberalised 
in the early 1980s. The new constitution took almost three years to be 
written and received important contributions from diverse sectors of 
civil society, including health movements, indigenous organisations and 
representatives of the black movement. The ‘Citizen Constitution’, as it 
was called, was guided by the principles of institutional decentralisation 
and popular participation. Broad fiscal reform was also initiated, which 
determined that state and municipal governments would receive 
greater shares of tax revenues and would consequently acquire new 
responsibilities in areas such as health, education and security.
Secondly, in addition to decisive macroeconomic reforms that helped 
the country to regain stability and control super-inflation, the social policy 
sector was largely transformed after the inauguration and expansion of 
social policies for poverty reduction, initiatives for popular participation in 
decision-making and the emergence of affirmative action and recognition 
policies. Motivated by the global and national renaissance of ethnic 
identity claims, movements of all sorts proliferated in post-democratised 
Brazil, demanding public recognition for specific marginalised groups 
such as family farmers, indigenous and slave-descendent populations. 
These new movements, although historically associated with movements 
from previous decades, present characteristics that are generally distinct 
from those of the civil organisations of the pre-democratisation period. 
Contemporary movements are mostly locally based, with well-defined, 
popular, grassroots bases and identities; they favour short-term goals 
and pragmatic strategies; they act in multiple arenas of negotiation and 
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their political ties reach national and international networks that go far 
beyond the alliances of the movements of the pre-democratisation era. 
The new guidelines in policy-making are redefining actors, strategies 
and the patterns of interaction between state and society.
3.3 South Africa
South Africa’s social history has been characterised by high levels of 
state authoritarianism and state-societal conflict; from colonial times, 
through to the beginning of fully representative democracy in 1994, until 
now. Ironically, while its Constitution is one of the most democratic in 
the world, and South Africa boasts some of the most democratic and 
progressive rights-based policies and legislation in existence (the free 
basic water and public housing policies being cases in point), state-
societal relations still manifest a large degree of direct contestation and 
conflict, most acutely demonstrated through what have come to be 
known as ‘service delivery’ protests (Thompson and Nleya, 2010).
The development of the South African state from the Union of South 
Africa in 1910 (a political outcome of the Anglo-Boer war of 1898–1902) 
to the official policies of ‘apartheid’ under the National Party in 1948 
can be seen as directly linked to cultural nepotism and racism. Under 
the Union agreement, all non-whites (as they were called –including 
the racial categories ‘coloured’, ‘Indian’ and ‘African’) were considered 
culturally separate from the white nation and were thus systematically 
denied both political and economic rights, including the right to own 
land in ‘white’ areas. The 1913 Land Act consigned African blacks to 
tiny areas of rural land, later to become known as the Bantustans. These 
policies of segregation were intended to stratify South African society 
spatially in order to prevent political and ideological allegiances (Piper, 
Tapscott and Thompson, 2010, this volume). Nonetheless, strong social 
movements opposing the apartheid state arose in the 1960s,1970s and 
1980s. The African National Congress (ANC), a liberation movement 
operating from both within and outside the country, as well as other 
fragments of the liberation struggle such as the Pan African Congress 
(PAC) and South African Communist Party (SACP), formed alliances with 
township-based movements such as the South African National Civics 
Association (SANCO), Black Sash and others. The formation of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) in 1984, and later the Mass Democratic Movement 
(MDM), united the NGOs and social movements in a broad alliance of 
resistance to the increasing repressiveness of the apartheid state.
14
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Post-1994, the nature of social movement activity changed 
dramatically. The liberation struggle movements lost many of their leaders 
to government, and labour-related social movement organisations such 
as the Congress of Trade Unions (COSATU) received greater prominence 
through their involvement in negotiating a new economic strategy for 
South Africa through the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC). While these alliances and the mood of collaboration 
did not last long, the initial phase of absorption into government 
structures served to weaken and disorganise civil society organisations 
(CSOs) and co-opt many NGOs into the new developmental paradigm 
(Ballard et al, 2006). SANCO has continued to function, but perhaps best 
characterises the problems involved in renegotiating a political platform 
and socio-economic position at grassroots level separate from the ANC 
(Zuern, 2006).
While social movements have grown in strength again post-2000, 
the broad-based resistance and coherence of pre-apartheid mass-
action platforms remain a thing of the past. Some social movement 
organisations, notably the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) have 
gained both grassroots, national and transnational prominence, and 
others have seen temporary prominence – the South African Homeless 
Peoples Federation (SAHPF) is a case in point. Broadly speaking, issue-
based social movements have had more success mobilising support than 
movements such as the anti-globalisation campaign. Alliances between 
broader social movements and developmental NGOs remain weak, 
partly because, as Ballard et al (2006) point out, funding to these NGOs 
has taken place through the state-regulated National Development 
Agency (NDA). Substantial contracts for development services have 
also been subcontracted to developmental NGOs through the NDA, 
effectively silencing critical opposition to government policies. Criticism 
of South Africa’s home-grown structural adjustment programme, the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR), was left to 
labour-based social movements such as COSATU, with little impact on 
changing the course of government’s economic policies because of the 
narrow social support base of the organisation – most of SA labour is 
not unionised.
Thus the South African civil society-state relationship remains 
contested by organisations and social movements who claim that the 
South African government ‘talks left and acts right’ (Bond, 2001; Mehta 
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et al, 2010), referring to the dichotomy between pro-poor policies such 
as free basic water combined with a strongly neoliberal macroeconomic 
strategy overall. Yet much of the resistance remains fragmented between 
more organised social movements with narrow support bases (such as 
COSATU) and more broad-based forms of resistance that lack social 
organisation (for example, grassroots movements protesting poor service 
delivery). Social unrest over service delivery is commonplace, but to 
date has not been sufficiently organised into an articulated strategy 
of resistance to specific policies. The state has remained oppressive to 
social opposition in the post-apartheid era, with government responses 
to service delivery protests mimicking the apartheid state’s responses 
to unrest in African ‘townships’ (settlements). The authoritarianism of 
the apartheid state has been replaced with a call to political loyalty and 
political-party allegiance which the ANC has imposed as the ruling 
power since apartheid. Criticism of the state is treated as disloyalty to 
the ANC, with very negative consequences for social contestation.
Looking at the historical trajectories of the three states, we find 
that while India and Brazil have had strong mobilisation since their 
respective democratic states were created, such mobilisation is weak 
in South Africa, where social organisation among the poor is often 
fragmented and episodic. Hence, unlike in India and Brazil, where both 
mobilisation and the state have evolved through their interaction (though 
such interactions are not always successful) and in contemporary times 
we even find alliances between the two in certain cases, this is not the 
case in South Africa, where the state appears to be more closed. In Brazil 
(and, it must be said, over a much longer time period) social movement 
organisations have built up strong forms of networking and collective 
action; thus, formal engagement through SMOs has become the dominant 
form of engagement. In India – much like Brazil, with a history of both 
strong social movements and of the role of NGOs in mediating the 
claims of the poor and discriminated-against – mobilisation takes place 
at many levels, spanning both the grassroots and the national spheres. 
However, India still does not match the scale of Brazil’s participatory 
spaces. In South Africa (where social movement organisations remain, 
by and large, fairly weak and/or disorganised) spontaneous forms of 
social mobilisation and protest – led by small and mobilised political 
movements, such as the housing movement Abahlali baseMjondolo – 
dominate as a form of participation.
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Evidence from case study work undertaken in the three countries 
shows some consistency with the dominant patterns presented above, 
as well as some important differences.
4. Modes of interaction in India, Brazil and South Africa
The historical trajectories discussed above highlight the following: 
despite the fact that all three states offer a number of opportunities for 
civil society to engage in politics, these opportunities do not only differ 
in nature, but social actors seem to use them differently in each country. 
To better understand these specificities we have selected six case studies 
that cover recurrent forms of mobilisation that make claims for both 
redistribution and recognition.
4.1 India
We examine two cases in the Indian context: the first one deals with 
issues of identity of nomadic tribes and their land rights (the claims in 
this case concern identity, recognition and redistribution); and the other 
deals with issues of rehabilitation and resettlement of communities 
whose land has been appropriated for industrial development (here, 
the claims concern redistribution of developmental gains, as well 
as claiming one’s own resources from the state). In both cases, the 
dominant form of social mobilisation is NGO intermediation on issues 
and understandings of development and of how state policies ostensibly 
aimed at developmental progress can negatively affect political rights. 
Marginalised groups themselves are often ‘spoken for’ as a result.
As the traditional lifestyle and livelihood of nomadic communities 
living in Rajasthan (a province in western India) were progressively 
threatened by changes in the economy, the need for such communities 
to claim land titles and alternative living space became a survival need. 
Conflict with other local communities began as soon as the nomads tried 
to settle in any specific geographical area. A recurring point of conflict 
was land rights. Even when the nomads sought to camp in demarcated 
government land near or within villages they came into direct conflict 
with the villagers – often supported by the administrative officials of 
the government themselves – all of whom accepted the stereotypical 
social belief that nomads are criminals and therefore to be kept outside 
the villages. In certain instances the local community reacted violently, 
demolishing the huts of the nomads or engaging the local administration 
to evict them from the village. 
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To make matters worse, the nomads’ invisibility as citizens deprived 
them of developmental benefits from the state (such as housing, 
water, electricity, sanitation, health, entertainment and education), 
marginalising them even further.
The nomads are too poor and disorganised to be able to make 
claims to their rights and entitlements. Muktidhara Sansthan (MDS), a 
local NGO, intervened to address them as a collective and facilitated the 
articulation of their concerns to the state. The right to ownership and 
control of land, the right to a settled life and the right to live with dignity 
were included in a comprehensive demand encompassed by the right 
to life as a fundamental human right. MDS also provided much-needed 
legal aid and direct legal services, provided mobilisation support through 
public hearings, processions, and highlighted issues in the media in 
order to put pressure on the state to act. It also lobbied for the nomads 
by sending them in delegations to present their petitions to government 
officials at the district administration. The local administration acceded 
to granting land rights (in some settlements) and other accompanying 
rights such as ration cards and voters’ identity cards. However, the 
NGO’s intervention was not welcomed by all and created friction, 
particularly when it organised nomads to campaign against the local 
administration (Pant, 2005).
In the other case of land claims in another region – Andhra 
Pradesh in southern India – poor communities affected by large-
scale land acquisition and displacement caused by the public sector 
industry Simhadri Thermal Power Project (STPP) (under the aegis of 
the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC)) were mobilised to 
claim compensation and resettlement from the state. STPP acquired 
prime agricultural land, which meant that farmers lost their livelihood; 
it also affected the livelihood of a number of families who worked as 
agricultural labourers. Loss of grazing land meant loss of livelihood for 
those villagers who maintained livestock such as buffalo, cows, sheep 
and goats. Fish populations were wiped out by effluent discharge, 
which affected the livelihood of fishermen. The acquisition of saltpans 
led to thousands of people from the coastal areas losing their livelihood. 
While resettlement and rehabilitation policies are put in place, claims 
by poor people who lose their agricultural land and habitat to industry 
are often ignored.
Local NGOs have tried to advance the cause of these communities 
in many ways. In Vizag, where STTP is located, Sadhana (a local NGO) 
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has been the frontline organisation in the campaign dealing with the 
STTP/NTPC plant. It has conducted surveys of villages most affected 
by the plant in order to compile data as evidence of the impact on their 
lives, and has recorded their demands and how they would like see them 
met. The findings were shared at local gram sabha as well as panchayat 
meetings and were fed into a people’s development plan.
As part of the process of resettlement, the industry is required to 
hold public hearings where people can make their claims. A notice must 
be placed in one local English newspaper and one regional language 
(Telugu) newspaper, a month in advance. Details are also required to 
be submitted to local panchayat offices to allow people to look over the 
documents. But NTPC deliberately placed announcements in the least 
widely-read local newspaper in the area and the announcement was 
made for one edition on one day (Rao and Kumar, 2004). 
The challenge for the NGOs was to ensure that people heard about 
public hearings and were aware of the implications of development 
on their livelihood. Local NGOs (including Sadhana) used multiple 
mobilisation strategies – media exposure, direct dialogue with industry 
and government officials, public hearings, etc – to negotiate fair deals for 
the communities that were to host the industrial projects. Persuading the 
NTPC to attend public meetings organised by NGOs was a difficult task. 
Direct appeals by NGOs on behalf of communities have consistently been 
refused or not acknowledged at all. Despite these communities building 
alliances with sympathetic elements within the government, as well as 
with groups within civil society such as trade unions, NGOs, the media, 
medical practitioners and scientists, the district administration ignores 
and refuses to meet their land entitlement claims. 
4.2 Brazil
In the Brazilian context we have two examples of modes of interaction. 
The first deals with issues of territorial development and links to 
claims to do with the quilombola identity, the debate about sustainable 
development and the political dynamics involving state bureaucracies, 
parties and participatory forums; and the second deals with health policy 
and the problems of universal rights and access to health, discussing 
the tensions between the public universal health system (SUS) in Brazil 
and the indigenous health subsystem. The case focuses on universal 
rights, indigenous identity and political dynamics, involving health 
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professionals, the indigenous movement, state bureaucracies, parties and 
participatory forums. In both cases the dominant form of mobilisation 
is social movements; both also feature elements of constitutional rights, 
public policies and tensions between universal and target policies. 
4.2.1 Territorial development policies in Vale do Ribeira
This case focuses on territorial development policies in the region of 
Vale do Ribeira and how they have reshaped the modes of interaction 
between state and civil society actors. Adopted in several parts of the 
country, territorial development (TD) policies gained ground in the 
late 1990s, as they translated the widespread rhetoric of sustainable 
development into concrete acts. Initiatives such as the Program for 
Familiar Agriculture (Pronaf) and Territories of Citizenship (Territórios 
da Cidadania), both recently implemented in Vale do Ribeira, combine 
essential ‘beliefs’ of the post-democratisation era – such as the belief in 
popular participation in decision-making and the belief that development 
plans should take regional integration, territorial sustainability, attention 
to territories’ specific needs and cultural embedded features into account 
– in opposition to strictly localised development projects or centralised 
top-down initiatives. TD policies have also attracted innumerable 
actors – from state bureaucrats to community leaders – who have had to 
reframe their collective identities in order to have their interests heard, 
with inevitable results for the democratic process.
The region of Vale do Ribeira, despite its location between two 
of the richest metropoles in the country, is known for its low human 
and economic development indicators. It hosts the largest preserved 
area of Atlantic Forest in Brazil and is the home of many traditional 
populations, small farmers and ethnic minorities. Numerous conflicts 
exist in the region, making TD a real (yet urgent) challenge. Strict 
environment-preservation laws have prevented the local population 
from developing traditional economic activities and have diminished 
the region’s attractiveness for investments; large infrastructural projects 
(especially roads and dams) have increased the competition for land. 
On top of that, only half of Vale do Ribeira’s territories are regularly 
demarcated and the majority of rural communities currently working 
and living in Vale do Ribeira do not have legal possession of their lands. 
In reaction to these grievances, popular mobilisation in Vale do Ribeira 
has taken off, particularly since the 1980s. Several grassroots movements 
(originally organised by Catholic activists) have emerged, such as the 
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mobilisation of historically significant quilombo communities and the 
new family farmers’ union (Sintravale). 
The rapid expansion of these movements, their unique strategies 
of mobilisation and their particular ways of interacting with the state 
through various and new mechanisms display the common trends of 
state-society interactions in contemporary Brazil. Therefore, in order to 
illustrate these recent trends in state-society relations in Vale do Ribeira 
and how they relate to similar processes occurring in the whole country, 
this case study asks: are the new TD initiatives helping to combat historic 
inequalities and structural social problems? Are the new invited spaces 
contributing to a more ‘effective’ interaction between social and state 
actors? Which mechanisms and strategies have been invented and used 
by civil society actors in order to have their interests heard? What modes 
of interaction have emerged since democratisation and what do they tell 
us about the limits and possibilities of current democratic processes in 
Vale do Ribeira – and possibly in all of Brazil?
Our findings suggest two major trends. The first is the difficulty in 
overcoming the ‘poor policies for poor people’ conundrum. Territorial 
policies have reproduced the existing dichotomy between ‘urban’ and 
’rural’ policies: when dealing with rural impoverished areas, the state 
accesses only those parts responsible for agricultural and social policies, 
while infrastructural project and economic stimulus policies remain 
focused on urban areas. Also no infrastructure department or large-
budget state secretaries with their ‘powerful state bureaucracies’ have 
been involved in these policies, which have remained the ‘monopoly’ 
of the social sector bureaucracy (Abramovay, 2006; Favareto, 2006). This 
dynamic contributes to keeping investors, companies and individual 
shareholders away from the region, leaving it as the arena for politicised 
civil society groups and party coalitions. 
On the civil society side, once social movements perceive that their 
claims are constantly ignored by ‘developmental’ sectors, they turn their 
attention to the ‘social’ sectors. This means that every time movements 
need to access the state, they look for the same partners, the same people 
and the same channels within the state bureaucracy. This mechanism 
ends up consolidating the state’s institutional split between the ‘social’ 
(and less dynamic) sectors and the economic (and more ‘developmental’) 
sectors.
The second trend is the limited inclusive capacity of participatory 
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forums. When we observe which actors have actually engaged in 
discussing the path of territorial development in the region, we notice 
that only collective and historically organised sectors of civil society 
have managed to correspond to the technical requirements of state 
programmes and to follow the numerous bureaucratic negotiations 
taking place in simultaneous arenas of debate. Limited deliberation 
and the need to be collectively organised to be heard both contribute 
to expanding the social, economic and political gap between mobilised 
and de-mobilised social actors.
4.2.2 Health care policies in São Paulo and Acre
The second case study analyses new forms of political engagement in 
the area of health policies. The public health sector was profoundly 
transformed by the 1988 Constitution, which established health service 
provision as ‘the right of all and the duty of the state’. The Constitution 
and subsequent Basic Health Law (1990) also provided for participation 
and controle social (or ‘citizen oversight’) of health policy through the 
institutionalisation of management councils. A large number of these 
councils were created over the course of the 1990s, at national, state 
and municipal level. In the largest Brazilian cities (such as São Paulo), 
sub-municipal or district health councils have also been established. 
Besides participation and social control, another key principle of the 
new unified health care system (SUS) is decentralisation, which has led 
to the progressive transfer of responsibility for managing primary care 
to the municipalities and their Municipal Health Councils. At the local 
politics level, these councils have come to play a key role in health service 
planning and provision, becoming important arenas for participation, 
decision-making and public accountability for government actions. At 
the macro-institutional level, this autonomy gained by the municipalities 
meant that larger public resources were transferred to and controlled by 
lower spheres of state bureaucracy.
Despite achieving quite satisfactory results overall, both in terms 
of a more equitable distribution of resources between regions and in 
terms of health indicators, SUS exposes some paradoxes of the post-
democratisation era. The system – which is an achievement of social 
movements from the democratisation era – is based on the idea of 
‘universal’ health provision and on a highly interconnected structure 
of shared responsibilities between municipal, state and federal levels 
of government. However, the SUS’s structure is increasingly being 
22
Introduction
confronted by recent claims for differential treatment, such as those 
related to special provisions for indigenous populations and other ethnic 
and minority groups. Investigating this paradox – between universal care 
and ethnic group demands – and its consequences to social mobilisation 
and state action is fundamental to understanding the current challenges 
of Brazilian democracy. 
In order to provide a more general overview of the complexity 
of these processes, this second case study presents evidence from 
two distinct realities: the indigenous health subsystem in Acre (in the 
Amazon region) and the experience of the health councils in the populous 
metropolis of São Paulo. Without doubt, the challenges faced by health 
policies in these scenarios are quite different. Acre lies in the far west 
of Brazil, in the heart of the Amazon Forest, and borders the countries 
of Peru and Bolivia. With a total population of 680 000, Acre is known 
for its indigenous minorities, which currently account for less than 3% 
of the state’s population. São Paulo, on the other hand, is the largest 
metropolis in South America, with approximately 18 million people 
living in its greater metropolitan area. 
Despite their differences, both São Paulo and Acre are part of SUS, 
having their own management participatory councils and following 
the same national health guidelines. Hence a comparison between such 
diverse contexts may provide us with clear insights into the current 
political processes guiding state-society interaction in Brazil.
In the case of São Paulo, data from 2001 to 2008 show that in the early 
2000s there were important differences in access to services, with basic 
services and high-complexity services concentrated in the central areas of 
the city where average education and income levels are higher, leaving 
the poorer inhabitants of peripheral areas with the burden of travelling 
to the centre of the city to seek access to these services. Nevertheless, 
more recent data indicates that the number of health facilities and the 
consumption of services are increasing at a faster rate in the poorest 
areas (Coelho, 2010). 
In the case of Acre, the distribution of health services was completely 
reshaped after 1999, when an alliance between local indigenous 
movements and health reformers succeeded in pushing through a 
law mandating the creation of an ‘indigenous health sub-system’, to 
be coordinated as part of SUS. The law ordained that the subsystem 
should be organised around special indigenous health districts (Distritos 
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Sanitários Especiais Indígenas, or DSEIs) and should respect the cultural 
differences of indigenous peoples.
In contrast to the realities of other poor Brazilians also living in 
rural areas, overall spending on indigenous health has risen fivefold in 
the decade since the creation of the indigenous health subsystem. This 
has contributed to overall improvements in health indicators, although 
indigenous Brazilians continue to have by far the worst health status of 
any group of citizens (Shankland, 2010). 
In this case – unlike with broader SUS policy, where there was a 
systematic refusal to aim services at the poorest – it has been argued 
that inclusion is not enough: the SUS itself would have to change to 
take indigenous Brazilians’ very different understandings of health and 
forms of social and political organisation into account, and consequently 
a special system (the subsystem) is better tailored to matching ethnic and 
cultural specificities. But how far can the process of institutionalising 
a system to deal with these differences take us in the attainment of 
universalistic goals of social justice? What are the risks of a perverse 
crystallisation and reinforcement of institutions that in a near future 
could block changes concerned with more universalistic and less specific 
goals? This case points to some of the tensions and trade-offs that 
appear when society decides to work towards equality by prioritising 
the necessities of the neediest members of the population through a 
target system.
4.3 South Africa
The two case studies of modes of interaction in South Africa highlight 
the obstacles facing the urban poor in lobbying government for public 
goods, either through formal spaces of participation or by other forms 
of mobilisation, including protest action. The case studies highlight 
the South African trend towards a formalistic form of inclusion into 
state policy formulation and implementation processes, as well as the 
resistance of the state (both politically and bureaucratically) to activism 
and social protest. In an examination of forms of interaction and aspects 
of mobilisation concerning service delivery in Khayelitsha the limits to 
both types of engagement are clear, with the state at local level allowing 
only certain kinds of engagement and input and repressing forms of 
social activism that openly challenge the state, especially protests. The 
second case study examines the case of social movements accessing 
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formal participatory spaces, in particular the ward committee structures 
in KwaZulu-Natal. This is linked to a broader critical discussion of these 
formal invited spaces as a viable mode of interaction for civil society 
to address issues relating to poverty alleviation and socio-economic 
redistribution. 
Currently the dominant form of mobilisation in South Africa is 
protest action by citizens. The reason for this becomes clearer through 
examining the specifics of the two South African case studies: the first 
deals with public participation processes at local government (municipal) 
level in two KwaZulu-Natal municipalities (Msunduzi and eThekweni), 
and the second examines forms of social organisation and perceptions 
of governance in an African township (Khayelitsha) in the Western 
Cape.
The insights gained by examining public spaces for engagement at 
local level reveal the empty promise of democratic participation in the 
new South Africa. Piper and Nadvi (2007) have examined the operation 
of the formal ‘invited spaces’ of participatory local governance and how 
these are linked to forms of popular mobilisation. In spite of progressive 
legislation such as the Municipal Systems Act of 2000 (which defines the 
municipality as consisting of elected councillors, administration and 
residents) there is very little to suggest that much has changed at local 
government level. Indeed, while Piper, Tapscott and Thompson (this 
volume) point out that these institutions are functioning very badly, civil 
society in general has yet to take a stance which is clearly articulated and 
well organised. The case studies from eThekwini and Msunduzi show 
that social movements do have a presence, in the form of movements such 
as Abahlali baseMjondolo in eThekwini, yet their organisational strength 
and popular base vary greatly. 
This conclusion is enforced by the Khayelitsha case study, 
which focuses on the popular perceptions of citizenship and popular 
mobilisation in this Western Cape township. By employing both 
quantitative methods (a survey) and qualitative methods (interviews 
and focus groups) the Khayelitsha case study illustrates a ‘view from 
below’ with regard to state-society relations in South Africa. The study 
highlights the high levels of social cohesion in the township (which is 
comprised almost entirely of migrants from two of the former Bantustans 
in the Eastern Cape – Transkei and Ciskei – who thus share a great deal 
of political and social history and forms of social organisation). 
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The Khayelitsha study highlights parallel forms of governance; 
communities engage in forms of community organisation that date 
back to pre-apartheid days, in the form of street committees linked 
both to SANCO (who used street committees as a way of organising 
grassroots resistance to the apartheid state pre-1990s) and to new forms 
of community governance like the Khayelitsha Development Forum 
(KDF), as well as Ward Committee structures (called Ward Forums in 
the Western Cape). The study highlights a continuum of participation: 
from more collaborative (through representative structures) to more 
conflictual (protests). The survey data shows that those who participate 
in formal channels of participation are also more likely to protest 
(Thompson and Nleya, 2010). Mirroring national social movements, 
societal disaffection seems to be moving from collaboration to more 
contested forms of engagement – although the Khayelitsha study shows 
that, like SANCO itself, communities may sometimes choose to ally 
themselves strategically with government, and take to the streets at 
other times. 
As Piper, Tapscott and Thompson (this volume) point out, it is worth 
noting that the Constitution outlines specific commitments to participatory 
democracy, which include as a requirement a responsiveness on the part 
of local government to the needs of local communities; and sections 151, 
152, and 195 carry an explicit commitment to encouraging community 
involvement. This is underscored by the Municipal Systems Act of 2000.
The case study material from both KwaZulu-Natal and the Western 
Cape shows the limits to the ward committee system, which is the 
cornerstone of inclusive local governance in practice. In both cases 
communities have had to confront representative democracy that is 
insufficiently responsive to local needs. Piper, Tapscott and Thompson 
(this volume) point out that participation at ward level is often seen as 
a form of information sharing, 
…and unidirectional at that, with information transmitted from the 
community to the council. The idea that residents may want to participate 
in debate – over how the needs should be prioritised, what strategies 
should be adopted, what form implementation should take and the like, 
is clearly not part of [local government’s] vision. 
Thus, in the case of eThekwini and Msunduzi, rather flimsy public 
participation policies emerged only after more than five years of 
consultation. Similarly, ward committees have failed to deliver, and 
Piper and Deacon (2009) have concluded that these structures have 
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made practically no difference to either community participation or 
decision-making at local government level. While consultation regarding 
development planning and the municipal Integrated Development 
Plans (IDPs) has been marginally better through the organisation of the 
series of what came to be known as the ‘Big Mama’ workshops aimed at 
identifying community needs, overall the public participation process has 
shown little direct benefit to communities. On the contrary, the expression 
of community needs appears to have been superseded by what Piper 
refers to as growing managerialism, especially in eThekwini.
Similarly, residents in Khayelitsha, Western Cape indicate that 
public participation through formal structures of local representation 
is only occasionally a successful strategy. Although formal channels 
are not eschewed, and there are high levels of community association, 
it is clear that local communities are becoming increasingly disaffected 
with formal channels. 
If we examine the continuum of participation in protest, the 
surveys conducted in Khayelitsha indicate that due to the failure of the 
formal institutions in identifying and meeting community needs, many 
citizens have participated in protest action. In 2007, approximately 45% 
of respondents had attended at least one march in the preceding year 
and nearly 80% said they would join a protest if they had a chance. Not 
surprisingly, shack dwellers have a much higher participation rate in 
marches (50%) than the 37% of house dwellers (shacks make up 70% 
of housing stock in Khayelitsha). Since 2007, the number of protests in 
Khayelitsha has continued to rise, indicating that the disaffected (and 
politicised) segment of the community increasingly prioritises protest as 
the most effective form of participation, underlining the ongoing failure 
of formal channels of participation to meet the needs of the very poor. 
In Khayelitsha, the high levels of protest indicate the potential 
for forming more organised social movement activity in time to come, 
should local governance structures continue to fail to meet community 
expectations relating to the supply of public goods and development 
programmes. Khayelitsha, the largest township in the Western Cape 
with approximately a million inhabitants (and in a similar way to the 
city municipalities of eThekwini and Msunduzi), shows how local 
communities have already come to terms with the failed promise 
of participatory democracy at local level. Forms of more organised 
mobilisation and social movement activity still need to catch up with 
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this groundswell of disaffection. The resurgence of street committees 
as important channels of community organisation indicate that social 
movements such as SANCO are indeed reinventing themselves, although 
SANCO has not associated itself with protest about service delivery in 
any substantive way at the time of writing.
5. Comparing cases of mobilisation-state interaction
5.1 Issues that trigger mobilisation 
Our study of the three countries shows that mobilisation occurred 
concerning issues of recognition (that the state recognises the particular 
identities of the poor and marginalised) and redistribution (that the 
state makes provision for fair distribution of material or developmental 
goods to the poor). However, we find that in societies as characterised 
by a high level of socio-economic inequality as the three countries under 
study, recognition and redistribution are not two distinct categories 
or interests; they are often two aspects of the same interest that are in 
constant reference to each other. 
The struggle for the recognition of certain identities (for example, the 
quilombolas in Brazil) is to put pressure on the state for the distribution 
of certain developmental resources to the bearers of those identities; in 
other cases (in India, for example) the existing nomadic identities help 
in accessing land resources from the state. In the case of the nomads, 
the identities that are mobilised are those of the Scheduled Castes (low 
castes) and Scheduled Tribes (indigenous) to which the nomads belong. 
This is a strategic advantage for redistribution of resources, as the two 
identities are recognised by the state. In South Africa, too, black identities 
and redistribution of resources are interlinked. 
Hence we can say that new (and persistent) claims in the three 
countries are arising concerning the recognition of identities and the 
redistribution of resources to the bearers of those identities. Mobilisation 
strategies therefore use both identities and interests as part of a two-
pronged approach to interactions with the state.
Our cases indicate that mobilisations are more pronounced and visible 
when concerned with existing policies that deal with the distribution of 
resources to the poor. From a mobilisation perspective, we get the picture 
that existing policies are potential triggers for mobilisation, either due to 
inadequacy in their provisioning for the poor (as the cases from Brazil 
and South Africa point out), or inadequacy in their implementation 
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(as the Indian cases show). They provide mobilisation with an already 
existing base of state-action upon which to raise their demands. The trend 
in IBSA countries also proves that merely formulating policies does not 
guarantee that they will be beneficial to the poor, or will be implemented 
to the advantage of the poor. People need to mobilise and engage with 
the state to make the policies real.
However, this does not mean to suggest that the state should 
formulate policy and then social mobilisation will takes place to 
guarantee access to benefits. Policy outcomes in themselves are interactive 
processes between political opportunities and social opportunities that 
have occurred through historical, institutional and social processes 
over a period of time. Democratic foundations such as constitutions, 
policies and institutional settings are the results of mobilisation and 
state interaction, which in turn produce opportunities for new policies 
and new mobilisation.
5.2 Political and social opportunity structures 
These cases show that political opportunity structures that collectivise 
identities and interests and cause mobilisation to take place have the 
following primary characteristics: affirmative action provided by the 
state to a certain section of people; socio-economic policies for poverty 
eradication; participatory spaces created by the state; and above all, a 
political environment in which claims can be made and a functional 
bureaucracy or public administration system where all social actors 
can interact.
Social opportunities are created by mobilising actors and bringing 
people together to make claims, issue demands, forge collective identities, 
and – by strategising – interface with the state. India and Brazil show 
strong trends towards social opportunities shaped by historical factors. 
In South Africa, social opportunities for the poor are fragmented and 
episodic. Looking at the historical trajectories of the three states, we find 
that, while India and Brazil experienced strong mobilisation after their 
respective democratic states were created, such mobilisation is weaker in 
South Africa. Hence, unlike in India and Brazil where both mobilisation 
and the state have evolved through their interaction (though such 
interactions are not always successful) and where at the time of writing 
we find alliances between the two in certain cases, this is not the case 
in South Africa, where the state appears to be closed and oppressive. 
As a result, when the state creates institutions for participation in the 
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form of invited spaces, it still remains at a distance from the people. In 
the absence of social organisations, as well as of bureaucrats, politicians 
and professionals to mediate people’s interest and their participation in 
such institutions, they remain largely empty and are unable to meet the 
interests of the poor. 
 Our study reveals that political opportunity may not necessarily 
be created if strong social opportunity structures are lacking, as in the 
case of South Africa. But political opportunity can also create grounds 
for social opportunity to emerge in South Africa, though such social 
opportunity will take time to crystallise into effective mediating voices. 
Strong social opportunities can put pressure on the state to create new 
political opportunities (as seen in both the Brazilian cases) or make the 
state respond to existing political opportunities (as in the case of the 
Indian nomads).
However, political opportunities created by the state do not 
necessarily mean that the corresponding social opportunities will follow 
the norms set by the state. This is seen in South Africa, where the invited 
spaces of local governance created by the state reveal that ideologies of 
participation conceptualised by people may not be the same as ideologies 
of state participation. Strong social opportunities may not always result 
in strong political opportunities, as seen in the Indian case of claims made 
by people displaced by industry. Despite strong mobilisation by NGOs, 
the state may not listen to people’s demands.
5.3 Mechanisms of interaction
Social actors mobilising for rights use a number of strategies. Even when 
the dominant form of mobilisation is not overtly critical but merely 
raising awareness, building capacity, or pursuing state officials to fulfil 
people’s demands, a certain amount of pressure is exerted on the state, by 
way of campaigns or occasional protests or public hearings at which state 
officials are forced to meet people whose interests are articulated by social 
and political actors. It is also clear from the case studies that strategies of 
mobilisation change in response to state action at its different levels. This 
is evident in India (in the case of the nomads, the local administration 
accused the NGO of organising protests and was open to interaction only 
when the NGO adopted a negotiating position). The changing nature of 
collective action and social engagement occurs in a reflexive way and 
(where successful) often in relation to multiple strategies of engagement 
that are learned and internalised by social actors over time.
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In the South African context, intermediaries are still struggling to 
define their ideological and political agendas and identities in relation 
to the state; for example, SANCO – as a largely ANC-created and -run 
civics organisation – has had to redefine its social movement role as a 
(previously revolutionary) movement now partly constituted by the state 
as well as representative of civil society (office-bearers in SANCO may be 
in government positions at the same time). At present SANCO is rather 
weak for an organisation lobbying government, although we know that 
street committees are alive and functioning effectively. In Brazil – over 
a much longer time period – social movement organisations have built 
up strong forms of networking and collective action, although they are 
not always as effective as might appear from outside the participatory 
spaces in which they function with government, as the Brazilian case 
study on the health movement illustrates. Nonetheless, the strength of 
the quilomba movement, for example, is not matched in South Africa, with 
the possible exception of that of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) – 
although the latter does not have the much wider base of representation 
throughout South Africa that the quilomba movement has in Brazil. In 
India, given a history of both strong social movements and strong NGO 
presence, mobilisations are indeed strong and well-grounded. Much like 
in Brazil, mobilisation in India takes place at many levels that span both 
the grassroots and national spheres. However, India still does not match 
the scale of the participatory spaces of Brazil.
5.4 Dealing with different faces of the state 
The three countries present different profiles as to the interaction 
between political parties, bureaucracies and mobilised actors. In South 
Africa, because of the recent transformation of the state from apartheid 
to democratic, those who mobilised against apartheid are now in the 
ruling party and occupy positions in state administration. Membership 
of political party and bureaucracy therefore overlap in many situations, 
which means that mobilised actors seem to be engaging with the same 
set of people whether their engagement is with a political party or a 
bureaucracy. Depending on which province one is referring to, this 
happens to a greater or lesser extent. Where ANC rule has remained 
constant there is a large overlap between political party and bureaucratic 
roles, with the former being closely tied to obtaining the latter. In the 
Western Cape, successive rearrangements of the political status quo have 
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caused great instability at local government level, with the Democratic 
Alliance and the ANC hiring and firing top bureaucrats (and senior 
managers) whenever each wins electoral control over the province. 
In Brazil there seems to be a constant migration between political 
parties, professionals and bureaucracy, indicating that mobilised actors 
are interacting with all three. Also, mobilised actors in Brazil may occupy 
seats inside the state, playing bureaucratic roles. In India, from the very 
beginning bureaucracies have remained distinct from political parties 
(though a certain amount of party influence on those at the higher levels of 
bureaucracy cannot be ruled out). Bureaucracy functions on its own as the 
executive wing of the state, as opposed to the legislative wing constituted 
by political parties. Hence, mobilisations wanting the state to implement 
policies which are already in place will interact with bureaucrats, whereas 
mobilisations wanting new policies or changes in existing policies must 
interact with political party members constituting the legislative wing, 
as well as with bureaucrats at the national level who are instrumental 
in making policy decisions. The political and social thus appear as two 
distinct spheres, with their own actors, norms and agendas.
The state levels at which interaction and mediation take place 
may differ: our case studies reveal that in India, mobilisation and state 
interact at district level (below the provincial level), as the execution of 
specific policies for which mobilisation is demanded is at district level 
even though the policies are of pan-Indian character. As for which face 
of the state the mobilisations interact with – in the Indian context, when 
it comes to the implementation of existing policies, it is the bureaucratic 
face. However, the social movements that contest state policies also 
interact with the political face of the state at the provincial and national 
level. We can perhaps say that the level and face of the state with which 
a mobilisation interacts depends on if the demands are for the execution 
of existing policies or the creation of new policies. In South Africa at the 
time of writing there still appears to be some disjuncture between the 
disaffections of local communities and more organised social movements 
at provincial and national levels. In Brazil, the growth of the participatory 
sphere has opened up opportunities for mobilisations that begin at 
the local level to interact at the state and national levels. In addition, 
national social movements find spaces at the sub-national level in which 
to communicate and fight for their agendas.
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5.5 State responses to mobilisation 
As to how the states respond to mobilisation, the broad pattern in all three 
countries suggests that states respond positively when they perceive 
the framework and means of mobilisation to be legitimate – that is, the 
ideology of mobilisations and the strategies that they use synchronise 
with those of the state (see Oommen 2004). As our cases have shown, 
the present governments of the three states seem to be comfortable 
with strategies of mobilisation that do not directly threaten state power 
through protest. This is evident in India (in the nomads’ case, the local 
administration accused the NGO of organising protest and was open to 
interaction only when the NGO adopted a negotiating position) and also 
in South Africa, where the state resisted protest about service delivery. 
In Brazil the more visible pattern of mobilisation and state interaction 
is collaboration, though protests have sometimes happened, even in 
the cases analysed. States are open when mobilising actors work on a 
dialogue or negotiating platform, or are ready to form alliances with 
the state. However, there is no straightforward relationship between 
negotiating strategies and state response. In India, while we have 
examples of worst-case state oppression to suppress protest against 
state-led development-by-industrialisation, there is no evidence that 
the state will listen if mobilising actors use strategies other than protest, 
as the case of resettlement of displaced people by the National Thermal 
Power Corporation illustrates. In South Africa too, people have turned to 
protest after their efforts to engage with the state appeared to be futile. 
What then will force the state to respond, even if selectively? Again, 
from looking at the case studies, the trend in India is that the state 
responds when issues (particularly those related to development and 
distribution of resources) fall within the ambit of a policy framework that 
is well laid out on paper, is doable and that does not threaten the interests 
of the state or of its allies. For example, in the case of land distribution to 
nomads, the state responds because there is a policy provision for it; but 
in another case of land distribution (the NTPC case in Andhra Pradesh) 
the state takes away resources for industrial development but does not 
make adequate provision for the resettlement of those whose resources it 
has taken away, even when the policies are in place for resettlement. The 
state does not respond because it is not possible to compensate people 
with land, as land is a scarce resource. 
Besides, the lack of state response in this case also relates to how 
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industrialisation is perceived by the state. In India, industrialisation is 
called a ‘public good’, for which the state is entitled to take people’s 
land under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. Hence the state is entitled 
to prioritise development over people’s resources. Even though in this 
paper we have dealt only with a single case, the history of industrial 
development in India is filled with stories of how the state has grabbed 
land from the poor using false promises, stealth and terror (Mohanty, 
2007, 2010). The two Indian cases deal with the issues of land allocation to 
the poor, but it is the conceptualisation or framework of the development 
of the state that makes it respond differently to mobilisations for land 
distribution.
As the three states attempt to integrate with the global economy and 
pursue a path of economic growth which is not always compatible with 
the interests of the poor, there will often be clashes between democratic 
rights and developmental policies in practice. In such cases, the state 
defends its actions and ignores or suppresses the claims of mobilisation. 
In India, the new industrial policy allows the state to become ‘investor 
friendly’ – meaning that it will encourage foreign investment – and often 
this zeal to pursue industrialisation makes the state blind to the interests 
of the poor (Mohanty, 2007).
As a broad generalisation we can say that state response to 
mobilisation is often selective – states are protective about their 
frameworks, strategies and ideologies, and often it is the ideologies and 
strategies of mobilisation that are not radically different from those of the 
state that seem to elicit some response from the state. It is seldom that 
state actors go to mobilisation spaces to interact; they prefer interacting 
with the mobilising actors in their own sphere (an exception to this is 
public hearings which are organised by mobilisations and in which 
state actors sometimes participate). This explains why the state is open 
to interacting with social actors in the invited space it sets up, since all 
the structures, processes and ideologies of participation of that space 
are set by the state.
6. Outcomes of mobilisation-state interaction
6.1 Successful, concrete and visible gains for the poor
From these six cases we see that the more successful ones happened in 
India and Brazil, in situations where the state bureaucracy and politicians 
channelled resources such as land and health care facilities to groups 
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mobilised around cultural and ethnic identities that were already legally 
recognised. These situations also reinforced the recognition of cultural 
and ethnic identities by society and the state. However, it is to be noted 
that even in the more established democracies of India and Brazil, the 
gains for mobilisation are often selective depending on what the state 
prefers to grant, and there are also contexts in which no concrete gains 
occurred despite mobilisation (for example, people asking for better 
resettlement and rehabilitation from industries in India). From the point 
of view of deepening democracy and making it inclusive of the poor in 
terms of the poor gaining from state resources, the outcomes are indeed 
selective.
6.2 Progressive and regressive democratisation
Historically we find several ‘footprints’ of democracy that have resulted 
from mobilisation and state interaction. As India and Brazil are the 
oldest democracies in this study, the footprints are more visible; in 
South Africa they are only beginning to emerge after a decade-and-a-half 
of democratic state formation. Though the states are selective in their 
response to mobilisation, preferring to interact within their own policy 
frameworks, their conceptualisation of development, their ideologies of 
participation and, within their own space, engagement with mobilisation 
makes the states open up to mobilising actors and the demands of the 
poor. In recent times the states in the three countries have opened up 
more by creating several participatory institutions in which people 
are invited to participate. The states have become open to forming 
alliances and collaborating with social actors in both the formulation 
and implementation of policies. 
At the same time, the states have become more resistant to protest. 
This is visible in South Africa, where protest by citizens demanding 
effective service delivery has been met with opposition. In India, too, the 
state is often violent in its response towards social movements that resist 
the results of neo-liberal economic growth. This duality in the behaviour 
of the state towards mobilisation strengthens the point we made earlier, 
that states are only comfortable with participatory engagements. 
Hence we can say that, while democracy has progressed towards more 
participatory modes of engagement, it has also regressed as a consequence 
of state aggression to protest and contestation. Contestation is as much 
part of democratic politics as participation. Even when their engagement 
with the state is often unsuccessful, social movements contesting state 
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policies play a critical role in keeping democracy alive. Notwithstanding 
all the merits of participatory engagement, democratic politics cannot 
be reduced to participatory and successful modes of engagement only. 
Unsuccessful modes, and strategies other than negotiation are also 
essential in imprinting the footprints of democracy. 
6.3 Construction of citizenship 
Modes of interaction enable the construction of citizenship in two 
significant ways: at the level of citizenship discourse, by getting 
the citizen’s view from below; and by creating citizen agency and 
empowerment in a way that is valuable to citizens. 
The cases of mobilisation discussed above indicate incompleteness 
and fractures in the state-led discourse of citizenship in liberal 
democracies. While the state conceptualises citizenship in universal 
terms, mobilisation brings citizenship issues of vulnerable identities to 
the citizenship discourse. Mobilisation thus reveals the issues of exclusion 
of certain identities and their interests from state action. The state action 
suggests that while the state (acting through the constitution) bestows 
universal citizenship, in practice that citizenship is selective of only 
certain identities and interests. When the state responds to the demands 
of mobilisation, it is an acknowledgement of that fractured citizenship. 
Hence, while there is a tenuous relationship between the state discourse 
of citizenship and the discourse of mobilisation, engagement between the 
state and mobilisation enables the evolution of a citizenship discourse 
that will include the identities and interests of poor and vulnerable 
groups.
Modes of interaction are also concerned with the construction of 
citizenship through agency and empowerment. Gaining knowledge and 
awareness creates a sense of agency and empowerment (Gaventa and 
Barrett, 2010). Such agency can be further enhanced when mobilised 
to interface with the state. A positive response from the state leads to 
reinforcement of agency, but agency and empowerment are not to be 
validated based on state response. Even in situations where the state’s 
response is negative, agency created in the process of mobilisation and 
interaction with the state does lead to a greater sense of citizenship 
rights.
6.4 Building accountable state institutions
As we found in our comparative analysis, the three democratic states do 
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provide certain political opportunities, but that does not guarantee that 
they will put them into practice until pressure is generated from below. 
However, as each state’s response to mobilisation remains ‘selective’, 
making the state accountable can at best be partially successful and at 
worst have a negative outcome. As our cases and modes of interaction 
show, selective and partial gains have occurred in certain cases, but in 
others the state has remained completely closed to citizens’ demands.
As the three states emerge into the global economy with a certain 
path of economic growth that is not always in the interest of the poor, 
but which the state defends, social actors find it hard to make the state 
accountable. The increasing closure of the public space for mobilisation 
to interact with the state in such situations is no longer mediated by the 
state alone, but also by the encroachment of neo-liberal market forces.
7. Conclusions 
Brazil, India and South Africa are useful sites for exploring discourses 
and realities of inclusive democratic practice through state-societal 
interaction. While much of what is evident here in terms of patterns of 
interaction is also present elsewhere in the global South, it is illuminating 
to focus on the patterns of engagement that emerge in three such different 
cultural, societal and geographical contexts, as it helps to establish 
whether or not there are similar patterns of engagement over time. 
While the three states – by virtue of being ‘formal’ democracies – 
do provide certain democratic foundations in the form of constitutions, 
policies and institutions that create the space necessary for mobilisation 
to take off, it is evident that mobilisation is still required despite such 
democratic foundations and political opportunities. Formal democracy 
means little without action on the part of the citizenry. Often, debates 
about the ‘nature of the state’ or citizenry reify and ideologise both state 
and non-state actors, but it is evident that roles and identities are far more 
complex and variable, on both sides of the state/non-state equation. It 
is important to remember, as we have concluded elsewhere, that there 
is often a tendency for research to ignore or gloss over the mutually 
constitutive nature of state and non-state actors (Cornwall and Coelho, 
2007; Thompson and Tapscott, 2010). The IBSA states are no exception. 
The nature of representation at both levels (state and civil society) 
is problematic here, as this exposes the true nature of participatory 
democracy (or the lack of it) in action. In the cases examined here it is 
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obvious that forms of interaction and engagement become more varied 
and sophisticated over time, yet the democratic gains are not always 
as clear. The political and socio-economic interests of the actors are 
particular to each case, thus making concepts such as POS and SOS 
extremely useful to understand how patterns of interaction emerge, 
although arguably the concepts do not adequately embrace the economic 
underpinnings of so many of the engagements which take place in these 
development-oriented democracies.
Recognition of excluded identities and redistribution of resources 
to poor, marginalised identities remain the critical issues around which 
mobilisation is taking place in all three countries. Such gaps point to the 
inadequacy of state responses to the poor, despite many pronouncements 
and policies proclaiming otherwise. Action is required to ensure delivery; 
however, not all action is taken by the poor themselves and the tensions 
between state and non-state actors and representatives are visible more 
frequently in the face of organised, large-scale, social-movement forms 
of mobilisation. While smaller-scale efforts at resistance (local protests 
in South Africa, for example) also evoke tensions, these are more 
readily addressed by the state, but not always in mutually satisfactory 
ways. Repression in different forms is not beyond the purview of the 
purportedly democratic developmental state.
Thus, from the point of view of concrete gains won by the citizenry 
from interaction with the state, such gains are selective and partial, 
depending on what the state in question prefers to respond to; and 
it is clear that these responses depend on a complex set of historical, 
institutional and situation-specific criteria, as well as political, economic 
and social opportunity structures.
We can conclude that since state responses and gains for citizenry are 
selective, building inclusive democracy through state-society relations 
is also selective, and certain groups are more likely to be included than 
others. Knowledge and access to resources are powerful leverage tools. 
However, as the literature on social movements has long maintained, 
the closer to the state the social movement gets, the less likely it will be 
to achieve major transformatory changes; co-optation is more likely, if 
not inevitable (Klandermans, 1984).
However, looked at from the citizen’s point of view, action (as 
constitutive of the construction of citizenship) is important; and despite 
the potential lack of state response, a sense of agency and empowerment 
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is crucial in keeping the ‘democracy debate’ alive. Knowing the state will 
be held accountable – in other words, not letting the state off the hook – is 
in itself an empowering expression of citizenship and political identity. 
Furthermore, while the cases discussed here show only a fragment of 
the international component of such empowerment, other examples in 
all three states do illustrate this point: for example, HIV/AIDS resistance 
action in South Africa by the TAC. In the same way, the environmental 
movements in Brazil and India have raised international solidarity and 
support through struggles for more equitable development that is less 
damaging to the environment and to livelihoods.
Both the broader patterns of engagement and the cases analysed 
here show that, while the state can choose to adopt participatory modes 
and engage with forms of mobilisation that are perceived (from within 
its institutional ranks) to be closer to its ideology, the cases in which 
citizens raise legitimate protests and still meet with state resistance reveal 
‘the other side of the democratic state’; that is, the dynamic, non-linear 
nature of creating democratic participatory processes around formalistic 
structures.
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Notes
 
1. The IBSA block came up as a state-led initiative when the foreign ministers 
of the three countries met and signed the IBSA declaration in 2003, with 
the primary aim of consolidating the economic powers of the South as a 
way of responding to global issues.
  2. Development Research Centre (DRC) project on citizenship, participation 
and accountability, located at the Institute of Development Studies, 
Sussex, UK. Research conducted as part of this project shed light on the 
conditions under which mobilisation contributes to the deepening of 
democracy. Available at http://www.drc-citizen.org.
  3. We draw from country papers written by teams of researchers in India 
(Pant, Mandakini), Brazil (Menino, Shankland, Favareto and Pompa) and 
South Africa (Piper, Tascott and Thompson). The papers were written 
specifically for the IBSA synthesis comparative project, drawing on 
existing case studies conducted under the DRC project. The papers were 
discussed and developed in two workshops held during 17–19 June 2009 
in Rio, Brazil and 25–27 October 2009 in Brighton, UK. 
4. In this sense, it is known that high levels of social inequality hinder 
the broad democratisation process. However, inequality (in addition 
to underdevelopment, poverty and discrimination) does not affect 
democratisation in the same way in every country (Kaplinksy, 2005). The 
particular manner in which these factors have an impact on democracy 
in each context depends on how social and state actors frame them; in 
other words, the way they are interpreted, negotiated and continuously 
disputed between civil society and the state – resulting, in the final 
analysis, in determining the outcomes of democracy in each particular 
country.
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2India
Social mobilisations and the state
Mandakini Pant
1. Introduction
Studies on social mobilisations have typically addressed 
questions about mobilisation for collective action in order to 
understand its impact. Social mobilisation, when viewed as a 
transformational approach, takes into account the felt needs of 
the people and embraces the critical principle of community 
involvement for action; when viewed as a process, it enables 
marginalised communities to challenge the dominance of 
elites, opponents and authorities collectively and create desirable 
changes in their lived situations. Social mobilisations involve 
a continuum of activities: new or transformed collective action 
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frames; a combination of organised and unorganised participation; and 
sequences of intensified interaction between challengers and authorities, 
which either reforms, or represses, or leads to total transformation. 
But the state’s responses and influences have been somewhat under-
researched. What are the conditions under which the state responds to 
social mobilisation? What are the intended and unintended consequences 
of state action on social mobilisations? In the absence of understanding 
on how the state responds to mobilisations, the understanding of citizen 
mobilisation and participation remains unbalanced. While mobilisations 
may have different trajectories of leadership and different styles of 
activism – ranging from direct action, to dialogue, to representation in 
participatory spaces – the state does influence their form and trajectory 
(Amenta and Zylan, cited in Amenta and Young, 1999: 153). Even 
when mobilisations target other societal actors such as the industrial 
corporates, they still use the state as leverage against their opponents. 
There are different types of states and different ‘layers’ within the state. 
Furthermore, there is a great deal of variation between the different ‘actors’ 
that constitute the state. Bureaucracy, for example, is the administrative 
arm of the government to deliver services, manage resources and 
implement laws and policies both at central, state and local levels. Thus 
the state needs to be unpacked and contextually situated for a deeper 
understanding of citizen mobilisation and democracy building. 
This paper is about modes of interaction between mobilisations and 
the state as they continue to respond, influence and reconstitute each 
other in a formal democratic state. It aims to unravel how mobilisations 
for claiming rights and entitlements have been addressed, responded to 
and dealt with by the state. In particular, two DRC case studies by PRIA1 
have been explored in depth: Meanings and expressions of rights and citizenship 
amongst nomadic communities in Rajasthan and Multi-party accountability for 
environmentally sustainable development in Andhra Pradesh. 
The focus is on the mobilisation of excluded and marginalised 
citizens through NGO intermediation for new or re-framed claims. The 
cases raise a crucial governance issue: the erosion of citizenship rights due 
to prolonged negligence by the state. Citizens, despite formal legislated 
policy for protecting the rights of marginalised citizens, have had to 
struggle for the inclusion and protection of their rights in situations 
where the developmental priorities of the state curbed their rights and 
entitlements. Civil society organisations have played an important role 
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in mobilising citizens to articulate their concerns through awareness-
building and organising them to the point that they claim their rights. 
The paper is organised as follows. The second section (following 
this introduction) describes the theoretical framework of the paper. The 
third section presents the trajectory of the state-mobilisation interface. 
It describes the nature of democracy in India; the cohesion, conflicts 
and contradictions within the state; and the ways in which civil society 
mobilisations have responded to the crises of democracy and governance. 
The fourth section describes case studies on rights claims. The fifth section 
describes the modes of interaction between the state and mobilisations. 
The sixth section draws outcomes from these modes of interaction. The 
seventh section concludes the paper.
2. Theoretical framework
The case analysis is formed around the following subsets of framing 
questions:
(a) What are the issues of mobilisations?
(b) Why do new or re-framed claims emerge? What are the contexts 
(policy environment, political and social opportunity structures) 
that create the conditions for mobilisation? 
(c) What are the different layers of actors which mediate the relationship 
between mobilisation and state? How do different strategies and 
configurations of actors within social mobilisations interact with 
different configurations of actors within state structures and 
institutions? What are the spaces of contestation?
(d) What democratic outcomes follow, in terms of new or re-framed 
claims, new actors, state effectiveness and accountability?
The cases describe (a) new or re-framed claims that gave rise to mobilisation 
of the excluded or marginalised, and the forms of mobilisation that grew 
around the articulated claims; (b) the modes of interaction between the 
state and society as they responded to, influenced and reconstituted 
each other; and (c) both democratic and other outcomes that followed 
from these events.
3. State and mobilisations: Trajectory of interface
Mobilisation/state interaction in India has a long historical trajectory, 
ranging over the last few decades of democracy. India emerged as a 
sovereign democratic welfare state in January 1950. The modern Western 
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ethos led freedom movement leaders to believe that only democracy 
could meet the aspirations of the people of the new, independent 
India. Key institutions of modern states – liberal democracy, modern 
citizenship, universal adult franchise, democratic decision-making, the 
rule of law and an impartial judiciary – established the sovereignty of 
the state. 
The agenda of the new, modern Indian state was: the national 
integration of an enormously diverse population; economic development; 
social equality of a population marked by hierarchies; and a vibrant 
political democracy (Kothari, 2001: 112). The most important priority 
was to weld together a nation-state from a culturally and linguistically 
heterogeneous society and economically disparate regions. In the 
pursuit of this goal, the political leadership followed the ideology of 
composite nationalism to integrate all strands of people. The linguistic 
reorganisation of states was a step towards the consolidation of federal 
democracy (Hasan, 2000: 17). 
To fulfil the second objective of economic development, the political 
leadership committed to building a developmental state to stimulate 
growth in the economy. The government adopted the dominant 
development paradigm of the West to augment India’s economic 
growth, albeit in the garb of a socialist state. The state assumed the 
role of provider, protector and regulator. It assumed responsibility 
for promoting economic growth, eradicating inequality, promoting 
social justice, generating employment and protecting citizens against 
the violation of their rights. Mixed economy and development with 
democratic ideals became the characteristic features of the socialist 
welfare state (Tandon and Mohanty, 2002: 30). Planning was adopted as 
the key instrument for attaining the twin objectives of growth and equity. 
A wide range of growth- and welfare-oriented policies and programmes 
came to be adopted. To attain growth, the emphasis fell on increasing 
national income though investments by the state in heavy industry, 
infrastructural facilities and agricultural development. The private sector 
was expected to participate in the development process with the active 
support, control and protection of the state. It was assumed that the 
growth outcomes would trickle down to the poorest sectors of society 
and help them to overcome their poverty and deprivation (Shylendra, 
2009: 22). 
The objective of equity was addressed through policies emphasising 
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the redistribution of resources, such as land reforms and positive 
discrimination policies in favour of socially backward communities. 
Recognising that people existed in unequal relationships in a society 
marked by multiple hierarchies on the basis of caste, class, tribe and 
gender, the state enacted legislation to provide equality of opportunity. 
The right to equality was supplemented with principles of protective 
discrimination and special welfare provisions. Scheduled lists of low 
castes and tribes were drawn up in order to establish their entitlement to 
the benefits of legal protection; access to welfare schemes (especially for 
scheduled castes); reserved seats in higher education, the legislature (both 
parliament and state assemblies) and institutions of local self-governance; 
reserved jobs in government employment; and special financial assistance 
for enterprise. The state also took measures to make special provision 
for the protection of tribal communities, by safeguarding against the 
transfer of tribal land to non-tribals. 
However, as the developmental priorities of the government began 
to be guided by successive and different five-year plans, the country 
went through distinct phases of development, affecting and influencing 
the rights of vulnerable citizens in its journey. It emerged that the gulf 
between the rights enshrined in the Constitution (and ensured through 
legislation and policy provision) and the actualisation of those rights 
is widening, reflecting the inefficiency and unresponsiveness of the 
state towards its citizens. Reforms through rapid industrialisation, the 
building of dams, mechanised farming, etc. – and land redistribution, in 
the first phase of the planning period – were followed by political crises 
such as national emergencies and economic liberalisation; closed-door 
policy decisions in the second and third phases of development planning 
alienated the masses. By carving out a bigger role for industries and 
private capital investments in employment generation and economic 
growth, the government minimised the role of the state in the processes 
of development, which also affected the protection of the rights of 
citizens. 
However, the principles of democratic equality and democratic 
rights of the political state are not in tune with the feudal and semi-feudal 
mindset based on religion and caste authority at social and regional 
levels. We find that the well-intentioned, state-directed technocratic 
development projects have ended up primarily as conduits of largesse 
for elite groups – middlemen, contractors, bureaucrats, politicians, upper 
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castes, big farmers and indigenous industrialists. Very little benefit 
has reached the intended groups. Development projects have added 
new dimensions of disadvantage to the already disadvantaged poor. 
As technocentric economic growth took off and heavy industry and 
huge irrigation and hydroelectric projects took shape, natural resources 
were exploited for commercial purposes. A large number of people 
directly dependent on nature for their subsistence lost their access to 
and control over their resources. Displacement became the inevitable 
fallout from development. Thousands of poor people were displaced 
from their original habitat – and without a comprehensive resettlement 
and rehabilitation policy (Tandon and Mohanty, 2002: 32). 
A substantial proportion of laws and common practice is still 
rooted in colonial values and culture. A number of resources that 
existed communally have become state property over the years, with 
serious implications for indigenous and nomadic people. ‘Equality’ – as 
it was originally envisaged – has remained merely procedural and has 
not translated itself into substantive equality. The gulf between what 
is enshrined in the Constitution and ensured through legislation and 
policy provision and the lack of actualisation of those provisions reflects 
the inefficiency and unresponsiveness of the state towards its citizens. 
Though the Indian state has made inroads into all aspects of the human 
condition – there is a programme for all – it doesn’t deliver. This has 
resulted in widespread apathy in the system. 
From the late 1960s and 1970s, fissures in the relationship between 
state and society began to appear. The state – far from living up to its 
promise to be a guarantor of welfare and democracy – had undermined 
the survival base of large sections of its citizens and curtailed their 
democratic rights. In recent times, with liberalism and the predominance 
of corporate capitalism, the limited welfare function of the state has 
been eroded further. Dissatisfaction with the existing, oppressive socio-
political and economic conditions (and the biased practices and/or 
indifference of the state) motivated individuals and groups to intervene, 
and question, challenge and change these conditions. The mobilisations, 
spearheaded through the intervention of civil society, worked primarily 
as watchdogs over the state’s transgressions (Jayal, 2001: 27). 
For instance, the Naxalite movement and Jai Prakash Narayan’s 
Sampoorna Kranti or Total Revolution in the 1970s was a response to state 
failure to address the issues of rural poverty, uneven land tenureship, 
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unemployment, price rises, food scarcity and bonded labour. Though 
these movements were confined to certain geographical areas and the 
waves of protest came haphazardly and piecemeal, it became quite evident 
that CSOs had a role in mobilising citizens to make their demands directly 
to state bodies for implementing public policies and programmes. In 
fact, for the first time the state felt threatened by civil society and took to 
capturing the civil society space by clamping down by delcaring a national 
emergency in 1975 (Tandon and Mohanty, 2002: 37). 
With the declaration of national emergency by the Indira Gandhi-led 
Congress government in 1975, the dictatorial potential of a democratic 
state became evident. In order to seek legitimacy for its actions, the state 
took to promoting populist measures to accelerate the socio-economic 
upliftment of the poor, through actions such as strict implementation of 
land reform legislation, liquidation of rural indebtedness, abolition of 
bonded labour, participation of workers in management, prevention of 
tax evasion, special benefits to weaker sectors, etc (Tandon and Mohanty, 
2002: 38). The emergency galvanised the civil society movements, as 
democracy, citizenship and constitutional protection became issues of 
public debate.
The next generation of civil society actors emerged in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Educated and research-oriented groups of people 
moved into this sector. In the late 1980s the policies of the government 
– at the national level – began to treat the ‘voluntary sector’ as a source 
of policy engagement. The mobilisations in the 1980s were a response 
to the violation of civil liberties and human rights; the degradation of 
the environment; large-scale displacement and threats to livelihood in 
the name of development; and the destruction of tribal cultures. These 
movements spoke of new concerns, reflected a new consciousness and 
gave rise to new identities. For example, the formation of the Bharatiya 
Kisan Union (and many regional parties based on local issues and 
caste-based politics) gave rise to large-scale debates about rights and 
democracy. Ecological or environmental movements such as Chipko, 
fishermen’s struggles against mechanised fishery in Kerala and Chilika, 
and tribal upheaval in Orissa were a result of livelihood struggles by 
people whose lives depend on natural resources such as forests and the 
sea. Large-scale mass movements such as the Narmada Bachao Andolan 
(NBA) challenged the hitherto ‘closed-door’ centralised planning. These 
movements extended the frontiers of the interface between state and 
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civil society by expanding the conception of governance beyond service 
delivery and politico-economic indicators. 
Addressing the governance crisis necessitated new sets of economic 
and administrative policy reforms, under the broad rubric of good 
governance. The new mechanisms of governance, characterised by a 
plurality of actors, caused the state to lose its pre-eminence in various 
development efforts (Shylendra, 2009: 21). The 73rd and 74th Constitutional 
Amendments in 1992 and 1993 ensured citizen participation in local 
governance institutions such as Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) and 
urban local bodies. In addition there have been innovative spaces for 
public participation and deliberation, eg public hearings for improving 
community and service delivery. The emphasis on collective and 
coordinated actions of state, civil society and market institutions aimed 
to maximise growth potential and ensure participatory democracy. 
Liberalisation reforms and the consequent policies facilitating the growth 
of the private sector and local level decentralisation and mechanisms 
for the political participation of marginalised and poor citizens in 
public spaces, have provided new political opportunity structures for 
interfacing with the state. Increasingly, civil society groups are providing 
a vital mobilisation infrastructure for nurturing and coordinating 
participation in local government. They are exerting pressure on the state 
to play a strong, responsive role within the framework of sustainable 
development and democratic participation.
4. Social mobilisations for rights claims and the state’s 
response: Case studies
The case studies have been selected according to two criteria: (a) 
the nature of the issues or claims that the mobilisations framed; and 
(b) modes of interaction with the state with regard to claim issues, 
mechanisms and the responsiveness of governance institutions. A brief 
description of the case studies follows.
4.1 Meanings and expressions of rights and citizenship among 
nomadic communities in Rajasthan
This study on nomadic communities in Rajasthan describes the 
mobilisation of four nomadic communities from the Alwar district of 
Rajasthan: the Gadiya Lohar, Banjara, Bhopa and Bawariya. Each of these 
tribes has a specific occupation, being foragers, traders, blacksmiths or 
entertainers. Other than this they also depend on livestock and sustain 
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themselves by periodic, seasonal movements along long-established 
routes through the country.
The problems of these nomadic communities – having started 
with the colonial state – failed to be resolved in independent India, 
despite the state’s promise to grant equality to all citizens of the land. 
During the colonial regime, some of the nomadic communities (such 
as the Banjara and Bawariya) were branded as criminal tribes, though 
they were de-criminalised in later years. However, the stereotypes still 
persist; the mainstream community sees them as ‘born’ criminals. Such 
categorisation also puts a limitation on their recognition as legitimate 
citizens.
The traditional lifestyle and livelihood of the nomads have become 
increasingly threatened by changes in the economy. The development 
of industry and technology and the accompanying lifestyles of other 
communities have caused changes in the social relations between the 
nomadic communities and other communities. These changes began 
with the upheavals of the colonial period and took a number of different 
forms. For example, the forest regulations that were put in place 
prevented the Bawariya from collecting forest produce, an important 
item for barter which contributes to their livelihood (Pant, 2005). The 
regulations also deprived them of grazing land and free access to the 
forest. Their traditional livelihood came under increasing pressure 
because of the growing population and its impact on common lands, 
along with the commoditisation of both forests and land. Deprived of 
their livelihood, they took up alternative occupations as agricultural 
labourers, construction workers, wage sharecroppers, cattle breeders, 
night watchmen for crops and shepherds for other people’s cattle.
At the same time, the construction of roads and laying of railway 
lines during the nineteenth century was particularly disruptive to the 
migration pattern of the Banjara, who travelled in the interior and were 
often the only source of trade for inhabitants of remote areas. As their 
trade routes became useless, with the advent of the modern transport 
system, they gradually turned to casual-wage employment in agriculture, 
construction and stone mining. Similarly, the Gadiya Lohars’ traditional 
ironware for agriculture became obsolete and the Bhopa (the entertainers) 
also lost their livelihood to the new forms of entertainment that the 
modern communication and technology brought. In later years all of 
these nomadic tribes were forced into seeking alternative livelihoods 
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and a more sedentary way of life. They had no choice but to take up 
low-paid, casual-wage employment as unskilled labourers. Given their 
peripatetic lifestyle, they were also excluded from upgrading their skills 
and forging better opportunities for themselves. 
In addition, conflict with other local communities started as 
soon as these nomads tried to settle down in a specific geographical 
area. One of the recurring causes of conflict was land. Even when the 
nomads attempted to camp in demarcated government land near or 
within villages they came into direct conflict with the villagers, who 
were often supported by administrative officials with the stereotypical 
notions that these people were born criminals and not to be trusted. In 
certain instances the reaction of the local community took violent form: 
demolishing the nomads’ huts, or engaging the local administration to 
drive them away. There were also power politics at play since, in some 
cases, certain powerful villagers had already encroached on the un-
assessed revenue land (the property of the state under the revenue or 
forest department), and were not ready to give up their interests. 
It is important to note here that attempts by local communities to 
drive away the nomads were often successful, because of the lack of 
protection from the state. Since none of them had either land deeds or 
ration cards, it became easy for the local administration to overthrow 
them.
Very strangely, this goes against the promises embodied in the 
fundamental rights, fundamental duties and directive principles of state 
policy listed in the Constitution of India, which – in recognition of the 
historical, social, educational, economical and cultural disadvantages 
faced by certain groups – is committed to protecting them from 
further discrimination. Moreover, though the Ministries of Social and 
Tribal Welfare in both the central and state governments have nodal 
responsibility for establishing programmes for the social and educational 
development of scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward 
classes, they have done little to address the problem of marginalised 
groups. In the case of the nomads this has been aggravated because of 
the problem of ‘misrecognition’. They fall into different lists of scheduled 
castes, scheduled tribes and backward classes in different states; and 
although inclusion in these lists entitles them to the associated affirmative 
action and safeguards, the reality is that their way of life makes it difficult 
for them to access even the most basic rights and opportunities as citizens, 
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let alone avail themselves of any special provisions.
In effect, while the top-down bureaucratic manner of implementing 
special provisions fails to reach them they face discrimination from 
the sedentary communities and local power brokers, who exploit their 
vulnerable status to deprive them of access to their rights. Even the 
state ignores them, as many of the officials reproduce the prejudices 
and biases of wider society. The central and state government schemes 
fail to benefit them, as they do not own any land or other immovable 
property. Nor do they have ration cards, or names included in voters’ 
lists to give them legitimate status as citizens, able to demand their 
entitlements from the state. Thus, while sheer survival instincts have 
forced the nomads to occupy government land near or within villages, 
the increasing pressure of populations on land has made their claims 
contentious. In addition, their invisibility as citizens deprives them of 
shelter, water, electricity, sanitation, health, entertainment and education 
and marginalises them further.
Nomadic communities are too poor and too marginalised to take 
action and counter the discrimination meted out both by the state and 
society. Muktidhara Sansthan (MDS), a local NGO working in the Alwar 
district of Rajasthan, played a crucial role in state-society interaction. It 
mobilised nomads to raise different kinds of demands from the state. (The 
claims have been about issues such as the right to have a settled life and 
access and entitlement to basic services.) It helped to generate awareness 
and formulate strategies and claims. It also acted as a mediator with the 
state. But the state’s response was not uniform; in the case of the nomads, 
the state granted land rights in some settlements and other accompanying 
rights such as ration cards, voters’ identity cards, etc; and has also shown 
positive changes in their perception of the nomadic tribes. However, the 
NGO intervention was not welcomed and created friction. 
4.2 Multi-party accountability for environmentally sustainable 
development in Andhra Pradesh 
This case describes ways in which local NGOs mobilised the felt need 
of the local community. The issues were compensation for displaced 
people whose lands had been taken away by the state for industrial 
development, and the provision of alternative livelihoods for them. 
Under the aegis of National Thermal Power Corporations (NTPC), the 
Simhadri Thermal Power Project (STPP) was commissioned in Paravada 
(40kms from Vizag) in Andhra Pradesh (AP). The AP state electricity 
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board signed a power purchase agreement with NTPC in 1997. The 
construction work began in 1998 after land was acquired from 13 villages 
spread over three blocks (mandals) in Vizag district. The plant began 
operating at full capacity in May 2002. 
The key catalysts were loss of livelihood, compensation, 
employment, pollution and health impacts. The land acquired by the 
STPP was primarily agricultural land. Loss of grazing land meant loss 
of livelihood for those villagers who had maintained livestock such as 
buffalo, cows, sheep and goats. Fishermen lost their livelihood when 
fish were killed by effluent discharge. The acquisition of the saltpan led 
thousands of people from the coastal areas to lose their livelihood. The 
acquisition of land also affected the livelihood of a number of families 
who had worked as agricultural labourers. Loss of livelihood displaced 
people. Very few land oustees were provided with jobs. 
The STPP created a Rehabilitation and Resettlement Department to 
rehabilitate the land oustees and to undertake community development 
projects in the villages affected by the project. Community development 
programmes were undertaken, such as the digging of bore wells, 
providing furniture to primary schools, the building of individual toilets, 
the construction of toilet blocks at Z.P. High School for Girls in Paravada, 
the construction of bus shelters, road construction, reimbursement 
for short-term computer courses and tailoring courses, etc. But the 
STPP avoided the larger issues of compensation, employment and 
its responsibility towards the displaced communities. STPP officials 
claimed that providing jobs was not part of their package, as theirs is 
an automated and capital-intensive industry, which does not require 
much manpower. Compensation was made on the basis of joint land 
holdings. In Vizag, families receiving compensation were not entitled to 
any employment within the plant once it was constructed. As agricultural 
labourers did not have any entitlement to the land on which they worked, 
they did not receive any compensation. 
In Vizag Sadhana, a Paravada-based NGO has been the frontline 
organisation in the campaign against the NTPC plant. The group has 
conducted surveys of villages most affected by the plant to compile 
evidence of its impact on villagers’ lives, and to record their demands 
and how they would like to see them met. The findings were shared at 
local gram sabha (people’s forum) as well as at panchayat (rural local body) 
meetings and were fed into a people’s development plan. In Vizag there 
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has been one public hearing so far. The challenge for the NGO was to 
ensure that people get to hear about public hearings and become aware 
of the implications of development for their livelihood. 
The NGO’s experience was not very encouraging. Persuading 
NTPC to attend public meetings was difficult. Direct appeals by the 
NGO on behalf of communities have consistently been refused or not 
acknowledged. In addition, the company is required to provide advance 
notice of one month for public hearings. A notice must be placed in one 
local English-speaking newspaper and one regional-language (Telugu) 
newspaper. Details were also to be submitted to local panchayat offices to 
allow people to look over the documents. But NTPC deliberately placed 
the announcement in the least widely read local newspaper in the area, 
and the announcement was made in one edition on one day. 
5. Modes of interaction
The case studies describe the following aspects of the problem: (a) issues 
(new or re-framed claims) that gave rise to mobilisations of nomads and 
displaced communities; (b) political and social opportunity structures; (c) 
the actors; (d) the strategies; (e) spaces of contestation and relationship 
with the state; and (f) state responses to mobilisations. 
5.1 Issues
Mobilisations identify an entry point, and develop strategies to address 
the issues accordingly. In both cases, the issues were context-specific. For 
example, in the case of the nomads, entry points around which nomads 
developed strategies to act were lack of land and shelter and lack of 
access to programmes of basic services and public assistance for the 
poor. Large-scale land acquisition and displacement of people, lack of 
compensation for poor workers, non-provision of promised employment, 
and pollution and health hazards were rallying points around which 
displaced communities could raise their concerns loudly.
5.2 Political and social opportunity structures
Mobilisations do not occur in a vacuum. Political contexts stress certain 
grievances and mobilisations organise around those. Mobilisational 
actions can only be understood when seen in the broader context 
of political opportunities or structure. The structure of political 
opportunities refers to the conditions in the political system which either 
facilitate or inhibit collective action. Political and socio-cultural traditions 
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determine the range of legitimate forms of struggle in a given society. 
The degree to which civil liberties and individual rights are respected in 
a given society will also facilitate or inhibit collective action. How open 
the political system is to incorporating the interests of a particular group 
will affect the emergence of social mobilisations (Canel, 2004). 
Thus, state-created democratic spaces, policies, institutions, etc – as 
well as rights violations, the lack of responsiveness of state institutions 
and the historical exclusion of certain social groups – provide the 
immediate and current context for people to get organised and mobilise 
themselves against the state. The functional bureaucracy or public 
administration system with which social actors can interact, a local-level, 
decentralised governance system and mechanisms for the participation 
of marginalised and poor citizens in public spaces all offer local NGOs 
(social movement organisations) the opportunity to engage in public 
education and to mobilise the community in policy debates.
Poor implementation of existing policies has excluded marginalised 
groups from policy and planning decisions, though the Indian 
Constitution has provided the nomadic community with certain 
safeguards for their development and protection. Constitutional and 
legal equality – as embodied in the fundamental rights, fundamental 
duties and directive principles of state policy and affirmative policies 
– aim to protect the socio-economic and political rights of the excluded 
groups classified as Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). 
Nomads, recognised (as underprivileged groups) as SCs, STs or Other 
Backward Castes (OBCs), are entitled to benefit from affirmative action 
and constitutional safeguards. But the promise of freedom and equality 
as envisaged in the Constitution has been largely elusive to nomads. 
Because of their itinerant lifestyles, they have been unable to access the 
common rights and opportunities of citizens, for example the rights to 
self-owned land, a settled life, and access to basic services.
State-sponsored policies and programmes have failed to take 
cognisance of the basic requirements of the nomads: shelter, security 
and livelihood. Maladjustment to living in sedentary society has further 
aggravated their difficulties. Exclusionary citizenship identity and status 
has forced the otherwise voiceless nomads into actively seeking their 
claims with support from the other civil society actor, the MDS. 
In the case of multiparty accountability for environmentally 
sustainable industrial development, the liberalisation reforms of the ‘90s 
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and the resulting new industrial policy in 1991, in facilitating the growth 
of capital, ended up not protecting the rights of local inhabitants. Land 
acquisition laws still operate under the legal shadow of the colonial 
era. Under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, state agencies can acquire 
a person’s property and decide unilaterally what compensation is to be 
paid, overriding any objection from the owner. The Andhra government, 
with NTPC, acquired land for developing infrastructure, displacing 
the communities from their land and livelihood without any monetary 
compensation. The compensation saga is filled with false promises, 
cheating, bad administration and implementation, and the malpractices 
of middlemen.
Social opportunities are created by local NGOs (the mobilising 
actors), who bring people together to make claims, issue demands, forge 
collective identities, and interface strategically with the state. For MDS, 
the denial of land for shelter is a violation of constitutional rights, as 
it is linked to the denial of other basic entitlements and facilities. The 
violation of constitutional rights, government negligence, and failure 
to provide infrastructure for addressing the basic needs of the nomads 
provide the context for MDS to organise and mobilise the nomads 
against the state. Displaced communities have the opportunity to voice 
their concerns through public participation in citizen health monitoring, 
as well as people’s development plans and deliberations in gram sabha 
and in public hearings to discuss the implications of development on 
community livelihood, health and environment. When the state failed 
to force the corporations under its jurisdiction to take responsibility for 
their actions, the citizens themselves mobilised to seek a response from 
the corporations. 
5.3 The actors 
In both case studies the dominant form of social mobilisation was NGO 
intermediation. The organised efforts of NGOs mobilised the citizens to 
articulate their concerns, seek inclusion and claim their rights within the 
state-given framework. Inclusion was sought in a variety of ways: by 
critiquing the state and by demanding accountability and transparency 
from the state. The social mobilisation organisations included the NGOs 
MDS, in the case of the nomads, and Sadhana in Paravada, Vizag District, 
Andhra Pradesh. 
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5.3.1 Muktidhara Sansthan (MDS)
MDS is an NGO in Viratnagar, Jaipur District, registered in 1993 under 
the Societies Registration Act. It started with the broad objective of 
securing mukti2 from injustice, illiteracy and hunger for marginalised 
sectors of society in that area. MDS was formed as a social movement 
and a membership organisation for socially disadvantaged nomads. 
It is committed to upholding the constitutional and human rights of 
nomads, and has been extensively involved in the settlement of nomads 
on government land as well as in the establishment of their settlement. 
MDS works primarily in Alwar, with some of its efforts spilling over 
into Jaipur, Bharatpur and Dausa.
Since its inception, MDS has had to contend with different layers 
of state, including civic and municipal officials and also the forestry 
department. Relations between the NGO and state institutions are tense. 
State officials have objected to the ways in which MDS have encouraged 
nomads to occupy land. They oppose MDS activities that stretch beyond 
the provision of social welfare.
5.3.2 Sadhana
Vishishta Gramodaya Swayam ‘Sadhana’ Parishad (VGSSP) is a non-
profit, non-political, secular and voluntary youth service organisation. It 
is more popularly called ‘SADHANA’, standing for the Society for Action 
& Development of Human Awareness for National Advancement. It was 
registered in 1990 under the Societies Registration Act. 
Sadhana has been involved mainly in development issues affecting 
the weaker sections of the population and Dalits.3 It aims to raise 
awareness of and promote integrated socio-economic development for 
the marginalised urban/rural mass, particularly Dalits, the poor, and 
backward, oppressed and exploited youth and women. They have been 
amplifying the voices of the weaker communities by building alliances 
with other actors, in order to exert more leverage over state government 
and corporations. They have been exploring labour-intensive livelihood 
alternatives to employment with NTPC, where few openings have been 
created. Their relationship with the displaced communities has affected 
how NTPC responds to community concerns. 
5.4 Mechanisms 
In both case studies CSOs played a key role in equipping mobilisations and 
evolving strategies by educating all concerned. They enabled citizens to 
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engage directly in problem-solving activities and to make their demands 
directly to state bodies for the implementation of public policies and 
programmes. Mobilisations emphasised issues of deprivation and stressed 
collective participation. The diverse mechanisms used in mobilisations 
were aimed at facilitating the process of reflection, analysis and action. 
The following approaches were most significant:
• Awareness of and education about issues through personal 
meetings, public hearings, health surveys and sharing information 
with the community at gram sabha and panchayat meetings.
• Active participation and multipronged strategies. Tactics included 
collective actions (protests and campaigns); the communication 
of ideology, to make participants aware of their rights; interest 
articulation (bargaining, submission of memoranda and petitions, 
lobbying, building alliances with sympathetic elements within 
government at all levels, from panchayat to state government); and 
alliances with groups within civil society, such as unions, NGOs, 
media organisations, medical and environmental professionals, 
and engaging in dialogue with bureaucracy.
• Strengthening the capacity of the local community to address 
problem issues through legal support, livelihood support, a 
people development plan, public hearings and the formation of 
community-based organisations and forums.
Nomads are generally too poor and disorganised to have sufficient 
bargaining skills, power or resources to stake claims to their rights and 
entitlements. MDS helped them to form a collective and facilitated the 
articulation of their concerns to the state, including their demands for 
the right to ownership and control of land, the right to a settled life 
and the right to live with dignity. Besides helping them to settle down 
and providing much-needed legal aid and direct legal services, MDS 
provided mobilisation support through public hearings, processions, 
and by highlighting issues in the media in order to put pressure on the 
state to act. It also lobbied for nomads by sending them in delegations 
to meet and present their petitions to government officials. In seeking 
multiparty accountability in Andhra Pradesh, Sadhana used multiple 
mobilisation strategies – such as media exposure, direct dialogue with 
companies and government officials, public hearings, etc – to secure fair 
deals for the communities that were to host the industrial projects. They 
also built alliances with sympathetic elements within the government, 
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as well as with groups within civil society such as trade unions, NGOs, 
media organisations, medical practitioners and scientists.
5.5 Spaces of contestation and relationships with the state
In terms of policy implementation, the state actually and physically 
interacts with citizens through bureaucracy. Bureaucracy functions 
as the executive wing of the state. Hence, mobilisations by nomads in 
Rajasthan and displaced communities in Andhra Pradesh must interact 
with the bureaucrats if they want the state to implement policies which 
are already in place. 
Interaction between mobilisations and the state for the execution 
of specific policies occurs at district level. Issues of rights, citizenship, 
participation and governance are the starting point, and often define the 
community/state interface. Both nomads and the displaced communities 
are challenging the state, but only as an attempt to implement policies 
which already exist. 
The changing socio-economic scenario is forcing nomads to articulate 
their citizenship rights by linking them to the right to own land with a title 
deed, the right to a settled life and the right to live in dignity. For nomads 
the title deed to land is important for sense of ownership. The ownership 
of land would not only give them a well-defined social identity but also 
improve their access to public services, entitlements, benefits and special 
statutory dispensations for SCs, STs and OBCs. They would get respect 
and recognition from state agencies and the community. 
The state’s lack of recognition of basic rights – and also special 
affirmative rights and entitlements, which should legally and statutorily 
be available to them through the usual administrative delivery system 
– has provided the context for nomads to get organised and mobilised 
against the state. State officials are hostile to the nomads’ demand for 
land. They resist the tirades of MDS. Yet MDS is not demanding the 
withdrawal of the state, or even acting as an alternative to it. They are 
only questioning the state and pressuring it to be sensitive to nomads’ 
concerns and interests. They are demanding the inclusion of nomads’ 
interests in governance, while simultaneously challenging the nature of 
what it means to be included. They are insisting on their rightful place 
in the power structure of society. 
In the case of the struggle of populations in Andhra Pradesh, the 
mobilisation was directed at the legislative powers of a state which 
ignores the basic rights of its citizens when they are most needed. 
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The marginalised communities of fishermen and agricultural workers 
lost their livelihood; their lands were seized without any monetary 
compensation; and the environment was polluted, which affected their 
health and general wellbeing. Demands were made for the redistribution 
of developmental gains. States have the formal power to regulate 
corporate activities and to implement sanctions for non-compliance; 
citizen mobilisations against STPP in Vizag were actually a response 
to the ineffectiveness of the state at ensuring the implementation of 
business regulations.
5.6 State responses to mobilisation
The strategies of the state vary in response to mobilisations. It is generally 
supportive of social mobilisations when it perceives the ideology and 
the means of citizen mobilisation to be legitimate (Oommen, 2004: 184). 
In the case of the nomads, for instance, the state granted land rights in 
some settlements as well as accompanying rights such as ration cards 
and voter identity cards, and has also shown positive changes in their 
perception of the nomads. But when the state finds both ideology and 
means of mobilisation to be illegitimate, it tends to remain indifferent 
to the demands of mobilisations (Oommen, 2004: 184). In the case of the 
displaced fishermen, agricultural labourers and salt pan workers, the 
state was forced to accept some peripheral demands, but avoided the 
larger issues and its responsibility towards the displaced communities. 
The state did not recognise the rights of landless labourers. It undermined 
the community’s rights to land, as well as social and environmental 
rights, and refused to release information on pollution.
A reverse trend also exists. The state may respond positively to 
the demands of citizens but repress civil society activism that is overtly 
critical of the state. In the case of the nomads, the state displayed 
positive changes in their perception of the nomads’ diverse needs 
(settled living with dignity and land entitlements). At the same time 
the state resisted intervention by MDS. The tension between state and 
MDS in turn affected the nomads’ access to state resources. When the 
state or state institutions choose to be unresponsive, the chances of a 
collaborative relationship are minimal. For instance, when Sadhana 
spearheaded a citizens’ mobilisation demanding accountability on issues 
of compensation, livelihood and health, STPP (NTPC) chose to ignore it. 
Persuading NTPC to attend public meetings was a difficult task. Direct 
appeals from NGOs on behalf of communities have consistently been 
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refused or not acknowledged at all. The troubled relationship between 
CSOs and the state manifested in NTPC refusing to release information 
on pollution.
The state responds when issues – particularly those related to 
development and distribution of resources – fall within the ambit of a 
policy framework; preferably one which does not threaten the interests 
of the state. The state responded to the demands for land distribution to 
nomads because there is a policy provision for it; but in the case of land 
distribution for displaced communities in Andhra Pradesh, the state 
did not make adequate provision for the resettlement of those whose 
resources it had taken away, even though there were policies in place 
concerning resettlement. The state did not respond because the existing 
legislation – the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 – entitles the state to take 
people’s land for development. 
State actors seldom enter mobilisation spaces. They prefer 
interacting with the mobilising actors on home territory. Both the case 
studies reveal that the state/mobilisation interface was at the district 
level of administration. 
6. Outcomes
The case studies clearly demonstrate that civil society activism for the 
purpose of engaging critically with governance institutions would 
not have been possible without a functioning public administration; 
a sensitive political or administrative culture that values notions of 
common public good; and an environment for political participation. 
The lack of implementation of existing policies by state institutions, as 
well as changes in policies, triggered opportunities for collective action 
to emerge. There are several outcomes of the interface between social 
mobilisations and the state.
6.1 Shifting power equations between society and state
Mobilisations have functioned as an instrument for exerting pressure on 
the state to satisfy citizens’ demands. Both case studies illustrate visible 
changes in state practices, such as regularised settlements with voting 
rights, ration cards and title deeds, in the case of the nomads, as well as 
changes in perceptions about the needs and priorities of nomads; and 
public sector industry committing to a number of peripheral demands 
from the community in Andhra Pradesh. 
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6.2 Different modes of interaction result in differential outcomes 
In the case of the nomads, triggers for interaction between state and 
society included lack of land, shelter and public assistance from the 
state. Demands for land rights have been addressed to an extent. Such 
demands could be raised because the district-level administration has 
a framework that commits the government to giving land to particular 
scheduled-caste communities. The state has a clear obligation here. The 
situation falls under the state’s social justice framework. Peripheral 
demands – the distribution of ration cards and other minor issues – have 
been met, but the larger issue of rights has not been addressed.
In the case of the displaced communities, the triggers were under-
compensation, the displacement itself, and loss of livelihood. The 
resettlement problem comes from the developmental workings of the 
state. There is an assumption that land acquisition provides a bigger 
developmental public good, the benefits of which will trickle down. 
Though the government has a resettlement and rehabilitation policy, 
it has not worked. In the rural areas, people do not have land titles. 
Compensation based on formal land titles has marginalised displaced 
communities without title deeds even further. The displaced communities 
have been quite active in engaging with the state in conjunction with NGO 
intermediation. However, when CSOs engaged in direct confrontation 
they have been resisted. Local NGOs tried holding public hearings and 
asking certain actors to attend, but their invitations were turned down. 
Some state and private actors chose not to respond at all. 
6.3 Experiences of exclusion and inclusion 
Both the case studies report experiences of exclusion and inclusion. 
Mobilisation/state interactions were characterised by recognition and 
resource problems. Lack of recognition by state agencies of the rights and 
entitlements of nomads and displaced communities, as well as a lack of 
resources that would allow them to articulate their demands for rights 
and entitlements, have created exclusionary citizenship identities. The 
articulation of rights demands focused on both material and identity 
issues. Communities were not only demanding the redistribution of 
resources but were also asking for the appropriate institutional conditions 
necessary for the development of their identity rights. While demands 
for redistribution recognise communities’ right to be treated equally, 
recognition of identity rights underlines the need for respect for their 
specific identities.
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Various actors – the state, civil society and the people at grassroots 
level themselves – may facilitate inclusion. But the degree and content 
of inclusion varies. While exclusion usually occurs simply on the basis 
of historically deprived and socially ascribed identities, the issue of 
inclusion may be extremely challenging. Often, exclusion and the 
experiences of it are so overwhelming that inclusion seems unimportant. 
This is clearly evident in the case of the nomads. The difficulties they 
face are immense. Not only does the state not have adequate provisions 
for them, it lacks the sensitivity to grant these provisions to them. But in 
the case of displaced communities in Andhra Pradesh, we get a glimpse 
of active citizenship (Mohanty, 2006: 23–24).
6.4 Dynamics of state/mobilisation action and response
The framework of the state defines an acceptable public arena for social 
mobilisations. State policies, legislation and institutions created the 
conditions for social mobilisations to emerge. Disillusioned with the state, 
mobilisations strive to make the state realise its ideals of social justice 
and equality. They are challenging the state institutions, with a view to 
redefining policies and influencing the governance process. 
The ideology and means of social mobilisations determine the state’s 
response. From the case studies described, two empirical possibilities for 
state responses to social mobilisations (and the concomitant variations 
in the nature of social mobilisations) may be identified:
 (a) When the ideology and means of social mobilisations correspond 
to the goals and means of the state, they are perceived as legitimate 
by the state. The state’s response is facilitation. In the case of the 
nomads the state granted land rights in some settlements, as well 
as accompanying rights such as ration cards and voters’ identity 
cards, and has also shown positive changes in their perception 
of the nomads. 
(b) Both ideology and means of mobilisations may be different from 
those of the state. The state either represses such mobilisations or 
remains indifferent to them. In the case of the local inhabitants 
seeking accountability from state and corporations, the state 
and corporations chose not to recognise the rights of landless 
labourers, as they had no land entitlements. Non-provision of 
and refusal to release information on pollution is an indication 
that community rights to land, social and environmental rights 
were undermined.
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6.5 Democratic mediation
CSO intermediation has helped vulnerable citizens to interface with the 
state and with companies. In Andhra Pradesh, CSOs seeking multiparty 
accountability used multiple mobilisation strategies such as media 
exposure, direct dialogue with companies and government officials, 
public hearings, etc to demand fair deals for the communities that were 
to host the industrial projects. They also built alliances with sympathetic 
elements within the government, as well as with groups within civil 
society such as trade unions, NGOs, the media, medical practitioners and 
scientists. Alliances with other actors were an effective communications 
strategy for the purpose of engaging in detailed, proposal-oriented policy 
dialogue with government. MDS helped the nomads to collectivise and 
articulate their demands for rights.
6.6 Strategies of the state and strategies of mobilisation
The political contexts of actors involved in social mobilisations intersect 
with the strategic choices that mobilisations make. The strategies of the 
CSOs were not static. They tended to be multipronged approaches, in 
order to address the range of conditions they faced. When mobilisations 
make use of diverse courses of action they take on different characteristics. 
For instance, media actors were engaged to highlight the issue of 
contestations. Interfacing and direct dialogue with company and state 
officials helped to emphasise the seriousness of the issues. The purpose of 
the protests and campaigns was to put pressure on the state. Awareness 
raising, education and group-organising strategies aimed to sensitise 
people and strengthen their capacity to address their problems. 
The strategies of the state have been facilitation, acceding to citizens’ 
peripheral demands only and choosing to remain indifferent by not 
recognising the rights and demands of citizens and CSOs. The state has 
not enabled the nomads or the displaced communities to access rights 
and resources. Weak links between state institutions and CSOs have 
produced exclusionary forms of citizenship.
7. Conclusions
In the democratic regime in India, there is at least a visible commitment 
in spirit that accepts a broader, more inclusive understanding of 
democracy and governance. Policy processes are widely understood to 
require inclusive participation of stakeholders and involve networks of 
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actors, with different sources of knowledge and legitimacy. However, 
as indicated in the case studies discussed above, despite an enabling 
framework for citizen participation in the affairs of the local state, poor 
communities face difficulty in making their voices heard. Access to 
basic rights and entitlements depends on their capacity to mobilise, 
the strategies they adopt, the alliances they forge, and the skills and 
knowledge of their leadership.
The cases represent different types of agenda, manifestations, 
initiatives or mechanisms and responsiveness of governance institutions; 
yet from both the cases common conclusions may be drawn regarding 
the interaction between mobilisation and the state as they respond, 
influence and reconstitute each other. These are:
• Prerequisites for a mobilisation for right claims are a functioning 
state apparatus with authority to legislate, spend, and regulate 
(as in federal political systems), a system of public administration 
and a democratic participation space. Without a functioning state 
apparatus and public administration there are few incentives for 
the state (or non-state actors such as corporate bodies) to change 
policies and practices. A degree of democratic participation space 
enables citizens to mobilise for the provision and protection of 
rights and entitlements, define their modes of engagement with 
state institutions, corporate bodies and other interest groups and 
strategise different forms of collective action. 
• Inclusions, exclusions, and restrictions in democratic access to 
services and resources, entitlements and representation will 
give rise to mobilisations for rights claims. Marginalised citizens 
mobilise for inclusion and protection of their rights when their 
rights are curbed or violated by the developmental priorities of 
the state. 
• State policy bureaucracies are relevant to social mobilisations. A 
biased and insensitive bureaucracy will discourage mobilisers, 
as it fails to implement policies in the right spirit; consequently, 
there is little likelihood that the provision of collective benefits 
will reach the marginalised.
• State policies and programmes encourage, discourage, shape and 
transform mobilisations, because policies influence the future 
flow of collective benefits to the constituencies of challengers. 
Government policies and legal frameworks protect and promote 
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the relative rights and responsibilities of companies. Government 
willingness and ability to implement policies influence how these 
play out in practice.
• The state’s unwillingness to enforce policy measures undermines 
community rights to consultation and to various citizenship 
rights related to land, social and environmental issues. A lack of 
transparency in decision-making excludes citizens from engaging 
in dialogue with power-holders.
• Mobilisations are socially embedded. The claims of marginalised 
citizens concern questions of recognition of identity (within society 
and polity), redistribution of resources and the provision of public 
goods (including effective service delivery) by the state. 
• CSO intermediation is the dominant form of social mobilisation. 
The organised efforts of CSOs mobilise citizens to articulate 
their concerns, seek inclusion and claim their rights within a 
state-given framework. Inclusion is sought in a variety of ways: 
by critiquing the state and by demanding accountability and 
transparency from the state. Mobilisations adopt multipronged 
strategies (for example monitoring, campaigns, advocacy, 
networking, interfacing, lobbying, and protest) to address the 
priority problems of a marginalised community. Such strategies 
represent a community’s need for asserting rights claims.
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Notes
1 The Development Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and 
Accountability (Citizenship DRC) is an international research partnership 
exploring new forms of citizenship that will help make rights real. It 
involves a network of researchers and practitioners working with research 
institutions and CSOs located in different countries, such as Angola, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Nigeria, South Africa and the UK. The network 
of researchers and activists focuses attention on the relationships between 
poor and marginalised people and the institutions that affect their lives, 
and how these relationships can be changed.
PRIA (the Society for Participatory Research in Asia) is an international 
centre for learning and promotion of participation and democratic 
governance. It is a non-profit, voluntary organisation, promoting 
initiatives for the empowerment and development of poor, marginalised 
and weaker sections of society. Its interventions and programmes are 
based on the philosophy of participatory research and have a people-
centred approach.
PRIA has produced several studies on the exclusion of citizenship 
rights from nomads, tribals and women and also the displaced 
communities in industrial projects in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. 
The studies have explored the dimensions of exclusionary citizenship and 
the ways in which inclusive citizenship could be achieved – by citizens 
participating effectively in social, cultural, economic and political arenas 
and demanding the accountability of powerful stakeholders (mainly the 
state and private players such as industrialists).
2 Mukti means freedom.
3 Dalit is a self-designation for a group of people formerly known as 
‘untouchables’.
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3Processing democracy 
State-society relations in the 
shaping of Brazilian democracy
Frederico Menino, Alex Shankland, 
Arílson Favareto & Cristina Pompa
1. Introduction 
Since its recent democratisation, Brazil has witnessed 
substantial transformations in the ways citizens interact 
with the state. Such transformations have usually been 
observed by analysts who focused on events occurring in 
separate domains of social life. While some looked at the 
vast institutional reforms initiated after the promulgation of 
the 1988 Constitution, others preferred to investigate recent 
trends in the civil society realm, such as the emergence of new 
demands, new and organised political actors and new types of 
mobilisation. However, few accounts combine evidence from 
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different domains to explain broader processes involving civil society and 
the state. Brazil’s recent democratic history is still largely explained as a 
combination of disconnected events happening in isolated spheres. ‘State’ 
and ‘civil society’, moreover, are usually understood to be antagonistic; 
as a consequence, democracy is seen as a new mechanism for mediating 
between the ever-opposite interests of state and society. 
In this paper, we try to overcome this type of approach by treating 
democracy and democratisation as ongoing processes, rather than 
merely mechanisms. We suspend the imaginary boundaries of state and 
society and focus on the intersection points where state bureaucracies, 
institutions and players meet civil society actors, claims and procedures. 
Our focus relies on aspects such as strategies, negotiations and dynamics, as 
we believe that constant exchange (of ideas, proposals, claims, interests, 
social networks, etc) is what ultimately defines a democratic outcome. 
The article is divided into three parts. First, we look back at key 
moments that preceded the 1988 Constitution in order to contextualise 
the political and social opportunities available in the new democratic 
period. Second, we present evidence of two case studies to show how these 
opportunities have been activated by state and civil society actors in distinct 
local scenarios. Finally, the evidence of both cases is synthesised into a series 
of ‘democratic outcomes’ resulting from the patterns, forms and modes of 
interaction between state and civil society in contemporary Brazil.
On one hand, the article’s conclusions reiterate that, apart from the 
unprecedented stability of Brazilian democratic institutions, it is difficult 
to confirm that the democratisation process has been fully accomplished. 
Enduring inequality, poverty and the weakness of social rights are still 
obstacles to Brazilian democracy. On the other hand, the article goes 
beyond this general diagnosis to suggest that the persistence of such 
structural problems may be linked – at least in part – to dilemmas in the 
contemporary ways found by civil society and the state to interact. Co-
option of deliberative spaces by organised civil society groups, limited 
deliberation and the lack of state engagement in crucial areas are some 
of the democratic impediments analysed here. 
Altogether, these dilemmas reflect the dynamics of an unconventional 
democracy, one sustained on the uneasy balance between stable, 
democratic institutions on one side and unattended demands on the 
other; a stable democracy in which vivid participatory institutions, a 
modern set of laws, diverse formal channels of interaction and a strongly 
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and diversely mobilised civil society live side by side with a government 
that is merely partially responsive; a democracy in which the state’s 
response to claims remains limited, while CSOs remain largely non-
violent and trustful of the institutional channels of negotiation. 
2. Political and social opportunities: When and how were 
they put in place?
2.1 Citizenship in Brazil: the long (and unaccomplished) journey
Studies in Sociology and Political Science usually associate the notion 
of citizenship in Brazil with adjectives such as ‘conceded’, ‘regulated’ 
or ‘negative’ (Salles, 1994; Santos, 1987). Historically, citizenship has 
been regarded as a ‘favour’ or a ‘gift’ from the state rather than a 
fundamental right of all Brazilians or the result of people’s striving 
(Schwarcz, 1993). This might explain why the evolution of civil, political 
and social rights in Brazil did not follow a linear path; or why, in several 
periods of Brazilian history, some rights have been oppressed while 
others were expanded (Carvalho, 1997). Moreover, according to most 
interpreters, state-society relations based on the private management 
of public institutions and on the perception of rights as favours have – 
since colonial times – represented severe obstacles for the introduction 
of the universal principles of equality, individual freedom and actual 
separation between the public and private spheres (Faoro, 2001).
Brazil was the last American country to abolish slavery, in 1888 – 
yet it did so without establishing the minimal conditions for the social 
integration of freed slaves on an equal footing. Black people remained 
largely marginalised from the productive system, forming clusters 
of poverty in the urban peripheries or joining the landless peasant 
communities. Something similar occurred to indigenous peoples, 
who have traditionally been regarded as ‘relatively incapable’ and 
submitted to a regime of state tutorship (Fausto, 1981; Franco, 1969; 
Ramos, 1997). 
Brazil started its late but ‘accelerated march’ towards modernity 
only in the 1930s (Carvalho, 1997). After four decades of an oligarchic 
republican system (1889–1930), the country adopted a centralised 
and authoritarian political apparatus, which allowed it to promote 
a fast industrialisation process based on import substitution and a 
new immigrant labour force. The state was the central agent of this 
transformation, and the model of state-society articulation revolved 
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around the political incorporation of the social actors – industrial 
employers and urban workers – engaged in the productive process within 
a single corporatist structure controlled by the state. In this context, 
access to social rights was extended to urban workers who were legally 
registered in the state-controlled unions. However, civil and political 
rights remained strongly restricted, as rural and undocumented workers 
still did not have access to these rights. Between the 1930s and 1950s, 
state-society relations were characterised by populism and paternalism, 
which to this day are still remarkable legacies of the top-down-approach 
tendencies of the state towards society (Santos, 1987). 
After a short democratic period (1946–1964), a military dictatorship 
was established. The following decades were marked by fast economic 
growth and fierce suppression of political opposition. The so-called 
‘Brazilian Economic Miracle’, based on foreign investment, a centralised 
economy and state control over production and salaries, stimulated the 
concentration of wealth, uncontrolled urbanisation and an extreme rise 
in social inequality. 
Ironically, although civil liberties were severely obstructed, political 
rights were only partially restricted; and social rights even increased 
during the military period. Welfare benefits were expanded to rural 
workers and other excluded sectors of the population. Housing, basic 
sanitation and several social assistance programmes were implemented 
by federal agencies during the 1970s. Although these initiatives 
represented new forms of state control in the countryside, they also 
contributed to the establishment of new channels for social mobilisation 
among the rural population (Arretche, 2002). 
Another distinguishing feature of Brazilian dictatorship was that 
it kept some political institutions from the previous democratic regime 
open. The Federal Congress was kept functioning and indirect elections 
for states and municipal governments were permitted throughout the 
military years. Of course, those allowances were limited. But they proved 
to be fundamental during the democratic transition of the late 1970s, 
when official opposition channelled the growing popular discontentment 
with the military regime (Lamournier, 1988). 
2.1.1 Social opportunities 
Various forms of rural mobilisation were triggered by industrialisation 
and agricultural modernisation policies adopted since the 1950s. 
Particularly important were the Peasant Leagues (Ligas Camponesas), 
Frederico Menino, Alex Shankland, Arílson Favareto and Cristina Pompa 
75
formed in 1955 and active until 1964. The leagues fought for land 
reform and would later serve as the seeds for post-democratisation rural 
movements – particularly the Landless Movement (MST) (Navarro, 
2002).
Here the Catholic Church played a fundamental role. The Church 
began giving crucial support to emerging social movements in poor 
rural and peripheral urban areas, especially since the 1970s (Houtzager, 
2004). Comunidades Eclesias de Base, or CEBs (Grassroots Ecclesiastical 
Communities) were created in all corners of Brazil, inspired by the 
communitarian ideals of liberation theology.2 The penetration of 
Christian ideas and activists into poor communities was facilitated by the 
fact that a large part of the Brazilian population is Catholic. Furthermore, 
the Church was immune to state repression, which allowed it to become 
the main ‘interlocutor of the people’ (Levy, 2009). 
The same Catholic logic underlying the idea of community as 
something pure, original and based on family and neighbourhood ties 
gained acceptance from another segregated sector of Brazilian society: 
the indigenous peoples (Ramos, 1997). Institutions such as the CPT (Land 
Pastoral Commission), CPI (Indigenous People Pastoral Commission) 
and CIMI (Indigenous Missionary Council) emerged in this period as 
the main mediators of the indigenous people, and to this day they are 
directly involved with the coordination of indigenous demands from the 
government for land and health rights. Finally, Catholic organisations 
have provided global visibility for humanitarian issues since the 1970s, 
opening new opportunities for local groups to mobilise with the support 
of international networks.
Other social opportunities were created in the course of the 
democratisation process, as emerging parties began to consolidate their 
electoral platforms. Despite the divergences, all parties created their 
own special departments to deal with racial discrimination, indigenous 
policies and minority rights issues (Guimarães, 2002). Leaders from 
emerging black, indigenous and local rural movements were welcome 
in the new parties, where they found an institutionalised space in which 
to vocalise their demands. 
2.2 The picture at present – democratisation and reform
The transition from authoritarian government started in 1974, when the 
official opposition (the MDB) achieved unexpected results in the general 
elections for the Congress and municipal governments. The elections of 
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1974 were treated as a referendum by the population, who showed up in 
large numbers to demonstrate their desire for a less repressive system. 
In addition, discontentment with the economic situation of the country 
begun to grow as the limits of centralised administration were exposed 
and the pace of economic growth declined (Lamournier, 1988). 
However, the transition was very gradual; formal democratisation 
would not be fully accomplished until 1989, when Brazil held its first 
general elections for President since 1960. In the late 1970s some civil 
rights were slowly reintroduced, as the most severe bans imposed by the 
authoritarian rule of the time were gradually rejected. Media censorship 
was softened, amnesty was granted to political exiles, new parties were 
allowed to form and a civilian government was elected in 1985. This 
peculiarly long and negotiated process leading to democratic transition 
allowed the established elite to maintain its influence even after the 
debacle of the military regime had passed. Meanwhile, social leaders 
who had been persecuted in previous years were occupying positions 
in the state bureaucracy and working side-by-side with their historic 
enemies (Moisés, 1985).
A new Constitution was promulgated in 1988. The ‘Citizen 
Constitution’, as it was called, was guided by the principles of institutional 
decentralisation and popular participation. A broad fiscal reform process was 
also established, which determined that state and municipal governments 
would receive greater shares of tax revenues, but would consequently 
acquire new responsibilities in areas such as health, education and 
security (Arretche, 2002). 
Important reforms have also occurred since the early 1990s in 
the economic sector. After a number of frustrated attempts to reduce 
rocketing inflation and to recover the country from a ‘lost decade’, 
President Collor de Melo initiated an extensive plan in which markets 
were opened to foreign investment and more support was given to 
national companies to develop and compete globally. Later, during the 
Itamar Franco and Fernendo Henrique Cardoso eras, inflation was finally 
controlled through the Real Plan, a wide-ranging fiscal and monetary 
reform involving negotiations between various productive sectors. More 
than merely stabilising the economy and the public deficit, the Real Plan 
was decisive in that it allowed the successful implementation of several 
policies for poverty alleviation (Bresser-Pereira, 1999). 
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2.3 Social, participatory and recognition policies – new spheres of 
interaction 
In addition to its macroeconomic reforms, the post-constitutional period 
saw the proliferation of three broad types of policy: social policies for 
poverty reduction and territorial development, initiatives for popular 
participation in decision-making and the emergence of recognition policies. 
These new guidelines in policy-making completely redefined the actors, 
the strategies and the patterns of interaction between state and society.
2.3.1 Social policies for poverty reduction and territorial development 
National policies to combat poverty have been greatly extended since the 
1990s (Arretche, 2000; Almeida, 2005). During Cardoso’s period in office 
(1994 to 2002), sectorial programmes such as Bolsa Escola (cash transfers 
to families with children of school-going age), Bolsa Alimentação (credit 
for food purchases) and Auxílio Gás (credit for natural gas purchases) 
were established. Later, under Lula’s mandate (2003 to 2010), these 
programmes were integrated and expanded. Extensively advertised 
national programmes such as Fome Zero (for combating hunger and sub-
nutrition), Bolsa Família (the largest income-transfer project in the world) 
and Territórios da Cidadania (aimed at promoting social and economic 
development of designated underdeveloped territories) have reached 
over 50 million low-income Brazilians. Although minimal in terms of 
work still to be done, the overall impact of these policies on poverty and 
inequality rates was quite positive, as they took over 20 million Brazilians 
out of extreme poverty between 2002 and 2008.3 
The relative success of recent programmes combating poverty is 
attributable to many factors. First, these programmes received ever-
growing chunks of the federal budget – while less than R$400 million was 
spent on cash transfers in 1994, over R$7 billion went to similar policies 
in 2008 (Fenwick, 2009). Second, despite the institutional decentralisation 
initiated through the new constitution, social policies for poverty 
reduction have been increasingly coordinated by central administrative 
bureaucracies. In 2003, President Lula created the Social Development 
Ministry (MDS), which became responsible for integrating many of the 
social programmes previously administrated by separate government 
bodies. Growing cohesion in intersectoral policies reduced disputes 
between agencies, led to greater cohesion in government spending and 
service delivery, and resulted in an overall increase in the programmes’ 
coverage (Almeida, 2005). 
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Similar transformations happened in other social policy areas, such 
as territorial development and public health. In both of these cases federal 
programmes reoriented local politics by establishing new guidelines, 
goals and procedures to be implemented by municipal governments. 
The Unified Health System (known as SUS), for instance, stipulates 
that in order to receive federal transfers, municipalities must adapt to 
the guidelines stipulated by the national Health Ministry.4 In the area of 
territorial development policies, the Territórios da Cidadania programme 
is the ultimate example of the federal government’s attempt to integrate 
different areas of social policy under unified and nationally supervised 
programmes. Territórios da Cidadania incorporates the activities of more 
than a dozen ministries and federal agencies and had reached 120 
designated territories in the 27 states of Brazil by 2009.5 
The widespread implementation of territorial development initiatives 
– especially during Lula’s government – also illustrates the great visibility 
achieved by sustainable development rhetoric in contemporary Brazilian 
politics (Veiga, 2006). The simultaneous re-valorisation of the ideas of 
‘territory’ and ’development’ reflect the perception of policy-makers 
that poverty and regional underdevelopment were two sides of the 
same problem: greater integration of local economies should trigger the 
revival of historically marginalised areas and consequently contribute 
to poverty reduction. 
2.3.2 Popular participation in decision-making
Post-democratisation policies (in all levels of government) have largely 
incorporated the idea of participation. Since the implementation of 
the Constitution, approximately 27 000 institutionalised arenas of 
participation have been created, reaching over 5 000 municipalities across 
the country (Dagnino, 2004). These ‘invited spaces’ encompass all sectors 
of public policy, from budget planning to local development, health and 
educational policies. They also incorporate representatives from various 
sectors of civil society and the state. For this reason, these forums have 
opened up completely new institutionalised spaces for direct and regular 
interaction between grassroots movements, NGOs, unions, individual 
citizens, political parties and state bureaucrats (Coelho et al, 2007). 
This recent ‘participatory fever’ was largely influenced by three 
main beliefs stemming from the negative aspects of the military regime. 
First, government’s extreme centralisation needed to be substituted 
with forms of policy-making that were closer to the citizens and their 
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demands. Second, society also needed to share with the state the 
responsibility of supervising public service delivery, infrastructural 
projects and government expenditure. Third, popular participation 
needed to accompany the decentralisation of public administration, in 
order to guarantee a fair and transparent transfer of responsibilities to 
lower levels of government (Avritzer, 2002). 
The Health and Territorial Development councils are good examples 
of this new trend in Brazilian policy-making. The Constitution (and 
subsequent Basic Health Law of 1990) stipulated that ‘social oversight’ 
and popular participation via institutionalised channels would be 
mandatory. Every municipality and state government is responsible for 
implementing and maintaining local management councils that are to 
respond to the National Health Council. In large cities, sub-municipal or 
district health councils were  established, with membership split between 
representatives of civil society (50% of the total), public officials and 
service providers (25%) and health workers (25%). The councils became 
responsible for approving the annual plans put forward by health service 
managers at each level of government, as well as for providing a space 
for consultation and an implementation oversight mechanism (Coelho 
and Nobre, 2004). 
Regional Development programmes were also increasingly 
intermediated by institutional spaces of participation. Access to public 
funds such as PRONAF and to resources provided by national policies 
such as Territórios da Cidadania and Luz para Todos became conditional 
on public deliberation via institutionalised regional councils such as 
Consad or CBH (Coelho, 2006). Implemented in all regions of the country, 
those councils inaugurated new channels for collective deliberation, 
discussion and reinterpretation of issues related to the rights and needs 
of marginalised groups (Van Zyl, 1995). Not only has a much larger and 
more diverse group of actors become involved in influencing policy-
making, but new forms of negotiation, coalition and political mobilisation 
have emerged. As the spaces for interaction have multiplied, actors from 
both state and society have had to reinvent their strategies of action, 
reframe their collective identities and re-evaluate their collective goals 
and ideals (Scherer-Warren, 2005). 
2.3.3 Recognition policies
Since the 1988 Constitution came into effect, several affirmative action 
initiatives have been implemented. Together they recognise cultural 
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rights and determine special treatment for minority groups on issues 
that range from land and territorial rights to special access to public 
services (Cornwall and Shankland, 2008; Menino, 2009). 
This ‘realignment’ of policy focus was triggered partly by the 
emergence of global consensus on multiculturalist ideals, a good example 
of which is Convention 169 of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO).6 International initiatives such as C169 and the relatively liberal 
attitude of the country in adopting them were decisive for state-society 
relations: for the first time in Brazilian history, cultural differences and 
ethnic injustices were officially admitted. 
Internally, the recognition of ‘official difference’ was also part of 
a long-term deconstruction of what became known as the ‘myth of 
racial democracy’. The myth of a mixed, unified and peaceful nation – 
envisioned as a ‘racial paradise’, where diverse cultures and ethnicities 
coexist in harmony – had been embraced by many as the official national 
identity (Schwarcz, 1993). In the 1960s, though, the abysmal racial 
divide of Brazilian society started to be uncovered in a series of social 
studies, which revitalised old struggles for affirmative action policies 
(Guimarães, 2002). Organisations such as the Unified Black Movement 
(MNU) and the National Indigenous Movement gained political visibility 
and participated actively in the creation of the 1988 Constitution (Garcia, 
2007). 
One typical case of the use of recognition policies refers to the 
historically significant quilombo populations. ‘Quilombo’ was the name 
usually given to communities formed by African slaves who had 
either fled from their masters or were abandoned by them during the 
slavery period (1560 to 1888). Found in all parts of Brazil, many of these 
communities still exist, while others have been displaced or remain 
waiting for identification. Even though there is no consensus about the 
precise number of existing quilombos or their total population, these 
communities are usually poor, isolated and rural – even though a few 
urban quilombos have also been identified. Moreover the majority of 
the current ‘quilombolas’ – as the slave descendants are called – have no 
legal possession of the land they occupy and are thus very vulnerable 
to territorial disputes (O’Dwyer and Silva, 2000).
Article 68 of the new Constitution gave the state the obligation to 
entitle quilombo communities to the legal and definite possession of their 
land. In addition, Articles 215 and 216 prescribed the preservation and 
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promotion of Afro-Brazilian cultural heritage. Several other laws and 
institutions were created – at local, state and federal level – to attend to 
the particular demands of slave descendant groups and ethnic minorities. 
Perhaps the most significant examples are Fundação Cultural Palmares 
(the Palmares Cultural Foundation, or FCP), a national agency created 
in 1989 and linked to the Ministry of Culture, and Seppir (the Special 
Secretary for the Promotion of Racial Equality), established in 2003 
and directly connected to the Office of the President. Together, these 
institutions coordinate a wide range of policies targeting the preservation 
of Afro-Brazilian cultural history, the promotion of racial equality in the 
marketplace and universities and the improvement of the socioeconomic 
conditions of indigenous groups and ethnic minorities. 
Along with recognition policies, the number of other channels 
available for mobilisation regarding ethnic issues grew considerably 
during the 1990s. The organisation of the National Quilombo 
Coordination (CONAQ) in 1994, the networks it has established with 
grassroots movements, national and international NGOs, and the space 
it attained in the internal bureaucracies of the state are a good measure 
of the participation opportunities available there. 
3. Modes of interaction – Evidence from two Brazilian 
cases
Bearing in mind the situation described above, we must now ask: how 
have state and civil society actors taken advantage of the existing social 
and political opportunities? How did they reframe their strategies and 
forms of engagement? Consequently, what new modes of interaction 
between social movements, CSOs, parties and state bureaucrats have 
emerged in the last 20 years? 
To illustrate these questions in more detail we rely on evidence 
from two case studies. Though they are based on distinctly different 
scenarios, the cases allow a broad comprehension of some of the 
main characteristics of current state-society relations in contemporary 
Brazilian democracy. The first case gathers data from research projects 
conducted by Vera Coelho, Arílson Favareto, Frederico Menino and 
Carolina Galvanese between 2005 and 2009, in the region of Vale do 
Ribeira.7 The poorest and least developed region in the south-eastern 
part of Brazil, Vale do Ribeira has been the target of several poverty 
reduction and territorial development policies in the last two decades. 
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The presence of a number of quilombo communities and the subsequent 
conflicts involving minority groups, local elites and the state add to the 
‘experimental’ character of the region. The second case focuses on new 
forms of political engagement in the area of health policies. The case 
relies on results from Alex Shankland’s research among indigenous 
populations in the state of Acre,8 as well as from Vera Coelho’s surveys 
in the municipal health council of São Paulo.9 
Data from the two cases is organised below according to the 
three main spheres of interaction identified previously: social and (more 
specifically) territorial development policies, participatory arenas and 
recognition policies. As noted previously, these three broad sets of policies 
have not only modified the face of the state and its duties, but have also 
opened completely new fields of negotiation for state and civil society actors 
in the post-democratisation era. In the following sections we identify the 
disputes, strategies and negotiations involving civil society and state 
actors, as well as key moments of mobilisation and state response in each 
of the spheres of interaction. As we shall see, these processes resemble 
dilemmas of interaction more than interaction per se – which tells us a lot 
about current democratic processes in Brazil. 
3.1 Social and territorial development policies
Among the many social policies implemented since the early 1990s, 
health policies and territorial development programmes are certainly 
exemplary cases. In the area of health, access to public services and 
service provision itself were profoundly transformed after the 1988 
Constitution, with the creation of the Unified Health System (SUS). One 
of the key principles of the SUS is decentralisation, which has led to the 
progressive transfer to the municipalities of responsibility for managing 
primary care. Nowadays, national transfers account for 55% of municipal 
expenditures on average in the area of health (Coelho et al, 2007). 
Decentralisation of health services provision has also resulted in the 
mandatory establishment of local health councils at state and municipal 
levels. As well as guaranteeing local access to national funds, these 
councils have come to play a key role in local politics, becoming important 
arenas for participation, decision-making and public accountability for 
the government’s actions.
The city of São Paulo and the state of Acre – following the example 
of more than 5 000 municipalities and state governments across the 
country – are also part of the system. Both have implemented their 
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own local participatory councils and follow the guidelines established 
by the health ministry in order to gain access to federal funds. In São 
Paulo, around 54% of the population are exclusively dependent on the 
SUS; in Acre, this number increases to almost 65%. Although different 
in many ways, the Amazonian state of Acre and the metropolis of São 
Paulo have a long history of mobilisation with regard to health issues. 
Local movements from both places were decisive in the cycles of protests 
that led to the formation of the SUS. Today, many of those health care 
activists and organisations participate actively in the local health councils 
and some have occupied important roles in government (Cornwall and 
Shankland, 2008; Neder, 2001). 
Regarding recent territorial development, the region of Vale do 
Ribeira is an excellent experimental case, as it has been the target of 
several development initiatives over the last 20 years. As happened in 
most of the country, the rhetoric of sustainable territorial development 
achieved prominence in Vale do Ribeira within the post-democratisation 
context. Two federal policies in particular contributed to this: PRONAF 
and Territórios da Cidadania, as mentioned previously. For example, in 
2009 the federal government invested approximately US$100 million in 
Vale do Ribeira via Territórios da Cidadania. A total of 45 different projects 
run by 10 distinct ministries (from health and education programmes to 
electrification and agricultural credit) were implemented in the region 
between 2007 and 2009 (Favareto, 2006). A number of state programmes 
promoted by the Land and Agricultural Institute of São Paulo (ITESP) 
were also implemented – sometimes overlapping with (and sometimes 
adding to) the federal programmes (Menino, 2009). 
The federal and state resources made available through territorial 
development policies rapidly attracted local entrepreneurs, civil society 
actors and municipal authorities. New institutional and non-institutional 
spaces of interaction were created between these actors. In some respects 
this represented the promise that historically clientelistic forms of 
relationship between local authorities and society would vanish, as 
community organisations would have a chance to access public resources 
without the manipulatory mediation of local politicians – at least in 
theory. In other words, the usual subordination of excluded groups to 
powerful local elites would give way to more horizontal negotiations 
between civil society and all spheres of government. This should enhance 
collaboration and facilitate the implementation of development plans that 
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would address collective and regional interests rather than individual 
desires. 
3.1.1 Dilemmas of social policy negotiations
s  3TRICT REQUIREMENTS
In Vale do Ribeira, national programmes such as PRONAF (together 
with state programmes administered by ITESP), while providing new 
‘fronts’ for local actors to access public resources, also obliged these actors 
to match their strategies to the requirements of the programmes. This 
meant that while new channels were indeed opened, effective access to 
these channels demanded familiarity with the programmes’ rules and 
adherence to their guidelines and requirements. As a consequence, when 
we observe which actors have actually engaged in discussing the paths 
of territorial development in the region we notice that only historically 
organised groups managed to comply with the many technical 
requirements and follow the numerous bureaucratic negotiations taking 
place simultaneously.
In practice, it takes a high degree of coordination to really influence 
public decisions, as the interactions between local civil society, local 
government, state departments and federal agencies regarding 
development policies are rather complex and multifaceted processes. 
Local movements such as MOAB (formed in the 1980s by quilombo 
associations and local groups who oppose the construction of dams in 
the Ribeira River) and Sintravale (the local family farmers’ union), two of 
the oldest and most influential movements in Vale do Ribeira, organise 
regular protests, recruit new supporters and raise the public visibility of 
their causes. At the same time, they rely on vast networks of collaboration 
with other civil society groups in order to remain constantly informed 
about government programmes and available resources. Moreover, they 
must work continuously behind the scenes, articulating their institutional 
alliances (parties, NGOs, allies within the bureaucratic structures of 
the state, unions and national movements) in order to influence central 
government’s decisions.
It is impossible to say which of these different strategies of 
interaction is more effective – and that is why movements (as well as local 
administrators) must work with all of these strategies at the same time. 
As might be expected, small local associations, non-organised citizens 
and the more excluded groups have very little chance of participating in 
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these negotiations. Civil society’s interests tend to become more and more 
attached to the interests of powerful and well-organised local groups. 
Health policy negotiation in São Paulo is faced with a similar 
dilemma. A survey of 31 sub-municipal health councils in São Paulo 
revealed that these forums were quite inclusive, as the spectrum of 
participants included representatives from all possible classes and 
backgrounds. This appeared to oppose the assumption that local health 
councils were controlled by former health activists and historically 
organised groups (Coelho, 2006). 
However, another in-depth study showed that the decisive dynamics 
of the councils are much more likely to be influenced by representatives 
with previous links to the state and more consolidated trajectories of 
mobilisation. Unorganised, historically excluded groups and actors with 
weaker political linkages to the state – though present in the councils 
– tend to speak much less and be much less informed about the topics 
in discussions. Data also showed a strong predominance of councillors 
affiliated to or sympathetic to the Worker’s Party (PT). This suggests that, 
despite coming from diverse backgrounds, not only do councillors seek 
party affiliation – as a means to overcome isolation or lack of institutional 
affiliation – but they also share very similar affiliation profiles (Coelho 
et al, 2007).
s  ,IMITED DELIBERATION
As collective organisation is a precondition for engaging in decisive 
deliberations, both social and state actors tend to stick to their previously 
established coalitions instead of making the extra effort to find middle 
ground, consensus or deliberated solutions. 
Many of the territorial development impasses in Vale do Ribeira can 
be explained by this phenomenon. As associational representation is key 
to having one’s point of view heard (and is sometimes a requirement for 
participation in local deliberative spaces), collective actors (from both state 
and civil society) involved in deliberations over regional development 
policies will not risk threatening their alliances for the sake of broader 
and more transformative consensus. Because of the fear of becoming 
politically isolated, movements, NGOs and even local state officials tend 
to assume static positions and defend pragmatic, individualistic and 
short-term propositions. In most cases these propositions are decided 
a priori, and are defined by alliances and party agreements decided 
outside the conventional channels of deliberation. 
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Consequently, although the agenda of the rural unions and 
movements has been diversified – incorporating issues that go beyond 
strictly agrarian matters to include subjects such as market access for 
family farmers’ products and broader regional development – the 
scope of the actors actually involved in rural struggles remains almost 
unchanged compared with previous decades. In the centre of these 
struggles the main civil society actors are still technical assistance 
agencies, environmental NGOs, worker unions and movements with a 
record of political organisation and a demonstrated capacity to follow 
up technical discussions and ongoing negotiations. Among state actors 
something similar happens: although the general discourse has become 
more interdisciplinary, the political coalitions most directly involved in 
dealing with agrarian challenges are still linked to old interest groups 
that somehow block the participation of newer and more dynamic state 
actors, bureaucrats and party coalitions. 
A good example of the enduring power of conservative state 
coalitions was the drawing up of the Sustainable Territorial Development 
Plan, which was meant to be finished by the end of 2006. This plan is 
intended to help with the guidance and definition of the directives to 
be taken up by local governments in Vale do Ribeira with regard to 
environmental and social development policies. Since the plan was the 
initiative of a regional forum (Consad) linked to a federal government 
policy, it has not received support from the state government, as the 
party coalitions that control the state government (centring on the 
Social Democratic party, or PSDB) are opposed to those in control of the 
federal government (centring on the Worker’s Party, or PT). In the end, 
because no coordination between federal and state coalitions could be 
achieved, some crucial aspects of the development plan – which included 
the recognition of land titles, the recognition of quilombo territories and 
extensive investment in family farming – could not be put in place.
s  3TRATEGIC PRAGMATISM 
One consequence of limited interaction is strategic pragmatism. Once 
civil society actors and state authorities realise that broad and negotiated 
plans for territorial development are difficult to achieve they quickly 
discard long-term goals in favour of immediate projects that are more 
in their own interest. In short, what has been observed in many political 
settings in Vale do Ribeira resembles a classic game theory dilemma: 
when cooperation is threatened, players tend to abandon long-term 
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plans that would generate relatively larger public benefits, and focus 
on their own small share of the profit. 
From a civil society point of view, a clear sign of strategic 
pragmatism may be seen in the new forms of engagement with the 
state. Mass manifestation or frequent protests as strategies to force 
demands into the state’s agenda have largely been replaced by more 
targeted, institutional and objective actions. Because of certain conditions 
(participatory institutions, diversification of policies and communicative 
channels, etc), nowadays rural movements and unions tend to fight for 
more specific and concrete resources, and their bargaining strategy has 
taken the form of long-term negotiation processes – which does not mean 
aiming for long-term collective goals. Even though public demonstrations 
still happen, their goal today is to affirm a movement’s legitimacy more 
than to force the state to adopt radical initiatives. 
From the state’s point of view, strategy has also changed. As new, 
leftist parties have come to power and former movement leaders have 
assumed posts in the government bureaucracy, the attitude of the state 
in relation to social organisations has become more passive – and in some 
cases, the government has been accused of hypocrisy for its inability to 
keep its own promises. As a consequence of new strategies, identities 
and political dynamics, the expected outcomes of state initiatives are 
no longer radical transformations to Brazil’s agrarian structure. In 
contrast with what was sought by movements up until the 1960s, the 
priority today is the definition of a clearer and more effective plan for 
the development of the family farming and small producer sectors. 
Furthermore, it has been noticed that social movements, rural 
workers’ unions, local associations and local state authorities privilege 
those spaces in which it is possible to compete for resources to finance 
individual small-scale projects – rather than large, development projects 
that demand the cooperation of different sectors and localities. Strong 
evidence of such negative phenomena was amassed by Coelho et al 
(2007), who observed that more than 80% of territorial development 
projects implemented by state and federal governments in Vale do 
Ribeira since 2000 benefited only specific communities or individual 
municipalities – and consequently had no regional, inter-municipal or 
long-term scope. 
‘Limited deliberation’ and the ‘need to be collectively organised to be 
heard’ also imply that the most excluded groups – usually also the least 
organised – end up participating less and consequently receiving fewer 
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public benefits. Although it is very difficult to evaluate the situation of 
non-organised sectors of civil society accurately, it is evident that the 
social, economic and political gaps between mobilised and de-mobilised 
social actors have grown lately.
s  )NSTITUTIONAL OMISSION 
Authors such as Ricardo Abramovay and Arilson Favareto10 observe 
that territorial development policies implemented in the last decade 
resemble the dichotomy that used to divide ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ policies 
in the military years: when dealing with rural issues, the state would 
access only those bureaucracies responsible for ‘social’ policies, while 
infrastructure projects, economic stimulus plans and higher investments 
would be channelled exclusively to urban areas. In this context, current 
development policies involve ministries and state agencies that deal with 
the provision of basic services and social security. Agencies with larger 
budgets, linked to the ministries of Science and Technology, Trade and 
Industry, and Tourism and Planning, have usually been left outside 
territorial development policies, limiting the transformative impact of 
such initiatives on historically excluded regions. 
This same ‘institutional omission’ is noticed in Vale do Ribeira, 
where only some parts of the state bureaucracy were mobilised to deal 
with territorial development issues, while other parts remained pretty 
much out of the game. An evaluation of all projects (both federal and state 
government) related to territorial development being discussed in inter-
municipal arenas of the region between 2002 and 2006 concluded that 
the only ministries and state secretaries involved were from the ‘social’ 
sector. No infrastructure department or ‘large budget’ state secretaries 
were identified, either as main promoters of territorial development 
policies or as collaborators in policies of this kind promoted by ‘social’ 
state bureaucracy (Favareto, 2006). 
Significant transformation in health service provision also remains 
an unresolved issue due to a lack of institutional capacity and bold 
investments in the area of health. When we consider the situation of 
indigenous groups in Acre, we see that the recognition of indigenous 
claims to specifically targeted service provision has contributed to a 
great rise in overall spending on indigenous health. This has certainly 
contributed to overall improvements in health indicators, although 
indigenous Brazilians continue to have by far the worst health status of 
any group of citizens. 
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In the region covered by the case study, the Alto Juruá DSEI in 
Acre, the indigenous infant mortality rate remained three times higher 
than that of the state’s non-indigenous population in 2007, but this still 
represents significant progress by comparison with 2000, when it was 
five times higher. This is partly because of lack of involvement by more 
decisive ministries, as well as the absence of long-term plans to improve 
the health conditions of indigenous groups. Temporary policies and 
random investments are being made that did not exist until recently. 
But this doesn’t seem to be enough, as ‘richer’ state bureaucracies do 
not commit to the larger impact plans. 
3.2 Recognition policies
The great concentration of quilombo communities in Vale do Ribeira and 
the high number of indigenous populations in Acre make the two cases 
investigated here good examples of recent recognition policies and how 
they have transformed state-society interaction. 
In Vale do Ribeira, the quilombo issue gained visibility with the 
emergence of a local movement (Eaacone11) in the early 1990s and the 
implementation of new laws guaranteeing special rights and benefits 
to slave-descendant minorities. These policies and the debates they 
stimulated consequently have been closely linked to the unfolding of 
the quilombo issue in the national scenario since the 1988 Constitution. 
The Constitution ignited numerous controversies by giving the state 
the obligation to entitle quilombo communities to the legal and definite 
possession of their land. However, the new laws did not specify 
exactly what a quilombo is, how the state should proceed to identify 
the communities, or what steps should be taken to transfer private and 
public territories to the communal ownership of quilombo associations 
and their members. 
In order to supplement the imprecise federal legislation, the state of 
São Paulo followed the example of other states in the country and created 
its own laws determining the procedures for recognising and entitling 
quilombo territories. These laws, in place since 1997, usually overlap with 
federal legislation, generating new disputes.
In addition to the laws, many social programmes targeting quilombo 
communities were created at federal and state level and implemented in 
Vale do Riveira. Programa Brasil Quilombola and Territórios Quilombolas 
are two of the many examples of policies that served as a complementary 
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stimulus for local communities to organise over ethnic issues and 
minority claims. 
Local quilombo communities use many mechanisms of interaction 
to access the state: they participate in national and regional hearings 
(since the implementation of the requirements of Convention 169, the 
government is obliged to consult the quilombos about projects that might 
affect their livelihood and lands); they have open access to state and 
federal legislators who support the quilombo cause; and they are in close 
contact with the national quilombo movement (Conaq) and international 
advocacy networks (Menino, 2009).
The Constitution also boosted profound transformations in Acre’s 
political scenario. New legislation and new mechanisms intended to 
address the growing health needs of minority groups – in particular, 
the indigenous populations of the state – were created and diversified, 
powering an emergent indigenous movement. In 1999, an alliance 
between local indigenous movements and health reformers succeeded 
in pushing through a law mandating the creation of an indigenous 
health subsystem, which is meant to be coordinated as part of the 
national system (SUS). Their argument was that the universal health 
care system did not respond adequately to indigenous peoples’ right 
to difference, since it recognised neither their territories (which often 
extended across state and municipal boundaries used to organise the 
SUS) nor their specific cultural practices and understandings of health 
and disease. The law ordained that the subsystem should be organised 
around Special Indigenous Health Districts (Distritos Sanitários Especiais 
Indígenas, or DSEIs) and should respect the cultural differences of 
indigenous peoples.
3.2.1 Dilemmas of state/minority interaction
s  3TATE CAPACITY AND VOLATILE LEGISLATION
According to Conaq there are over 5 000 quilombo communities 
spread over 25 states and occupying a total area of 240 000km2. The 
federal government officially recognises the existence of 1 408 of these 
communities. Regardless of the accuracy of these numbers, the fact is 
that only 98 quilombo territories and a total area of 6 700km2 have been 
entitled in the whole country since 1988. 
In the first place, this reflects the state’s lack of institutional capacity 
to address the quilombos’ demands. The state seems not to have the 
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resources or disposition to acquire large portions of private land and 
transfer them to quilombo associations. As a consequence, the identified 
quilombo communities only receive short-term compensation benefits 
via targeted and minority policies. 
In the second place, the slow pace of the state in concluding land 
entitlement processes is because of the confusing legal framework that 
deals with the quilombo issue. In the last two decades Congress, state 
governments and autonomous federal agencies – attempting to overcome 
the gaps of the constitutional text – produced a number of independent 
normative instruments, laws and decrees. Some norms follow Convention 
169 and defend the quilombos’ right of self-recognition; others argue 
that recognition should be made exclusively by state authorities; some 
norms attribute the main responsibilities for quilombo entitlements to 
federal agencies, while others pass the same responsibility on to state 
governments. As might be expected, the overall result is a dysfunctional 
legal framework characterised by a multiplicity of overlapping and 
contradictory norms.
Besides these shortcomings, the quilombo legislation changes 
very frequently, which affects both state and civil society strategies 
of interaction. From a civil society point of view, mobilisation over 
recognition policies becomes very challenging, as only a few, well-
organised groups are able to keep up with the technical discussions over 
the definition of a cohesive legislation. From the state’s perspective, the 
fluid aspect of the legislation and the endless debates surrounding it have 
allowed authorities to avoid long-term commitments coupled with truly 
transformational policies – policies capable of minimising the structural 
inequalities affecting minority groups. 
Such a paradox is clear in the case of Vale do Ribeira. Similar to the 
situation in the national context, the legal situation of the local quilombo 
communities is still very uncertain: only six communities have been 
fully entitled to the lands they occupy, while another 39 wait for their 
processes to move forward.
From a political perspective, what is noticeable is that federal, 
municipal and state politicians are not willing to face the costs of long-
term commitment to the quilombo cause. While these actors want to 
be associated with immediate improvements in the quilombos’ socio-
economic conditions, they are usually conspicuous by their absence 
when it comes to land entitlement. Authorities from all spheres of 
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state (from legislators to government executives and bureaucrats) are 
normally reluctant to commit to land transfers to quilombo associations, 
which involve high economic costs as well as unpopular negotiations 
with powerful sectors. In short, few seem interested in enforcing what 
is prescribed in the Constitution.
A good example of another aspect of the same dilemma may be seen 
in the case of indigenous health policies in Acre. There, the creation of 
the indigenous subsystem, far from accommodating divergent interests 
and contributing to long-term improvement in health conditions, served 
to deepen historic bureaucratic battles between different state agencies 
in charge of dealing with indigenous issues. 
The most complicated of these battles occurred (and is still ongoing) 
between FUNASA (the executive agency of the Ministry of Health) 
and FUNAI (the federal indigenous affairs agency). FUNAI had been 
responsible for health service provision for indigenous peoples since 
its creation by the military regime in the late 1960s. But after years of 
budget cuts and growing dissatisfaction of the indigenous groups with 
the services provided by the poorly trained FUNAI health officers, the 
institution was finding it difficult to maintain coverage. In the view of 
indigenous leaders and partner organisations, indigenous Brazilians 
were getting a second-class service. The impacts of such institutional 
disputes on the quality of health services, as well as on the effectiveness 
of state society interactions, are many – and they are usually negative.
s  -INORITY MOBILISATION AND SCARCE BENElTS
It seems no accident that the only six entitled quilombo communities in 
Vale do Ribeira also happen to be the most mobilised. Their community 
associations are the oldest in the region, their leaders helped to found 
the local quilombo movement and such communities were the first to 
establish strong political alliances with NGOs, academics and the national 
quilombo movements. In short, there is little doubt that the older history 
of mobilisation of these six communities was fundamental to the early 
achievement of their land titles. These examples of political mobilisation 
are slowly being followed by many other quilombo communities which 
have recently organised and have submitted their demands to the state. 
However, the benefits given to already-entitled quilombo 
communities sometimes had a perverse effect on the overall potential of 
political mobilisation for minority issues. In the first place, the inequality 
between entitled and non-entitled communities tends to grow, as the 
Frederico Menino, Alex Shankland, Arílson Favareto and Cristina Pompa 
93
most organised ones are more likely to reap the economic, social and 
political benefits that come with state recognition and entitlement. 
Hence the more access entitled communities have to public resources via 
recognition policies, the more dependent they are on these transfers. As 
a consequence, the motivation of already-entitled communities to fight 
for entitlement for other communities tends to decrease over time. 
As observed in the Vale do Ribeira case, political mobilisation 
concerning minority issues tends to take a negative route when faced 
with the scarcity of public resources made available through recognition 
policies. Although quilombo communities collaborate in joint activities 
(marches, protests, etc), share the same aspirations and exchange 
mobilisation experiences, they fight fiercely for public resources. 
Alex Shankland’s research also shows evidence of widening 
inequalities among indigenous communities in Acre. Accordingly, 
groups that had developed more successful mobilisation strategies and 
direct links with the state (often mediated by political parties and civil 
society groups who had access to policymakers in the Worker’s Party-led 
Acre state government) benefited from more regular service provision, 
while other groups remained underserved or completely excluded from 
coverage.
However, the research demonstrated that indigenous representatives 
– including some belonging to the most historically marginalised 
‘minorities within the minority’ – are becoming increasingly skilled and 
sophisticated in their strategies and tactics of engagement with the state. 
The experience of engagement with the indigenous health subsystem 
has trained a generation of ‘mediators’, who are beginning to translate a 
broader set of demands into language the SUS can understand – demands 
that focus not on simple inclusion but on transformation of the health 
system to accommodate the reality of a pluriethnic Brazil.
s  3TATE RACISM 
Another way of interpreting the unwillingness of state authorities to 
commit to long-term transformational recognition policies is that it 
is what authors like Lilia Schwarcz label ‘state racism’ (1993). Even 
though terms such as ‘indigenous rights’ and ‘minority demands’ have 
become much more common in the state agenda, and although new 
ministries and agencies have recently been created to deal exclusively 
with these peoples’ particular demands, the reality is that in most cases, 
recognition policies are extensions of universal social policies aimed at 
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combating poverty as a whole. Instead of addressing specific demands 
from historically marginalised groups, government often invents new 
names for old policies. 
This evidence allows many observations about the ways in which 
the state currently interacts with society, and particularly with society’s 
segregated minorities. First, the ‘myth of racial democracy’, although 
deeply contested in the academic and political fields in the last 30 
years, is still a feature in the modus operandi of state bureaucracy. 
State bureaucracies do not know how to deal with particular demands 
in pragmatic terms. When pressured to promote affirmative policies to 
combat racial and ethnic inequality, all spheres of government usually 
step back, arguing that the racial divide in Brazil is not as bad as it seems 
to be. In Vale do Ribeira, this is also often the case: local administrators 
declare themselves in favour of quilombos, but when asked to provide 
special schools and land titles they do not consider it necessary.
3.3 Participatory arenas (‘invited spaces’)
As mentioned above, a number of institutionalised arenas for popular 
participation have been inaugurated since the 1988 Constitution. 
Alongside administrative decentralisation, ‘popular participation in 
decision-making’ became the motto of the new democratic period. 
Thereafter, all sectors of policy-making incorporated participatory 
mechanisms to allow direct deliberation between state and civil society 
representatives. The areas of health and territorial development were 
no different. 
In Vale do Ribeira, two ‘invited spaces’ are significantly important 
and have been investigated in depth by previous Cebrap studies: the 
Ribeira basin Water Resources Management Committee (CBH) and the 
Consortium for Food Safety and Local Development (Consad). These 
inter-municipal forums cover 23 and 25 municipalities respectively.
They discuss local development plans, accompany the implementation 
of development policies and allocate resources to individual projects. 
Both forums play a central role in the everyday life of the region. This 
happens in part because they deliberate on large resources, which may 
vary between $65 000 and $2 million per project. CBH and Consad also 
deliberate on controversial issues. Consequently, they are arenas in which 
antagonistic interests clash and are (sometimes) negotiated. 
The participation of civil society in the two forums is considerable 
– even though participation is only opened to representatives of 
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organisations, and autonomous citizens cannot run for council. Overall, 
it can be argued that both forums have opened active channels of 
communication between public managers and civil society, and have 
contributed towards developing opposing political views with respect 
to polemical issues such as the construction of hydroelectric plants and 
the implementation of sustainable development policies (Coelho et al, 
2007).
In São Paulo and Acre no other space represents the recent 
transformations in health policies better than the local Participatory 
Health Councils. Over time, there has been a broad shift in the nature of 
the activities of the popular health movements and in their engagement 
with the state. In the 1970s there was a predominance of direct action, 
with large-scale popular mobilisation and pressure on the administration 
through marches and petitions. During this period the state was perceived 
as opposing the interests of the popular classes, and the movements 
refused to engage in any more far-reaching form of interaction that might 
lead to the subordination of these interests and the undermining of the 
movements’ dynamism (Neder, 2001: 92). In the 1980s, however, this 
pattern began to change, with the creation of popularly elected health 
councils and the start of the democratisation process. This began a trend, 
among popular movements, towards the occupation of representation 
spaces institutionalised by the state (Neder, 2001). 
As stated above, soon after democratisation many activists from the 
health movement – because of their direct involvement in the foundation 
of the new democratic parties – began occupying positions in the 
municipal, state and federal bureaucracies. In Acre and São Paulo – as 
in all other parts of Brazil – nominations of former health care activists 
for positions in local health bureaucracies became quite frequent.
3.3.1 Dilemmas of institutional participation
s  #OOPTATION
The debates and public hearings promoted by Consad and CBH, though 
attended by representatives from diverse sectors of civil society and the 
state, are usually monopolised by a few organised groups. In Consad, 
party coalitions and unionised representations normally set the tone of 
the debates and deviate what were meant to be public discussions into 
deliberation over private and corporative interests. In CBH, something 
similar occurs with regard to the participation of MOAB (the anti-dam 
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movement led by the quilombo associations). The movement – by far 
the most organised of the civil society organisations represented at the 
forum – insists on always discussing the Tijuco Alto hydroelectric project, 
forcing this issue to be permanently at the top of the forum’s agenda. 
This attitude usually hinders the capacity of CBH to discuss other 
matters of public interest. Moreover, the pressure exerted by MOAB 
contributes to the polarisation of opinions regarding the construction 
of the dam and the ‘mono-thematisation’ of the forum’s agenda. The 
result – once again – is lack of deliberation and reduced consensus 
(Coelho et al, 2007). 
The completely different case of participatory health councils 
resulted in another typical type of co-optation: the negative influence of 
party affiliation and political trajectory on the dynamics of invited spaces. 
Qualitative studies on the internal functioning of health councils in São 
Paulo and Acre confirmed that, despite the variety of representatives 
in the councils (judging from their socio-economic, cultural and ethnic 
backgrounds), many of the discussions, decisions and deliberations that 
take place within the councils are ultimately determined by interests that 
are set by political alliances outside the council. 
In her 2007 study, Vera Coelho demonstrated how the trajectory of 
social mobilisation (as well as the history of civil society engagement) in 
certain São Paulo districts ended up determining not only the degree of 
inclusion in those districts’ forums but also the ‘quality’ of deliberation 
found there. As stated, in districts with a record of popular mobilisation 
around health issues the councils tend to be more ‘vivid’ (more people 
participate in the meetings regularly) and ‘inclusive’ (the members 
come from more varied backgrounds). However, though located in 
districts with a history of social mobilisation, these same councils do 
not present great innovations in terms of their day-to-day operation. In 
many cases, vibrant councils are also the ones most likely to replicate 
the pre-established positions of the health movement, and of old health 
care activists with well-known connections with the state bureaucracy 
and the ‘health policy sector’. Innovative institutional designs and more 
effective forms of interaction between state and society actors are not 
necessarily more easily found in the most vibrant participatory arenas, 
though one might expect them to be.
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s  ,ACK OF STATE ENGAGEMENT
Another challenge for Vale do Ribeira’s territorial development forums 
is the difficulty found in engaging public authorities – especially the 
representatives of the state government – in the forums’ discussions. 
Similar to the experiences described in the ‘institutional omissions’ 
section above, state government officials have not only failed to deliver 
on major responsibilities; they have also encouraged the creation of 
parallel regional arenas with missions that are very similar to those of 
Consad and CBH. 
Hence, once state authorities see that their participation in the 
regional forums will not generate any extra political gain and will thus 
only involve costs, they tend to look for alternative arenas in which 
they can attain greater public visibility. As a consequence, territorial 
development arenas such as Consad and CBH, though planned to 
strengthen communication between society and state, end up weakened, 
or have to face competition from other, similar forums. Government 
representatives effectively only participate in these forums’ debates 
when the subjects discussed interest them directly (for instance, when 
large projects and large public resources are deliberated). In other cases, 
state government and its most important agencies simply ignore the 
regional discussions.
s  -ULTIPLE CHANNELS VS BROAD DELIBERATION 
There is no doubt that the new, institutionalised arenas of participation 
have contributed to the inauguration of new channels of communication 
between society and state, diverse and more complex forms of 
mobilisation, wider political networks and a richer and more democratic 
exchange of ideas between social and state actors. However, having 
observed the political processes that have occurred in the last two 
decades in Vale do Ribeira, it is possible to say that the routinisation 
of mobilisation activities has also exposed some negative and limiting 
aspects of institutionalised participation.
Many of these aspects may be related to the multiplicity of 
participatory arenas. In the first place, by having to participate 
simultaneously in a number of different spaces, local social movements 
have few choices but to adopt the recipe of verticalisation plus 
pragmatism. Movements such as MOAB and Sintravale not only need 
to make themselves heard in regional forums such as CBH and Consad; 
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they also need to guarantee their space in the many local sectorial councils 
(for example, the Municipal Health Council, Education Council, and 
Agrarian Council), which also deliberate on important local demands. 
Unless these movements develop a disciplined structure to help 
coordinate overlapping agendas and activities, they cannot succeed 
in the region’s politics – either because they are unable to defend their 
supporters’ interests or because they have no capacity for dialogue with 
the state if they must do so in multiple matters. Therefore, considering 
that their movements’ resources are scarce, the only possible way to 
achievecoordination is by concentrating the responsibilities in the 
hands of a few leaders and by verticalising the mobilising structures. 
Consequently, more and more power is given to a few social leaders 
and more and more emphasis is given to pragmatic action and short-
term goals. 
In-depth interviews with members of MOAB illustrate how 
pragmatism has an impact on the participation of local movements in the 
region’s institutionalised arenas of participation (Menino & Galvanese, 
2005). When asked about the importance of CBH, members of MOAB 
declared that they do not recognise the forum as a strategic and legitimate 
space for negotiating territorial development plans. The committee is 
seen purely as a source for information and a place where the movement 
can present itself and raise public awareness about the construction of the 
Tijuco Alto dam. Participation takes place not to discuss and negotiate 
ways of taking all parties involved in the conflict into account, but to 
clarify their radically opposite ideas. In this sense, participatory spaces 
(according to MOAB leaders) are important for consolidating alliances 
formed outside of the forums, but not for building new coalitions. 
It seems that ‘coalition freezing’ is a second problem associated 
with a multiplicity of participatory arenas. Because movements do not 
believe in invited spaces as places to form new agreements, they tend 
to stick with their old partners, contributing even more to the decline 
of deliberation. Local movements often opt to engage in alternative 
spaces, such as the Forum of Entities Against the Dam. This forum brings 
together various organisations opposed to the construction of Tijuco Alto 
and which support the quilombo cause. However, these actors had all been 
previously connected, which means that the new forum is no more than 
a formalisation of pre-existing mobilisation activities and alliances. 
This vicious circle has contributed to reinforcing the exclusion of 
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the poorest segments of the local population, which are not effectively 
organised and so must be represented indirectly, by third-party 
organisations. Therefore, even though the assortment of activities 
performed by the social movements has been diversified in the last 
few years, the movements’ activities have routinised narrow forms of 
interaction with the state. In Vale do Ribeira, the lack of deliberation 
in regional arenas of negotiation and the several impasses regarding 
territorial development and recognition policies are related to a certain 
degree of accommodation in the actions of the social movements. Civil 
society organisations tend to speak only with the few privileged state 
interlocutors who usually listen to their claims. No further effort is made 
– by either civil society or state actors – to strengthen communication 
between the radically different ends of the political spectrum.
In Acre, in addition to consolidating the Indigenous Health 
Subsystem, indigenous groups began participating in the activities of 
the health councils established by each of the social oversight institutions 
(DSEIs). There, as in São Paulo, interaction between state and social actors 
in the institutionalised arenas of participation has also been hindered. 
In many of Acre’s DSEIs there were clear contradictions between this 
mode of engagement and that of direct involvement in service provision. 
This contributed to tensions within the indigenous movement, since 
only a small elite of the movement was centralising all communication 
with the state. 
Interestingly, the movement responded to these tensions by 
combining contradictory strategies of ‘orderly’ participation in formally 
recognised state spaces and ‘unruly’ engagement through direct action. 
This direct action included the kidnapping of non-indigenous health staff 
working in the villages and the occupation of FUNASA offices by groups 
of war-painted warriors whenever Movimento Indígena leaders perceived 
that FUNASA’s endemic bureaucratic mismanagement, corruption and 
neglect was leading to unnecessary deaths in their communities.
4. Final remarks: Dilemmas and outcomes of 
contemporary democratic processes 
Few would disagree that democracy in Brazil has never been as strong 
as it is today. There are many signs pointing to this positive diagnosis. 
From a normative point of view, state repression of social movements 
and opposition parties – fairly common, not too long ago – is no longer 
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tolerated. Basic civil and political rights are respected by law and 
effectively guaranteed by the state. Democratic institutions such as free 
and regular elections are also well established, working and stable. 
Furthermore, as observed in this article, current democratic processes 
reveal that state bureaucracies are somewhat receptive to civil society’s 
demands. Leaders from old and recent social movements, unions 
and civil organisations all find space within the state bureaucracies 
to manifest their demands and interests publicly. Be it through the 
many participatory arenas created in the last three decades, through 
various local, regional and federal agencies or through the emerging 
political parties, activists from diverse sectors of civil society have found 
numerous new channels through which to have their demands heard. 
Finally, not only has more attention been given to marginalised sectors 
of society, but these sectors have also obtained new resources from a 
wide array of social policies that aim to reduce poverty and empower 
historically excluded minorities.
Nevertheless, Brazilian democracy is still paradoxical in many 
ways. State-society interactions are still characterised by procedural 
difficulties that, grouped together, work as impediments to definite 
democratisation. 
Vivid and institutionalised arenas of participation exist, but the 
major guidelines of development plans and social policies are still 
elaborated within restricted state bureaucracies. A multiplicity of social 
and recognition policies have been put in place in the last two decades, but 
‘mysterious forces’ and particular modes of interaction still allow the state 
to deviate from long-term commitment and transformation. Institutional 
omission is a common trend when state negotiates with society – while 
‘social’ and ‘cultural’ departments of the state are designated to deal with 
the demands of society, the agencies with the largest budgets remain far 
from the reach of organised sectors of civil society. 
One apparent negative consequence is that movements are 
increasingly adopting pragmatic and self-oriented strategies. Multiple 
arenas of interaction and the scarcity of public resources in the form of 
compensatory social policies have also contributed to limited interaction 
between state and society actors, as the organised sectors of civil society 
prefer to guarantee their share of available profit instead of trying to 
negotiate larger and longer-term development plans. 
To conclude, state and civil society in Brazil are interacting in 
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broader forms than ever before. These interactions are richer, more 
inclusive and more diverse than in any other period of Brazil’s short 
democratic history. However, it is still not possible to confirm whether 
these current interactions will lead to more deliberative processes or 
to more horizontal negotiations between state and society. It is still 
not clear that the marginalised sectors of civil society will participate 
effectively in the construction of Brazil’s long-term (and long-desired) 
development. 
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4Where are the democratic mediators? 
Making sense of state complacency and popular 
frustration in South African state-society relations
Laurence Piper, Chris Tapscott 
& Lisa Thompson
Introduction1. 
This paper examines the promise of formal ‘spaces of 
engagement’ and other modes of interaction between the 
state and society in South Africa by focusing first on the 
broad socio-economic and political trends that have shaped 
society and the state in order to understand state-citizen 
relations in South Africa today. We provide a brief overview 
of the historical forces which gave rise to the democratic post-
apartheid state, as these continue to shape power relations. 
We point out that while the nature of the state has changed 
somewhat, the balance of power between the state and the 
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citizenry is as lopsided as it has been for most of South Africa’s history. 
This affects current modes of interaction in significant ways. The broader 
development of state-societal relations and our two case studies of 
formal engagement, as well as more multiple strategies of participation 
presented here, show that the power balance is still tilted significantly 
towards the manipulation of political and social opportunity structures 
by the state.
Despite some initiatives to institutionalise public participation in local 
governance, poor institutional design wedded to an indifferent dominant 
party and a compromised officialdom has led to unresponsive local 
governance. Out of frustration, local communities have turned to the anti-
apartheid methods of protest, which tend to get better results; although 
these moments are not united into a general campaign or a coherent 
national organisation committed to pursuing democratic development. 
Grassroots social movements tend to have very loose organisational 
affiliations; SANCO, for example, has some influence – though it has been 
weakened – in many urban townships, as do housing movements such as 
Abhahli base Mjondolo. Thus while there is clear potential for progressive 
social movements to re-emerge and root governance more successfully in 
the popular will, this is yet to happen in ways that substantially challenge 
government. Indeed, the desire for democratic mediation of popular 
demands has found expression in the populist politics displayed by the rise 
of Zuma in the African National Congress (ANC) and the recent outbreak 
of xenophobic attacks across the country in 2008.
The historical context: Opportunity structures and 2. 
social mobilisations
This section outlines the key characteristics of the structural relations 
of power and wealth, and the resultant struggle for rights by the 
majority of the population, which has typified South Africa’s history. 
Particular attention is paid to the local level of governance. This section 
also describes the largely repressive character of state-society relations, 
defined by an identity politics of racial hierarchy and exclusion. While – 
for most of South Africa’s history – state power has not been substantially 
threatened by social mobilisation, there have been episodic periods of 
significant mobilisation which threatened white rule. The most important 
of these came in the 1980s and culminated in the democratisation of the 
political order. 
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2.1 The struggle for political rights
Unsurprisingly, social mobilisation in contemporary South Africa 
continues to be influenced by the impact of three centuries of colonial 
and white minority rule. For the vast majority of citizens, their history 
and that of their forebears was of constant resistance, first to conquest 
and subsequently to subjugation by successive white settler minority 
governments. The state forms that emerged during this era were mostly 
oriented to the control of the indigenous population and to ensuring 
that they contributed cheap labour to the settler economy. Thus, in the 
subjugation of the indigenous population during the 1800s, both the 
Boer settlers and British colonial governments made a conscientious 
effort to subvert or (in many instances) eliminate traditional forms of 
government. In extending Western notions of government to South 
Africa, no consideration was given to the rights of the indigenous 
population; nor were they considered citizens in any positive sense of 
the word.
Space prohibits discussion of the state systems prevalent in the 
British colonies and Boer republics or of the power struggles between 
them that led up to the Anglo-Boer war of 1898–1902. Suffice it to say 
that the imperialist ambitions of the British government which led to the 
war also led to the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910. 
The establishment of the Union served to unite the two Boer republics 
and the two colonies into one sovereign state. However, the process 
also set in motion a train of legislation which effectively excluded the 
black majority from the political process and culminated in the racial 
separatism of apartheid. A battery of laws, commencing with the 
Natives Land Act of 1913, progressively discriminated against the black 
population (Marx, 1998). 
Although the Union brought together the previously antagonistic 
Boer and English settlers into a government of national unity (at the 
expense of the black population), segments of the Afrikaner population 
considered that the arrangement prejudiced their people politically, 
culturally and economically. Consequently, the 1920s and 1930s saw the 
rise of Afrikaner nationalism and ultimately the victory of the Nationalist 
Party in the elections of 1948 (O’Meara, 1983). The National Party rose 
to power on the ‘separate development’ or ‘apartheid’ ticket, which 
promised to elevate the status of the previously disadvantaged Afrikaner 
people – and whites in general. The policy of separate development was 
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portrayed in strongly ideological terms as the only possible solution to 
the country’s complex racial setup. Under this rubric, the white ‘nation’ 
(presented as an undifferentiated unity) would be able to maintain its 
integrity and cultural identity. At the same time, the diverse ‘nations’ said 
to constitute the African population would be able to progress at their 
own pace in their own designated ethnic rural homelands (Bantustans), 
free of corrupting external forces.
From the outset, then, apartheid served to divide African opposition 
to the state. It did so by inhibiting any prospects of an alliance between 
urban workers and rural peasantry, and subsequently by reinforcing 
(or manufacturing) ethnic distinctiveness within the African population 
(Moerdijk, 1981). By setting urban workers against migrant workers, Zulu 
against Xhosa and so forth, the Bantustan system was able to dissipate 
resistance to white rule. This process was reinforced by the fostering of a 
small collaborative African elite, drawn from the ranks of the Bantustan 
bureaucracies, tribal authority leaders and small traders. Through the 
services of this elite, whose economic and political existence relied on 
the maintenance of ‘separate development’, the state was able to operate 
a form of indirect control and repression, at least in the homelands 
(Mamdani, 1986). Moreover, the state was structured primarily to satisfy 
the interests of the white population, including their privileged access 
to the means of production.
Thus the apartheid policies were intended to serve a variety of 
objectives, including the reinforcement (albeit uneven) of the process of 
capital accumulation through the exploitation of cheap black labour, the 
maintenance of class cohesion within the dominant white population (and 
within the Afrikaans-speaking population in particular) and ultimately 
the control and subordination of the black majority. From the late 1950s 
to the early 1970s the apartheid formula fulfilled these objectives, for the 
most part. During the decade from 1963 to 1972, in particular, the South 
African economy experienced an uninterrupted boom. As high profit 
rates were practically underwritten by the state’s policies, international 
firms saw in South Africa both a market for high technology and a 
production site for capital-intensive commodities (Carter, 1980). With the 
direct support of foreign capital, the manufacturing sector in particular 
expanded rapidly; and with real growth rates of between 6% and 8% per 
annum, yielded profits well above world averages (Houghton, 1976). In 
the very midst of this boom, however, the seeds of a subsequent economic 
crisis were germinating.
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2.2 The crisis of apartheid
In the mid-1970s the conditions for accumulation changed dramatically 
and the South African state was confronted by a deep and enduring 
structural crisis. Moreover, this crisis was multi faceted, manifesting 
itself economically (through the collapse of the gold price and the flight 
of foreign capital), politically (in the resurgence of black opposition) and 
ideologically, as splits were beginning to emerge in the alignment of class 
forces within the Afrikaner nationalist movement (Saul and Gelb, 1981). 
Labour resistance manifested itself (for the first time since industrial 
action was outlawed in the early 1960s) in a series of spontaneous strikes 
in the port city of Durban at the end of 1972, and subsequently spread 
throughout the entire country. At the same time, the Black Consciousness 
movement of the late 1960s marked a resurgence of political activism, 
which culminated in the Soweto uprisings of 1976. Far from quelling 
resistance, the brutal police repression which accompanied the uprisings 
during this period acted instead to redefine the parameters and alter the 
tempo of black opposition. In the months which followed the Soweto 
revolt, thousands of young black people left the country illegally and 
joined up with exiled political parties – predominantly the ANC. Many of 
them underwent political training and then returned to escalate an armed 
struggle which had begun (albeit at a low level) in the early 1960s.
The National Party and the state responded to this threat in varied 
and contradictory ways. Of immediate concern was whether the crisis 
could be overcome by more repression alone or whether some reform 
of the apartheid system was also necessary. The heated debates which 
ensued served to divide ruling Afrikaner nationalists and culminated 
in the creation of a new balance of social forces, determined (at least in 
part) by considerations of defence and the interests of big business.
2.3 Attempts to reform the apartheid state 
In their attempts to restore political stability, the National Party 
government embarked on an extensive programme of political and 
economic restructuring, represented by a series of new initiatives to 
defuse opposition by the masses and to co-opt leading segments of the 
black population. The state’s approach, which was presented as a ‘Total 
Strategy’ by the early 1980s, presented a new package of economic, 
political and ideological policies.
The Total Strategy set out to restructure apartheid rule by altering 
the form of the state through a greater centralisation of authority and 
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a militarisation of the administrative decision-making structures. This 
undertaking entailed the introduction of a wide range of ostensibly 
reformist policies, including an attempt to redirect the relations 
of production through changes in labour legislation and through 
stabilisation of the urban African population. It included efforts to 
reorient the ideological discourse of the white population. It further 
entailed attempts to defuse mass opposition by incorporating sections 
of the black population into central state institutions through the 
mechanism of a federal or confederal system. The establishment of a 
tricameral parliament in 1983 marked the first step in a process to co-
opt the ‘coloured’ and ‘Indian’ populations, but its exclusion of African 
representatives – who constituted the vast majority of the population 
– meant that the initiative had little appeal to the majority of South 
Africans and lacked any legitimacy. The subsequent establishment of 
Black Local Authorities (BLAs) was intended to provide a minimal level 
of local government for African people, but from the outset they were 
rejected as apartheid creations and their office bearers frequently became 
the targets of mass violence.
These attempts to reform apartheid proved to be too little too late: 
the 1980s witnessed an upsurge of mass protest and an escalation of the 
armed struggle. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
in 1984, in particular, marked a turning point in the mobilisation of 
black South Africans and brought together people from all segments 
of society, including religious bodies, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs), as well as social 
movement organisations such as SANCO, to challenge the hegemony of 
racist rule. This mobilisation was met with extreme state repression and 
the 1980s were the most violent years of the apartheid rule. Confronted 
with the reality that the reform measures were not working, it became 
clear to strategists in the government and the state that apartheid was 
unsustainable in the longer run and that alternative solutions had to be 
found. The unbanning of black political movements and the release of 
Nelson Mandela from prison in 1990 marked the start of a process that 
would ultimately lead to the establishment of a non-racial democratic 
state in April 1994.
The lead-up to democracy was preceded by a series of multi-party 
negotiations, intended to establish the parameters of a new state. It is 
clear that the National Party had never intended the creation of a black-
Laurence Piper, Chris Tapscott and Lisa Thompson
111
majority state, envisaging instead a federal structure which would limit 
any one group’s access to political power. Conversely, the predominant 
liberation movement led by the ANCand its allies favoured a unitary 
state as a means of transforming a highly fractured and unequal society. 
Ultimately, the form of the state brokered during these negotiations 
was a hybrid one. Thus, while the 1996 Constitution speaks of a single 
sovereign state, the three-tiered structure of national, provincial and 
local government has many of the features of a federal system, with 
the devolution of significantly more authority to lower echelons of 
government than had been the case under the apartheid regime.
2.4 Associational life and civil society during apartheid
The forms in which citizenship and civil society are constituted are 
a product of the socio-political milieu in which ordinary people are 
socialised and the ways in which norms and values are inculcated in 
them. This process was severely distorted by apartheid rule, which 
actively sought to limit social organisation in black communities and 
to promote division and distrust through its divide-and-rule policies. 
As a consequence racial and ethnic identities gained and retain strong 
currency, shaping the way in which individuals and communities both 
perceive and interact with the state.
State oppression notwithstanding, the struggle against apartheid 
created its own forms of associational life in the urban areas of South 
Africa. Following the Soweto uprisings in 1976, popular resistance to 
the apartheid regime grew progressively in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
despite heightened repression. The foundation of the UDF in 1984 and 
subsequently of the Mass Democratic Movement brought together a 
broad spectrum of organisations (including the newly legalised trade 
unions, community organisations, churches and many others) in a 
combined challenge to the apartheid government. As part of this process, 
in the decade leading up to the election of a democratic government in 
1994, NGOs and CBOs proliferated, as did civic associations and street 
committees, the latter predominantly under the organisational leadership 
of SANCO. For many social commentators this development marked the 
emergence of a viable civil society in South Africa and augured well for 
the future of a democratic society (Swilling, 1991).
However, this newly formed civil society did not advance as 
expected. This eventuality was entirely predictable to a significant extent. 
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The anti-apartheid struggle served to unite black communities across 
the country in a common cause and promoted community cohesion. 
However, this cohesion was shallow, in the sense that it was united 
around one main purpose – the ending of white rule – and the focus 
of collective action was on political mobilisation rather than social 
organisation (Taylor, 1996: 78). Although some civic organisations 
and trade unions attempted to broaden their activities to include more 
developmental goals, the major thrust of most mass and community-
based organisations at the time was decidedly political.
In the aftermath of this struggle, many NGOs and CBOs (including 
SANCO) went into decline, as their leadership was absorbed into the 
public and private sectors and as foreign donors redirected their financial 
support to the democratically-elected government (Ballard et al, 2006). 
At the same time, the civic associations – seen by many as the backbone 
of civil society in black townships – lost their focus and their capacity 
to mobilise communities. In any event, the ‘civics’ (as they came to be 
known) tended to be ascriptive in nature; and though they promoted 
populist principles, their leadership was frequently self-appointed. While 
the civics encouraged popular participation, they also resorted to coercion 
and violence when compliance was not forthcoming. For the majority of 
South Africans, local democracy was an entirely novel experience; and 
there was no social or institutional memory to draw upon. 
Trajectories in contemporary state-society relations 3. 
This section briefly outlines the character of contemporary state-society 
relations in South Africa, explaining the shifts in political and social 
opportunity structures represented by (mostly political) institutional 
change and tracing the evolution of behaviour of key actors on both sides 
of the state-society equation. On one hand we appear to have legitimate 
political elites who respond complacently to popular demands, and new 
and inexperienced administrative elites, many of whom appear to have 
inherited the arrogant attitudes of the apartheid order. On the other, we 
have dissatisfied citizens who resort to protest rather than engagement 
through new participatory channels. Lastly, it seems that civil society 
is quite weak – with a few notable exceptions – and the underlying 
ideological impetus of organisations such as SANCO is unclear. The role 
of the ANC as a political party with social movement roots is central 
to understanding the ways in which grassroots social movements have 
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struggled to redefine themselves in the post-apartheid era, to give 
substance to indigenous meanings of democratic citizen engagement 
with the state.
3.1 The structure of the state in the post-apartheid era
Unlike many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, post-apartheid 
South Africa moved beyond political rhetoric in its efforts to decentralise 
administrative responsibilities to the local level. In a marked departure 
from the apartheid era, the new Constitution of 1996 significantly 
elevated the status of municipalities. Local authorities are now recognised 
as a distinct sphere of government, with their own originating powers. 
Affirming that a ‘municipality has the right to govern on its own 
initiative, the local government affairs of its community, subject to 
national and provincial legislation’, the Constitution further states that 
national and provincial governments ‘may not compromise or impede 
a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its 
functions’ (RSA, 1996). Underlying this formulation is the conviction 
that local government constitutes the foundation stone of democracy 
and represents the first line of service to local communities.
A feature of post-apartheid local government in South Africa is the 
fact that it has been in a constant state of transition. In the first instance, an 
extensive re-delimitation programme was embarked upon to reconfigure 
racially segregated constituencies. The outcome of this exercise was 
the establishment of more than eight hundred municipalities across 
the country. However, a substantial proportion of these municipalities 
existed in little more than name. In attempting to redress these 
shortcomings and to establish more operationally functional entities, a 
further re-delimitation was undertaken in the late 1990s, which reduced 
the number of municipalities to 283. 
A further challenge to the advancement of local government was 
the shift in government macroeconomic policy, which sent confusing 
messages to lower echelons of the public sector. Though the 1994 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (the lodestar of the 
incoming ANC government) was premised on the advancement of an 
interventionist state, in 1998 it was replaced by the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) macroeconomic framework. GEAR, which 
embraced neo-liberal nostrums dominant at the time, envisaged an 
enabling state with a reduced role for the public sector in service delivery. 
Resorting to outsourcing and the extensive use of consultants was (in 
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part) a consequence of this approach – although, as will be shown later, 
it was also a response to limited capacity at the municipal level.
3.1.1 Administrative incapacity
Among the most pressing challenges confronting the ANC government 
on its ascension to power in April 1994 was the transformation and reform 
of the apartheid state. This transformation was necessary, both to ensure 
the legitimacy of the state (hitherto white-male-dominated and autocratic) 
and to create a bureaucracy capable of delivering services to all of the 
country’s citizens in an efficient and effective manner. The challenge 
was formidable, in that the state inherited by the new government was 
essentially racist in orientation, had undergone little adaptation over 
the preceding three decades and was eminently unsuited to driving 
the development of a democratic South African society. Not only was 
the new state charged with being responsible for the rapid delivery of 
social services to a poor majority, hitherto deprived, in a highly dualistic 
economy; for stimulating economic growth; and for promoting a non-
racial and democratic ethos; but it was also expected to do so in the 
context of an administrative system in flux, and staffed (for the most part) 
by officials who had either had little experience of a developmental state 
or who had had little prior administrative experience. These challenges 
were most keenly felt at the local level, where the new responsibilities 
assigned to municipalities were not matched with staff with the requisite 
experience and skills.
Despite a transformative agenda, moreover, a decade and a half 
into the new democracy it is evident that the state bureaucracy has 
been only partially transformed. The institutional memory of many 
government agencies in all levels of the governing hierarchy remains 
that of the apartheid administration, which was characterised by a lack 
of transparency, by arrogance and by a disregard for individual integrity. 
It is partially in this context that we can understand the tyranny of petty 
bureaucrats at the local level and their seeming disinterest in effective 
service delivery. The lack of administrative capacity has given rise to a 
crisis of popular expectations. For the majority of the population (who 
benefited little from the apartheid state), there are high expectations 
that the new government will assist them in the development of their 
livelihoods. This expectation extends particularly to the local level, 
where (as stated previously) municipalities have been presented as the 
first line of government service; and this intent is supported through 
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numerous state policies. Their concerns have been heightened by the 
fact that politicians and the government’s own policies have repeatedly 
reinforced the idea that municipalities have the right to participate at this 
level in decision-making that directly influences their livelihoods. 
3.1.2 Invited spaces in post-apartheid local governance
At a formal level the constitutional and legislative framework for the 
realisation of citizenship through popular participation in decision-
making is well established in South Africa. In 1993, on the eve of the 
transition to democracy, the ANC (then a government-in-waiting) 
signalled its commitment to participatory governance in the publication 
of its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which 
espoused both the principle of popular participation in decision-
making and that of public sector accountability. The RDP, according 
to its founding tenets, committed itself to ‘grassroots, bottom-up 
development which is owned and driven by communities and their 
representative organisation’ (ANC, 1994). This ideal was given effect in 
the 1996 Constitution, which stipulates that ‘[p]eoples’ needs must be 
responded to and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy 
making’ and asserts that ‘[p]ublic administration must be accountable’ 
(RSA, 1996: sections 195 (1) e and f). The Constitution also stipulates 
that national legislation must ensure that these values and principles are 
promoted. To that end, legislation was enacted which explicitly charges 
different state structures with the responsibility for the promotion of the 
participation of citizens.
Despite the fact that the 1996 Constitution and a plethora of policies 
emanating from that founding document have created an enabling 
framework for participation, the institutions and processes set in place 
to engage citizens in this process – the ‘invited spaces’ – have not yielded 
returns in the form of service delivery (houses, water, electricity, etc) 
or job creation (DPLG, 2008). The reasons for this are many. First, it is 
evident that the understanding of the meaning of participation varies 
and is confused among the various players. In part this has to do with 
the fact that participation, as demonstrated above, is being promoted in 
a top-down fashion, rather than being permitted to develop organically. 
Second, most of these processes are not really empowered so much as 
consultative, and thus rely heavily on the political will of local leadership 
to make a difference. For reasons to be outlined below, local leaders tend 
to be less responsive to the populations they serve than to the political 
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elites above them. A third problem concerns administrative capacity. 
Not only are most local governments new structures, but most officials 
lack experience in their positions. In addition, there is much evidence of 
rent-seeking behaviour among the new administration, many of whom 
are now in positions in which social mobility becomes possible for the 
first time. Hence there are many reports of corruption, nepotism and 
clientelism in local administration. 
Fourth – and perhaps most important – is the impact of the 
dominance and legitimacy of the ruling ANC. Since the first democratic 
elections of 1994 the party has won between 63% and 70% of the popular 
vote nationally, between six and nine of the nine provinces, and about 
200 of the 283 municipal councils. This fact, combined with the ANC’s 
history as the leading force in the national liberation movement, plus 
the fact that minorities who benefited under apartheid tend to support 
opposition parties, has led the ANC to regard itself as the only legitimate 
voice of the nation. In addition, the electoral system is a Proportional 
Representation party list system at national, provincial and half of local 
level, which means that voters choose a party and the party chooses the 
representative. This tends to make politicians accountable to parties 
rather than to the electorate. The upshot of this combination of factors 
has been a degree of behaviour among the ruling party similar to that 
of a one-party regime, where the boundaries between state and party 
become blurred and accountability runs increasingly upwards rather 
than downwards. As a consequence, not only do voters still support 
the ANC though dissatisfied with local government led by the ANC, 
but local leaders are much more concerned about pleasing more senior 
politicians than pleasing their constituencies.
3.2 Popular mobilisation and service delivery protest
Faced with the reality that the state is generally unresponsive to demands 
raised through formal institutional channels, disaffected citizens and the 
organisations which represent them have increasingly sought alternative 
means for expressing their grievances. The channels chosen have varied 
from community to community (according to their social, economic 
and political contexts) and they have differed in their effectiveness in 
extracting concessions from the state. Hence in addition to protests, 
communities have mobilised through CBOs or the local ANC branch, 
or have formed their own social movement. Regardless of the method 
chosen, in essence these social movements are challenging the hegemony 
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of the state exercised through formally designated sites of participation 
(including ward committees, public meetings, and local elections) and 
are insisting that their concerns be addressed directly and as a matter 
of urgency. It is evident that many communities have reverted to the 
forms of engagement with the state which characterised the struggle 
against apartheid, and are taking their grievances to the streets. An 
indication of the scale of this trend is that about 6 000 protests were 
officially recorded during the 2004–2005 financial year and during 2007, 
an estimated fifteen protests were being held per day somewhere in South 
Africa (Delaney, 2007).
However, these manifestations of popular dissatisfaction have 
tended to be diffuse and episodic. In part this has to do with the new 
forms of social organisation which appear to be emerging at both 
national and local levels. These differ from the mass-based movements 
of the past in that they are non-linear, discontinuous, fragmented 
and differentiated. An example is the distinct disconnect between a 
community’s engagement with the system of representative democracy 
and their simultaneous rejection of participatory democracy. Thus, 
despite widespread dissatisfaction with the performance of local 
government, local election results might still reflect strong support for 
the ruling party. This indicates that many communities still retain a 
strong affiliation to the ruling party as the party of liberation, though 
they condemn its local leaders. 
Much of this has to with the fact that during the struggle period – and 
especially the 1980s – popular mobilisation was channelled into explicitly 
political anti-apartheid activities. Hence grassroots organisations (most 
emerging in urban centres to secure basic public goods such as education, 
health and housing) united under an explicitly political formation, 
the United Democratic Front (UDF), which identified clearly with the 
ideology and organisation of the banned and exiled ANC. The UDF 
was closely associated with the ANC-aligned Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) and the two organisations captured most of the 
popular mobilisation behind the political project of national liberation. In 
effect, grassroots and issue-based mobilisation was quickly united and 
generalised in national and political terms; in a sense, the ANC was the 
social movement of the 1980s.
While there can be no doubt that this popular mobilisation of 
the 1980s was tremendously effective and important in hastening the 
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end of apartheid, many have pointed out the demobilising effect that 
democratisation had on social movements in South Africa (Ballard et al, 
2006: 14–17). Once the ANC was unbanned in 1990 and reconstituted itself 
as an open organisation, the UDF (and SANCO) effectively collapsed into 
the ANC. After the 1994 elections, movements which mobilised people 
were absorbed into the ANC government or went into partnership with 
government, and most held the view that government would deliver to 
the poor (Heller, 2001: 134). The remaining NGO organisations came 
under pressure to ‘professionalise’ and withdraw from advocacy to a 
more limited role in service delivery (Greenstein, 2003).
It is notable that this demobilisation paralleled shifts in donor 
funding – such that most foreign aid money was channelled into and 
through the new democratic state, to build its capacity to meet the many 
challenges of proper administration and the delivery of social goods 
eschewed by the apartheid state on racist grounds. Though perhaps it 
is not surprising that despite significant delivery of water, electricity, 
housing, health care and education to poor and working people by the 
democratic state, it has not met popular expectations; hence the many 
popular protests regarding poor service delivery. Indeed, according to 
Ballard et al (2006: 400), these protests are representative of a broader 
shift in state-society relations. More specifically, these authors hold that 
since the late 1990s there has been a rebirth in oppositional civil society, 
although only some of this is framed in terms contrary to the ‘emerging 
pro-growth consensus’ of Mbeki’s governance, while much falls under 
broader rights-based opposition. 
In addition, foreign donors are now spending more money on civil 
society, but mostly on projects that emphasise practical delivery rather 
than advocacy or challenge. Notably, while there is no neat division 
between movements that will engage the state and those that won’t, the 
engagements of counter-hegemonic movements ‘tend to create crises, 
which more rights-based campaigns can capitalise on to influence policy 
and government practice’ (Ballard et al, 2006: 404). Critically, however, 
oppositional civil society is not tremendously strong; hence, Beall et al 
(2005: 681) argue that emergent state-society relations exist in a kind of 
‘fragile stability’ that is likely to continue into the medium term until 
new social actors emerge to change this equilibrium.
To sum up, contemporary South African state-society relations are 
in a state of transition, recovering from the vacuum of mobilisation left 
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by the social movements of the anti-apartheid era becoming the party in 
government or its allies. While enduring real-world problems mean that 
the conditions remain for popular mobilisation around social goods, and 
there is evidence of the growth of more organic and local community-
based organisations, civil society in all its forms – especially democratic 
social movements – is not particularly strong. The case studies which 
follow provide evidence of the extent to which poor South Africans have 
adapted to the reality that the invited spaces of democracy provide only 
minimal opportunities for the realisation of their rights.
Unpacking modalities of state-society engagement 4. 
through case studies
In this section we unpack the general snapshot of post-apartheid state-
society relations described above in more detail, through two case 
studies which were selected as exemplars of this general condition. 
The first case (Piper and Nadvi, 2007) examined the operation of the 
formal ‘invited spaces’ of participatory local governance in the two 
cities of Durban and Pietermaritzburg, and how these relate (or do not 
relate) to forms of popular mobilisation. The key insights concern the 
poor functioning of these institutions, their disempowerment, and their 
clear marginality to most state-society relations. Conversely the research 
also suggested a general weakness in civil society (with some notable 
exceptions), especially in social movements capable of playing the role of 
democratic mediators. While social movements do have a real presence 
in the research sites – for instance, the housing movement Abahlali base 
Mjondolo in eThekwini – their organisational strength and popular base 
vary greatly. 
The second research project (Nleya and Thompson, 2007) examined 
the popular perceptions of citizenship and popular mobilisation in the 
Cape Town township of Khayelitsha, using both quantitative methods 
(a survey) and qualitative methods (interviews and focus groups). This 
case complements Piper and Nadvi in focusing on social mobilisation 
and the ‘view from below’ with regard to state-society relations in 
South Africa. The key insights concern the impressive extent of political 
knowledge and local organisation in the township, although this tends 
to be based around family and neighbourhood, rather than civil society 
or the formal structures of the local state. Furthermore, contrary to the 
perception that poor areas turn to militant protest before constructive 
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engagement, the vast majority of respondents not only preferred 
constructive engagement to militant protest, but had engaged in some 
form of constructive engagement before protest. In short, militant 
protest was both seen and practised as a last resort. Notably, while this 
is consistent with the ‘frustration-aggression’ explanation of violence, 
another reason offered for militant protest was tradition: it was the way 
that protest had always been done. 
In addition to fleshing out the bigger picture, the case-studies are 
also used as a means of engaging with the framing questions of the 
comparative study:
Regimes of democracy and citizenship;• 
Sites of contestation between the state and mobilisation; • 
Strategies of the state and strategies of mobilisation;• 
Political opportunity and social opportunity structures; • 
Possibilities or absence of democratic mediation; • 
Dynamics of state (mobilisation action and response) – • 
simultaneous, periodic, sporadic; and 
Progressive democratisation, or reversal and polarisation.• 
In what follows we explore each of these themes in sequence.
4.1 Regimes of democracy and citizenship
In this section we explore state-centred forms of democracy and 
citizenship at local level, both in formal policy terms and as implemented 
on the state’s account. As noted in the Piper and Nadvi study, it is a 
feature of post-apartheid South African democracy that the formal 
requirements for democratic operation of governance are much more 
developed in the local sphere than in the provincial and national spheres 
in South Africa. While consistent with the model of decentralisation 
and democratisation advocated by the World Bank and major donor 
organisations (eg World Bank, 1996), this development has introduced 
novel conceptions of democracy, new participatory institutions and 
concomitantly new conceptions of citizenship. 
4.1.1 Public participation on paper
In terms of democracy, the new constitution of 1996 affirms a familiar 
liberal or associational conception of democracy as competition between 
interest groups through the mechanism of elections, rooted in a free and 
plural public sphere which includes a vibrant civil society. However, at the 
same time the Constitution makes limited but significant commitments 
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to participatory democracy; it explicitly requires local government to 
be responsive to people’s needs, and to encourage community and 
community organisation involvement in governance (Sections 151, 152, 
and 195). This modest requirement is expressed in subsequent legislation 
in more assertive form. Hence the Municipal Systems Act of 2000, section 
4 requires that municipalities must ‘encourage and create conditions for 
the community to participate in the affairs of the municipality, including 
in the IDP, performance management system, monitoring and review 
of performance … preparation of the budget, strategic decisions re 
municipal services’.
 In addition to being elected, post-apartheid local government is 
explicitly required by law to involve the public in its processes to an 
extent greater than in any other sphere of government. But what precisely 
does this mean? Is it really a commitment to direct participation by 
citizens in the decision-making process? On paper, it appears to be – at 
least if one considers deliberation to be an important part of decision-
making. Thus, in addition to the requirement that municipalities 
develop a public participation policy, there are basically three aspects 
to the innovation of participatory governance which may potentially 
transform the character of deliberation in local governance: the 
definition of the municipality, ward committees and the requirements 
for public participation. 
The first of these is in some ways the most remarkable – and yet 
intangible. The Municipal Systems Act defines the municipality as 
consisting of the governing structures (the elected councillors), the 
administration (the appointed staff) and the residents. The inclusion of 
residents as part of the municipality is claimed to be unique in the world, 
and establishes the grounds for greater involvement by the public in 
municipal matters (Carrim 2006). While the practical ramifications of this 
definition are not yet obvious, the symbolic effects are considerable.
The second innovation is the concept of ward committees. First 
mentioned in the 1998 White Paper on Local Government, ward 
committees are outlined in some detail in the Municipal Structures Act. 
This act provides for ward committees to be established in each ward 
of a Category A or Category B municipality, if the municipality so 
chooses, though recently government has been suggesting that the ward 
committee system be made compulsory for all municipalities (Msengana-
Ndlela, 2006). Chaired by the ward councillor, ward committees are 
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intended to consist of up to ten people representing ‘a diversity of 
interests’ in the ward, with women ‘equitably represented’. In respect 
of their role, Section 74(a) of the Municipal Structures Act states that a 
ward committee ‘may make recommendations on any matter affecting 
its ward (i) to the ward councillor; or (ii) through the ward councillor, to 
the metro or local council, the executive committee, the executive mayor 
or the relevant metropolitan sub-council’. Section 74(b) adds that a ward 
committee ‘has such duties and powers as the metro or local council may 
delegate to it in terms of section 32’.
This suggests that ward committees serve mostly as advisory bodies 
to ward councillors, but may enjoy greater powers if the council sees 
fit. But can a representative structure play a participatory role? Let us 
consider subsequent legislation. While little mention is made of ward 
committees in the Municipal Systems Act, following the Community 
Participation Conference held on 28–29 March 2005 the Minister of 
Provincial and Local Government published a notice entitled Guidelines 
for the Establishment and Operation of Municipal Ward Committees (Notice 
965 of 2005), which held that the ‘duties and powers’ delegated to ward 
committees may not include executive powers (Section 5(3)(d)), but 
instead emphasised their role in communication and mobilisation.
Overall, the 2005 Notice embodies a double movement: on one hand, 
the potential decision-making powers enjoyed by ward committees are 
substantially limited by prohibiting any significant delegation; but on the 
other, the deliberative role of ward committees is enhanced by specifying 
that central municipal issues and processes could well pass through 
ward committees. This seems consistent with the observation of Yunus 
Carrim (2001), ANC MP, former chairperson of the Local Government 
Portfolio Committee, and architect of much local government legislation: 
‘Essentially, the system overall seeks to provide a balance between giving 
residents the fullest space to participate in municipal affairs and ensuring 
the right of councillors to ultimately govern.’
The third and final element of participatory governance is effectively 
a set of requirements for public involvement in various decision-making 
processes. These requirements include the receipt, processing and 
consideration of petitions and complaints received from the public; the 
notification and public comment procedures, when appropriate; public 
meetings and hearings; and consultative sessions with locally recognised 
community organisations. Perhaps more important are the requirements 
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of the Systems Act (Section 16(1)) that municipalities must ‘(a) encourage, 
and create conditions for, the local community to participate in the affairs 
of the municipality, including in – (i) the Integrated Development Plan; 
(ii) the performance management system; (iii) performance; (iv) the 
budget; and (v) strategic decisions relating to services.’ In short, public 
participation is statutorily injected into the most important municipal 
processes.
In this way the hybrid conception of democracy in the Constitution 
is fleshed out as greater public deliberation through the form of new 
participatory institutions in local governance. On its own this conception 
has clear implications for a form of citizenship that is more than just 
voting and associational life, and more even than the more minimalist 
models of deliberation in the public realm. What is required on this 
account is also participation and debate by citizens in specific and 
explicitly formal institutions of local governance. This is clearly a richer 
notion of democratic citizenship, although not the fuller conception of 
‘people power’ as popular decision-making that was manifest in some 
domestic popular anti-apartheid organisations of the 1980s.
4.1.2 Public participation in practice
Critically, however, the evidence from the case studies suggests a wide 
divergence between the formal regimes of democracy and citizenship 
that exist only on paper and the actual practices implemented by post-
apartheid governance. In respect of democracy, the formal commitments 
to pluralism and local participation are undermined by the deafness of 
government to communal voices. This deafness is illustrated in both 
case studies, through the express attitudes and behaviours of both 
politicians and officials. Correspondingly, the implementation of the new 
institutions of participatory governance has been poor, and typified by 
a minimal compliance that has reduced participation (and its potential 
deliberative dividend) to information exchange and public relations. 
Lastly, and concomitantly, the experience of citizenship (as shown by 
the Khayelitsha research) is thus one of frustration at being ignored in 
formal processes; but also a willingness to protest, and to express popular 
views through this means.
To begin with, the deafness of elites is reflected in the express 
attitudes of key players. For example, in the case of eThekwini, the third-
largest city in South Africa with an administration that claims to be one 
of the best run in the world, Mike Sutcliffe, the city manager (Piper and 
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Nadvi, 2007: 38), had the following to say about public participation: ‘We 
know what people’s needs are. Indeed, for the next 100 years the needs 
will remain the same, although the rank order might well change.’ 
The clear implication here is that public participation is understood 
as a form of information exchange – and unidirectional at that, with 
information transmitted from the community to the council. The idea that 
residents may want to participate in debate – over how the needs should be 
prioritised, what strategies should be adopted, what form implementation 
should take and the like – is clearly not part of the vision.
Perhaps even more telling than what officials and politicians say, 
however, is what they do. In respect of public participation the effort 
has been largely one of minimal compliance with legislation. In what 
follows we outline implementation in terms of policy, ward committees 
and public consultation processes. 
4.1.3 Policy
During the term of office stretching from 2001 to 2006, eThekwini 
municipality only managed to adopt a public participation policy by 2006, 
entitled Citizen Participation Policy: Framework for eThekwini Municipality. 
The document begins with the obligatory background conceptual 
discussion and legislative review, before proposing a model for ‘active 
participation’, as well as various institutions including ‘mechanisms 
to ensure efficiency’, ‘systems of redress’, a ‘citizen’s charter’ and an 
‘intervention strategy model’. There is a long list of ‘tools’ that includes: 
newsletters, citizens’ meetings with councillors, talk shows or interviews, 
public hearings, city festivals, public surveys, local partnerships, and an 
NGO charter and rules for co-financing of civic initiatives.
The policy is general, vague, and short on innovative mechanisms 
to empower community participation in municipal deliberations. 
Furthermore, if one reviews the Performance Assessment account of 
the Head of the Community Participation and Action Support Unit 
(CPASU) 2004/5, it is notable that many key performance objectives 
are really forms of service provision. For example, CPASU assisted 
in setting up soup kitchens in poor areas, facilitated youth business 
training, lent support to gender policy programmes, organised Masekhane 
(‘let us build together’) road shows, and held live broadcast events for 
key government events such as the State of the Nation address. Hence, 
according to the public participation officials’ own accounts, deliberation 
in decision-making disappears in implementation. This suggests a lack 
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of understanding of what public participation ought to be about, even 
the formal version defined in law.
A similar story emerges from the policy process in Msunduzi, which 
completely failed to finalise a public participation policy during the five 
years from 2001 to 2006. It did manage to generate a draft in 2005, which 
is reported to be still in the consultative phase before being adopted by 
the executive committee and then by council (Jackson-Plaatjies, 2007). 
Notably, the draft policy is very brief, at less than five pages in 14-point 
font, and makes no reference to civil society whatsoever. Instead emphasis 
is placed on ward committees, izimbizo (public meetings convened 
by the municipality) and various forms of communication between 
communities and councillors. Reference to public participation is also 
to be found in other policies, notably the 2005 Policy on Establishment 
and Functioning of Ward Committees, Msunduzi Municipality and the 2006 
Msunduzi Municipality Spatial Development Framework Review – Proposed 
Communication Strategy and Plan. Of these two documents, only the latter 
deals with public participation even in general terms, and it is notable in 
identifying civil society organisations as development stakeholders with 
rights and responsibilities to participate in the project process.
From this brief review of policy documents, two insights are already 
evident. First, it has taken some time for policy on public participation 
to make it on to the agenda of the Msunduzi municipality; this despite 
the fact that Msunduzi implemented ward committees as early as 
2001. Second, there seems to be no coherent or common conception 
of public participation, evidenced by the inconsistencies between the 
various documents as to who the public is (communities and/or civil 
society), and how they ought to participate (ward committees, izimbizo, 
stakeholder forums or all of the aforementioned). 
4.1.4 Ward committees
Perhaps the most notable feature regarding ward committees in 
eThekwini between 2001 and 2006 was that there were none. According 
to city manager Mike Sutcliffe (2006) there were two reasons. First, 
when the opposition IFP controlled the provincial government, the 
party decided to implement sub-councils instead of ward committees. 
Second, when the ANC came to power in KwaZulu-Natal in 2004, the 
city decided to go the ward committee route; they approached the 
province to apply in terms of the Municipal Structures Act and publish 
a Section 12 Notice formally constituting eThekwini as ‘a municipality 
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with a collective executive system combined with a ward participatory 
system’. However, the provincial department responsible ‘dropped the 
ball’ and this was never done.
In the interim the city proceeded with ward committee elections, 
on the assumption that the legal niceties had been completed. A large 
number of ward committees were elected. According to Sutcliffe, in 
this process the ANC ‘out-mobilised the DA’ with regard to the ward 
committees in about four DA wards, by dominating ward committee 
election meetings even though they had lost the ward. This meant that 
while the ward councillor belonged to the DA, the majority of the ten 
members of the ward committee belonged to the ANC. (Notably, while 
the DA agrees with the same description of events, they interpret them 
quite differently. In the words of DA Ward Councillor for Ward 35 Rory 
MacPherson (2006): ‘Sadly, the ANC decided to abuse this facility and 
instead, bussed many people in from outside the ward and hijacked the 
election of these committees.’) In response to the ANC’s actions the DA 
took the matter to court, objecting to the whole ward committee process 
in terms of the failure by the province to publish the required Section 
12 notice. The court upheld the objection and ward committee elections 
were shelved until the next term of local government in 2007. 
Msunduzi implemented ward committees in the 2001–2006 period, 
but as Piper and Deacon (2007) show, these structures made practically 
no difference to either community participation or municipal decision-
making. Officials estimate that some 40% of the 37 ward committees in 
Msunduzi never met, and that of the balance only 33% met regularly. 
Furthermore, even the functional ward committees had no clear role 
in municipal processes and thus could not influence decision-making. 
And as they were linked to the least powerful politicians on the council 
– ward councillors, who do not sit on the executive committee of the 
municipality – ward committees were already one step removed from 
real decision-making. In addition, most ward committees made no 
attempt to consult or involve communities in their activities. For ward 
committees to deepen local deliberation they must play a participatory 
role – a fact barely recognised by any municipal actor, and certainly not 
implemented at all.
4.1.5 Public consultation on budget, development planning, etc
eThekwini made an impressive start to public consultation regarding 
the budget and IDP with the first draft IDP in 2001 and 2002. However, 
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since then the annual review of the budget and IDP has been limited. 
The main reason for this appears to be the challenge of coming to terms 
with various new statutory and policy requirements from national 
government (for example, the Municipal Finance Management Act 
(MFMA) of 2003) which has absorbed the time and energy of most senior 
city officials. In this regard it is notable that the appointment of Mike 
Sutcliffe as city manager in 2003 coincided with the implementation of 
the MFMA and a new Performance Management System. 
eThekwini’s first planning process around the IDP and budget is 
impressive for a number of reasons. First it integrated the two; instead 
of the traditional approach of allocating resources to departments, it 
introduced a system which allocates resources to priorities as defined by 
the IDP. Second, it used these priorities to establish the key performance 
areas and indicators central to the performance assessment of senior 
officials. Third, the process of drawing up the IDP was both participatory 
and needs-driven; that is, it also drew on community-based planning 
methodologies. As part of this there were a series of five ‘Big Mama’ 
workshops which constituted the main public input into the process. 
These workshops drew together some 450 participants from all sectors 
of civil society, spatial areas of the city, spheres of government, unions 
and traditional leadership. 
The first such workshop reflected on eThekwini’s draft Long-Term 
Development Framework (LTDF) which envisaged the city in 2020. 
Next were a series of 100 community workshops across the city to assess 
local needs, followed by a strategic budgeting exercise. The needs list 
obtained through the community process was related to sets of existing 
data and the planning teams proposed various technical interventions, 
which were considered at Big Mama 2 on 4 May 2002. Based on this, and 
after engagement with other spheres of government, the municipality 
launched its 2002/2003 people’s budget (Big Mama 3) at Kings Park 
rugby stadium on 29 June 2002. In February 2003 another Big Mama 
was called to reflect on and revise the budget. 
While there is much to admire about the Big Mama process, what 
has happened since 2003 is also important. Not only has there been 
a clear downturn in regular and effective public participation in city 
planning but, as reported above, a significant amount of time and 
effort has been invested in the development of technical systems in 
the municipality since 2002. Partly this has to do with new national 
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requirements for financial management, but it also reflects the growth 
of a culture of professionalism, and the particularly authoritarian style 
of the city manager. Hence tremendous energy has been invested in 
developing performance management systems for top officials and in 
implementing a new system of area-based management to integrate 
planning spatially within the city. At the same time the city has found 
itself drawn increasingly into international networks of management 
and funding, and it seems clear that top leadership has global ambitions 
for the city of eThekwini. 
All these trends suggest a growing managerialism among the city 
elite, an attitude reflected in the recent indifference towards public 
participation. According to City Manager Mike Sutcliffe, the IDP and 
budget processes are too complex for ordinary people and meaningful 
public participation could only be a long-term strategy. In the interim 
(2006), according to his view:
... communities will spend their money on things that do not do anything. 
Communities spend their money on things that have no lasting impact 
on their lives. All that happens is that the public feels better about 
developing their area. Interest groups play a more significant role in 
public participation as they are useful in having more practical goals 
for the municipality.
From 2001 until the present, the Msunduzi municipality has undergone 
four separate public consultation processes concerning the budget and 
IDP. Consultation has ranged from soliciting inputs from stakeholders 
(the first stage) to the introduction of mayoral izimbizos to achieve broader 
public input. From 2006 onwards, the municipality introduced the use 
of surveys at izimbizos as an additional means of soliciting the views and 
needs of the communities, as Jackson-Plaatjies (2007) states:
We have found that the meeting times (duration) do not allow adequate 
time for input from the majority of attendees at these meetings … The 
main aim of the questionnaire is to give those participants who did not 
get a chance to speak [the opportunity] to put across their views and 
(mainly) their needs.
Along with the minutes from each meeting, the survey data is then 
collated into a community needs analysis report and forwarded to the 
subsequent IDP and budget processes. What impact these reports have 
on subsequent deliberations is unknown.
It is clear that public consultation about the budget and IDP has 
become a form of information exchange, and a limited and largely 
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ineffective form at that. Notably, this is despite the participatory success 
of the first IDP process in eThekwini in 2002/3, which offered the basis 
for an indigenous form of participatory budgeting and development 
planning. Instead, implementation has come to mean minimal 
compliance – or, in the terminology of Sherry Arnstein (1969: 7), a form of 
‘tokenism’, even ‘placation’. Correspondingly, the regime of citizenship 
implemented has become diluted down to the mainstream associational 
model of voting and associating. The opportunity to participate directly 
in local governance deliberation has been lost.
4.2 Sites of contestation between the state and mobilisation 
From the above account it should be clear that the invited spaces of 
public participation in local governance, ward committees, public 
consultations processes and the like are sterile places, marginal (at least 
in any meaningful way) to where state and society interact. As noted 
above, there are administrative and political reasons for this; the case 
studies tend to confirm that local government elites have the attitude 
that they look upwards rather than downwards in order to secure their 
political futures. 
Evidence of this lack of responsiveness – or deafness – to communities 
is very evident from Thompson and Nleya’s work on Khayelitsha, where 
there have been frequent protests about the failure of local government 
to deliver public goods (housing, water, sanitation, electricity and the 
like) for a number of years. These issues – which in South Africa are 
called ‘service delivery’ issues – are typically the concerns about which 
local protest is mobilised. Hence, even in a country where the official 
unemployment rate is just under 30%, the residents of Khayelitsha 
voted housing as the most pressing issue (22.7%), followed by crime 
and unemployment (tied in second place at 21.7% each) (Nleya and 
Thompson, 1998: 4). Other issues lagged some way behind this with water 
in fourth spot at 7.9%, sanitation in fifth at 5.9%, and refuse collection 
in sixth place at 3.7%.
Note that crime and unemployment are not issues for which local 
government is primarily responsible; hence the question may be raised 
whether these protests are directed towards the correct sphere of the state. 
It is important to note that the above figures refer to the most important 
issue, so the fact that only 7.9% of respondents said that water was the 
most important issue does not mean that most people are satisfied with 
water delivery. Indeed, the survey also showed that 75% of residents said 
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the municipality was doing a poor or very poor job of water delivery in 
Khayelitsha, practically the same level of dissatisfaction as with housing 
(76%). In terms of sanitation about 70% said the municipality was doing a 
poor or very poor job. There were some services which residents thought 
were reasonable. Thus, 53% said the municipality was doing a fair or 
good job of refuse collection, and 62% were positive about electricity 
provision. While these latter figures show approval, it is important to 
note that the approval rates are lower than in most of the rest of the 
country, and certainly lower than in wealthier areas.
The survey suggests that local government is doing a reasonable job 
in some areas of public goods delivery, if not in most areas. Furthermore 
it reflects that communities are not completely dismissive of local 
government and are capable of reasonable judgements. This latter point 
is strongly reinforced by survey results showing attitudes and practices 
in respect of appropriate state-society relations. Hence nearly 46% of 
respondents in Khayelitsha could name their ward councillor correctly, 
a figure much higher than the national average of 15% in 2006 (Mattes, 
2008: 126) and not far behind that for the identification of the Premier 
of the Western Cape (55%). That the Khayelitsha population is highly 
politicised was also confirmed by an 86% reported registration rate for 
national elections, well above the 70% national average. Furthermore, 
62% watch TV news broadcasts daily and 68% discuss politics daily or 
occasionally. Importantly, politicisation does not mean radicalisation. 
Thus, when participants were asked what the most effective method of 
public participation was for them, 42% chose participatory forums, 40% 
referred to contacting an elected leader such as a ward councillor and 
only 15% chose protest. In addition, 74% agreed that lawful solutions 
are the best way to solve problems, against 25% who felt that sometimes 
it is necessary to disobey a law to solve a problem; and 70% felt that 
violence is not justified in South African politics, against 30% who felt 
it is sometimes necessary. 
Another important observation was that politicisation did not 
translate simply into a healthy membership of civil society. Instead 
associational life and social capital were strong, but only at a very 
parochial level. Thus the majority said that family (63%), friends (62%) 
and neighbours (60%) were influential in motivating them to participate 
in community activities, whereas speakers at community meetings and 
political representatives scored much lower (50% and 39% respectively). 
Laurence Piper, Chris Tapscott and Lisa Thompson
131
Levels of membership in civil society organisations were low (trade 
unions 14.4%, community associations 22%, political parties 36%, social 
movements 10%), with the notable exception of faith-based organisations 
at 76%. The parochiality of associational life was expressed in high 
membership of street committees (62%), which address all local level 
problems and are not connected to the formal institutions of public 
participation in local government. 
Hence a picture begins to emerge of a disconnect between the 
formal institutions of local governance and citizens’ engagement with 
governance. Simply put, the community did not engage widely with 
either the new participatory institutions of ward committees and public 
consultation, or with ward councillors and the like, even though the 
Khayelitsha community is clearly very politically aware and keen to 
engage local government constructively and reasonably on important 
issues. Faced by the indifference of the formal institutions, many 
report that they have participated in protest actions. Thus some 45% of 
respondents had attended at least one march in the preceding year and 
nearly 80% said they would join a protest if they had a chance. Notably, 
there was a significant difference in this regard between those living in 
houses and those living in shacks, with the latter reporting a much higher 
participation rate in marches (50%) to the 37% of house-dwellers. The fact 
that such huge majorities would march despite believing it is not the most 
effective way of getting things done speaks volumes of the frustration 
many clearly feel at the unresponsiveness of local government. To sum 
up, the site of contestation is not the formal structures but the local streets, 
where citizens articulate what they feel are legitimate grievances mostly 
out of frustration, and after having tried other methods.
4.3 Strategies of the state and strategies of mobilisation 
From the above discussion it is now reasonably clear that, despite formal 
commitments (in law and policy) to greater community participation in 
the deliberations of local governance, the efforts of local elites tend to 
meet the minimum requirements of the law at best. Given the claim that 
accountability flows upwards in the ruling party, one should not lay the 
blame solely at the feet of local government; provincial and national 
structures must also bear responsibility. Paradoxically, instruction from 
above to behave in more accountable ways might well have produced 
a different attitude and effort from local leadership. While much state 
strategy for implementing public participation may be characterised by 
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neglect, this does not completely summarise state strategy towards local 
communities. A key point made by Heller (2001) concerns the tendency 
towards centralisation in government, due both to the idea that the 
ANC is the only party truly normatively entitled to govern and to the 
state-centric conception of development. The combination of these views 
tends to undermine the chances of partnership or power-sharing between 
government and other social actors, including civil society and local 
communities. Evidence of this comes through in the work of Thompson 
(2007) on water delivery, which reveals an indifferent and even arrogant 
attitude on the part of the local officials responsible for delivery.
4.4 Political opportunity and social opportunity structures 
The preceding analysis makes clear the ways in which the implementation 
of participatory governance effectively closes down the opportunities for 
deliberation that these new institutions are intended to facilitate. Indeed, 
Piper and Deacon (2008) point out how new participatory institutions 
can have a demobilising effect – in this case, through having politically 
controlled ward committees supplanting civil society formations such 
as ratepayers’ associations. However, there is an important ray of hope: 
the potential for such institutions to become more meaningful spaces 
still remains – at least for processes of public consultation. Thus, the 
current closing of a space is not necessarily permanent, and the existence 
of opportunities for engagement on paper could yet become a reality in 
practice. This will be dealt with in more detail below. 
In recognising the practical closing of formal political space it may 
be instructive to note the general weakness of CSOs such as NGOs and 
community-based organisations in the Khayelitsha case study (with the 
exception of faith-based organisations), despite high levels of political 
awareness and street-level organisation in the population. In this regard 
it is notable that the street committees report to SANCO – an organisation 
associated with the ruling tripartite alliance, albeit a little ambiguously. 
The point is that the inclusion of SANCO into the ruling political 
elite might be a form of elite capture of these formations, or at least a 
relationship likely to prevent their mutation into an anti-government – or 
perceived anti-government – social movement. Thus, although the levels 
of party membership are reasonably high at 36%, they are not as high 
as might be expected given the general levels of political consciousness 
and formal electoral participation in the community. 
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With regard to social opportunity structures, Nleya and Thompson 
have identified good levels of social capital and neighbourhood-level 
organisation in Khayelitsha, as well as high levels of participation in 
faith-based organisations. These appear to be important potential bases 
for other forms of civil society organisation and perhaps even for social 
movements into the future.
4.5 Possibilities or absence of democratic mediation 
The case studies reveal a significant lack of democratic mediation 
between state and civil society, due to the generally weak case of civil 
society, but also to the express lack of progressive, pro-poor organisations 
independent of the ruling alliance and thus willing to challenge the 
government. There are a few exceptions, such as Abahlali base Mjondolo 
as noted in the eThekwini case study, but to date these have not been 
common. A key reason for this gap is not just the ANC’s firm grip on 
power, but also the fact that a good deal of the internal governance 
structures of the ANC were linked to the existing popular social 
movement that led the anti-apartheid struggle in the country during 
the 1980s, the United Democratic Front (UDF). The dismantling of the 
UDF in 1990 has seen the absorption of key leadership and organisations 
into the ANC, which is now increasingly a political party rather than 
a social movement. This development has left a significant vacuum in 
civil society organisation. 
Add to this the overwhelming grip on power of the ANC and its 
allies, plus the forms of elite capture of local participatory institutions, 
and it is not hard to understand the lack of independent, popular 
organisations capable of democratic mediation. But the enduring 
unhappiness with the performance of government (and local government 
in particular) when it comes to the delivery of public goods means that 
the conditions for independent organisations to arise still exist. Hence, 
many of the conditions for the emergence of organisations capable of 
democratic mediation exist. This possibility is confirmed by the freedom 
and self-belief manifest in the many militant protest marches seen over 
the last ten years. What seems to be lacking is a class of leadership that 
is large enough and sufficiently independent from the ruling alliance. 
Without this, much of the protest action seen will remain reactive, 
parochial and often reactionary, as demonstrated by the xenophobic 
attacks of 2008. 
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4.6 Dynamics of interaction between the state and popular 
mobilisation
The case studies offer significant evidence confirming the notion of a 
negative dialectic between state and society, in which an authoritarian 
(if well-meaning) state implements its vision of local development 
while remaining largely deaf to the voices of local communities. As 
stated above, this prompts frustrated residents to turn to militant 
protest which is often very parochial, reactive and sometimes very 
conservative, as illustrated by the xenophobic attacks of 2008. Having not 
heard residents properly in the first place, the state typically responds 
to protest with surprise and defensiveness – and sometimes coercion 
– all of which reinforces the negative dynamic. Occasionally the state 
does yield to demands and provides more ‘service delivery’; hence the 
belief that protest brings results. But even this service delivery tends to 
be unilaterally conceived and implemented, and thus runs the risk of 
frustrating communities even further. 
This is precisely the sort of context in which a popularly rooted 
social movement – independent of the ruling elite, but sharing its 
general ideological vision – could intervene to transform local protest 
into a more constructive and progressive political project, which has the 
sophistication of strategy to engage the state in real dialogue as well as 
with protest. Indeed, as shown by the examples of the TAC and others, 
it is this ability to combine ‘walk’ (protest) with ‘talk’ that is able to 
secure the state’s respect and even change its mind. This is the kind of 
democratic mediation that is required, but which the case studies suggest 
is still missing. The absorption of the anti-apartheid social movement 
into the new ruling elite might explain this, but it also means that the 
prospects for democratic mediation remain distant. What South Africa 
really needs to transform state-society relations is a balancing of power 
between organisations on either side of the relationship. Until the 
power of the ruling alliance is weakened by a split and/or new social 
movements independent of the ruling alliance emerge in civil society, 
it is hard to see how the negative dialectic between state and society – 
and especially between the local state and poor communities – will be 
overcome.
4.7 Progressive democratisation or reversal and polarisation 
If one considers South Africa’s history over the long term, and the fact 
that democracy is just 15 years old, then it is clear that we have made 
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much progress towards a more democratic order, especially at local 
government level. For the first time the whole country – and the entire 
population – has elected leadership at the local level, and almost all 
political parties are committed (at least on paper) to the economic and 
social development of all South Africans. Recent years have seen the 
introduction of new participatory institutions at local level which promise 
the greater deliberative empowerment of communities. However, the 
very same period has seen increasing levels of protest regarding the 
poor functioning of local government – especially about the delivery of 
key public goods, but also about corruption. While the possibility and 
presence of protest is a sign that local communities will not acquiesce to 
poor treatment, the above analysis suggests that the dynamic is largely 
a negative one, in which unresponsive governance begets militant 
reaction, and the lack of independent and progressive social movements 
undermines the possibilities for democratic mediation between the hard-
of-hearing and those struggling to express themselves. 
Whether this negative dialectic will transform into a positive 
one is hard to assess; however, there are some positive signs on both 
sides of the state-society relationship. First, the state does seem to be 
slowly recognising that militant protest is genuinely rooted in popular 
frustration rather than some kind of third force conspiracy, as was 
suggested initially. Furthermore, national government seems interested 
in improving the functioning of new participatory institutions such as 
ward committees, and processes of public consultation. Second, on the 
side of civil society there is clear evidence of significant levels of social 
capital and very local forms of popular organisation, which could form 
the basis of future social movements. In addition, most South Africans 
value their political liberties and still believe they can act on them, which 
is also positive. However, it is important not to be too sanguine about 
this. Much popular action is reaction, drawing on harmful prejudices 
about gender, sexuality, ethnicity and national identity. If and when new, 
progressive social movements do arise, they will have as much work 
to do in transforming local consciousness as in successfully engaging 
the state. The future of local democracy thus relies significantly on the 
growth of democratic mediators, able to both root themselves in poor 
and marginalised communities and also to transform them in more 
democratic directions.
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Conclusion5. 
This chapter argues that contemporary state-society relations in 
South Africa are characterised by a well-meaning and legitimate but 
authoritarian state, implementing its vision in a way that is largely deaf 
to the express needs of many communities. This is despite the existence of 
new instruments of public participation, mostly at local governance level, 
which tend to be bypassed by communities in favour of the more effective 
methods of mobilisation and protest. This systematic miscommunication 
between the post-apartheid state and its people also reveals the relative 
lack of democratic social movements able to mediate between state and 
society in order to enhance service delivery and local empowerment. 
Understanding current state-society relations requires understanding 
the asymmetrical power relations between the state and society. The state 
is underwritten by a tremendously popular ruling party in electoral 
terms; but also in ideological terms, given that the ANC was the leading 
anti-apartheid liberation movement, and is the ‘natural political home’ 
of the black majority. The power of party elites is further reinforced by 
the top-down logic of the proportional representation, party-list electoral 
system. In addition, the administrative bureaucratic elite are either old 
apartheid officials, typically indifferent or antagonistic to the needs of 
the majority, or new and inexperienced officials, many of whom have 
inherited the dismissive attitudes of the old, or who treat public service 
primarily as a rent-seeking opportunity. Hence, new institutions, history 
and identity politics coincide in favour of both state power and state 
indifference to popular demand. 
Society’s problem is primarily one of organisation rather than 
popular attitude. It is clear from survey evidence and the ongoing and 
increasing popular protest against poor local governance that citizens 
feel both entitled to key rights and confident enough to demand them. 
Indeed, the evidence suggests that citizens tend to resort to protest only 
after trying other more constructive channels of engagement with the 
local state. However, what does seem to be missing is the plethora of 
democratic social movements for broadening initiative beyond the local 
area, and broadening demands beyond a specific complaint; and also 
for challenging the social conservatism of many communities, most 
clearly evidenced by ongoing xenophobic attacks. To a large extent this 
organisational gap is explicable in the transformation of the ANC and 
its allies from a social movement into the ruling party, and the vacuum 
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this left in civil society leadership in social movement organisations 
such as SANCO in particular. It also reflects the enormous legitimacy 
the ANC continues to enjoy, and the fact that many prefer to contest 
governance issues through the ANC, as manifested in the new, populist 
politics in the party which, for example, underwrote President Zuma’s 
rise to power.
In many ways South African state-society relations remain 
paradoxically shaped by apartheid-era politics, and these traditions 
have undermined rather than reinforced the new political opportunities 
opened up by institutional reform in local governance in general and 
by new forms of public participation in particular. At the same time, 
these traditions have left a population with sufficient expectations and 
political agency to challenge the new state indifference, resulting in 
tremendous potential for revitalising social organisation into forms that 
effectively challenge the state to become more genuinely responsive to 
societal demands. 
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1 An Afrikaans word which literally means ‘apartness’.
2 ‘Black’ here is used to refer to three of the race groups distinguished 
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